Hodges v. Indiana Mills & Mfg , 474 F.3d 188 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 27, 2006
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
Nos. 04-41362, 04-41764, 05-40686
JAMES EDWIN HODGES; BEVERLY HODGES,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross Appellants,
versus
MACK TRUCKS INC.,
Defendant-Appellant, Cross Appellee,
JAMES EDWIN HODGES; BEVERLY HODGES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
INDIANA MILLS & MANUFACTURING INC., ET AL,
Defendants,
MACK TRUCKS INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
JAMES EDWIN HODGES; BEVERLY HODGES,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
INDIANA MILLS & MANUFACTURING; ET AL,
Defendants,
ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM INC.,
Intervenor-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(2:03-CV-183)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
These three appeals arise out of a product-liability,
diversity action for injuries sustained because of a secondary
collision in Texas, involving a tractor-trailer manufactured by
Mack Trucks, Inc. (Mack). Mack seeks judgment as a matter of law
and, in the alternative, a new trial, claiming, inter alia, the
district court improperly both admitted expert testimony and
excluded evidence concerning the use, or nonuse, of his seatbelt by
James Hodges (Hodges), the injured driver of the truck. Hodges
received a multi-million dollar verdict. He and his wife, Beverly
Hodges (the Hodges), contest her not also being awarded damages and
seek a new trial on that issue. Finally, ABF Freight Systems, Inc.
(ABF), Hodges’ employer and workers’-compensation provider,
challenges the district court’s rulings on its subrogation claim.
A new trial and ABF’s claim’s being reconsidered are required.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
I.
On 1 November 2002, a 16-year-old drove her vehicle into the
path of an oncoming Mack truck, driven by Hodges, a 34-year veteran
driver of large trucks. His cab was pulling two trailers, and the
other vehicle hit the right front wheel of Hodges’ truck, causing
extensive damage. The truck swerved into the path of an oncoming
car, breached a guard rail, and jack-knifed down an embankment. It
came to rest with the nose of the tractor pointed up; the
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passenger-side door was damaged but the door frame and the cab were
not deformed.
Hodges was ejected through the passenger side and sustained
severe and permanent injuries, including paraplegia. (It is
undisputed that, had he remained in the cab, his injuries would
have been far less serious.) ABF, Hodges’ employer, was self-
insured and began paying Hodges workers’ compensation.
ABF owned the truck. Its seatbelts were manufactured by
Indiana Mills & Manufacturing (Indiana Mills). Its door latches,
manufactured by KSR International, were installed by Mack.
In May 2003, the Hodges filed this action against Indiana
Mills and Mack, claiming a design defect in the seatbelt caused
Hodges to be ejected. (The Hodges had settled with the 16-year-old
driver for $50,000.) In early 2004, the Hodges added a design-
defect claim for the passenger-side door latch, asserting the
defect caused the latch to fail after Hodges’ truck was hit. That
June, ABF intervened to protect its subrogation interests in
workers’ compensation paid to Hodges.
Prior to trial, Mack repeatedly, and unsuccessfully,
challenged some of the Hodges’ proposed expert witnesses being
permitted to testify. Notwithstanding the district judge’s
concomitant extensive involvement and knowledge about the issues,
the case was reassigned approximately two weeks before trial
3
commenced on 23 August 2004. (Jury selection was during the week
of 16 August.)
On 14 August, Indiana Mills settled with the Hodges on the
seatbelt claim for $1.4 million. The settlement structure provided
for James and Beverly Hodges to each receive half of the settlement
amount. Accordingly, only the defective-door-latch issue remained
for trial, with Mack as the sole defendant.
On the eve of trial, as a result of that settlement, the
Hodges moved to exclude all evidence of Hodges’ use, or nonuse, of
his seatbelt, pursuant to § 545.413(g) of the Texas Transportation
Code, claiming the statute proscribed introducing such evidence in
civil trials (seatbelt evidence). The motion was granted without
written reasons being given.
During trial, the Hodges introduced expert testimony by Steven
Syson. He testified: the door latch failed; and there was a safer
alternative design available that would have substantially reduced
the likelihood of Hodges’ injuries. Mack’s pretrial motions to
exclude this testimony had been denied.
On 26 August, following approximately two and one-half days of
testimony, the jury returned its verdict, finding Mack and the 16-
year-old driver 60% and 40% liable, respectively, for Hodges’
injuries. It awarded $7.9 million in damages, but awarded the
entire amount to Hodges. In short, the jury awarded Beverly Hodges
no damages for loss of household services and consortium.
4
That September, Mack moved for judgment as a matter of law (as
it had done during trial) and, in the alternative, a new trial.
The Hodges moved for a new trial on Beverly Hodges’ damages claim.
That November, the court denied those motions, without providing
written reasons.
In October, Indiana Mills had interpled its $1.4 million in
settlement funds into the court’s registry. As noted, under the
agreed settlement terms, James and Beverly Hodges were to each
receive $700,000. ABF claimed it was entitled to the entire
amount, not just the $700,000 Hodges was to receive, for workers’
compensation it had paid, as well as would pay in the future. That
December, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the
funds’ disbursement. Among other rulings, it denied ABF’s request
for reapportionment of the settlement amount, holding, inter alia,
the intent of the settlement scheme was not to deprive ABF of its
rights to subrogation or future credit. The funds have been
disbursed.
II.
For this diversity-jurisdiction action, arising out of an
accident in Texas, its substantive law applies. Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). At issue is whether the district
court erred in: (1) admitting Syson’s expert testimony; (2)
denying Mack judgment as a matter of law (JML); (3) excluding the
seatbelt evidence; (4) failing to grant a new trial on Beverly
5
Hodges’ damages; (5) approving the apportionment of the Indiana
Mills settlement amounts between the Hodges; and (6) assessing
attorney fees and litigation expenses out of ABF’s subrogation
recovery and calculating its right to future credit.
We hold, inter alia: JML was properly denied; the court
reversibly erred, however, by excluding the seatbelt evidence; and,
therefore, a new trial is required. Accordingly, we need not
address Beverly Hodges’ damages claim, nor fully address ABF’s
claims. ABF’s claims are remanded to the district court for it,
inter alia, to consider whether the effect of the settlement was to
settle around ABF’s subrogation lien.
A.
Mack maintains: Syson’s testimony should have been excluded,
pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
593-95 (1993); and, even if admissible, it failed, as a matter of
law, to prove the requisite safer alternative design for the Mack
door latch. Therefore, Mack contends judgment should be rendered
in its favor. In the alternative, it seeks a new trial. (In a
footnote to its opening brief, Mack also addresses the testimony of
the Hodges’ accident-reconstruction expert, stating it should have
also been excluded under Daubert. It is unclear whether Mack
presents this as an issue for appeal. In any event, because we
reverse based on the district court’s exclusion of the seatbelt
evidence, it is not necessary to address that expert’s testimony.)
6
JML is proper when “a party has been fully heard on an issue
during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for
that party on that issue ... ”. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (as amended
effective 1 Dec. 2006); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (as amended
effective 1 Dec. 2006) (post-trial JML). An appellate court, in
deciding whether JML should have been awarded, must first excise
inadmissible evidence; such evidence “contributes nothing to a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis”. Weisgram v. Marley, 528
U.S. 440, 454 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, we
first address the contested admission of Syson’s testimony.
(Obviously, in deciding whether JML should be awarded Mack, the
seatbelt evidence is not in play because it was excluded, not
admitted. Instead, it comes into play in deciding whether, in the
alternative, Mack is entitled to a new trial.)
1.
The admission of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. E.g., Stolt Achievement, Ltd. v. Dredge B.E. Lindholm,
447 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2006). “District courts enjoy wide
latitude in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and
the discretion of the trial judge and his or her decision will not
be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous.” Watkins v.
Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal
citations and quotations omitted; emphasis added).
7
Daubert interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702
(admissibility of expert testimony) and assigned the trial court a
gatekeeper role to ensure such testimony is both reliable and
relevant. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598. In determining whether the
proferred testimony is reliable, the district court must first
“assess[] ... whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid”. Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc.,
174 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1999). The court should “make certain
that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies
or personal experiences, employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field”. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
152 (1999).
Rule 702 was amended in 2000, in response to the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Daubert and Kumho Tire. See Advisory
Committee Notes on FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000 Amendments). A party
seeking to introduce expert testimony must show “(1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case”. FED. R. EVID. 702.
In analyzing the Mack latch at issue, Syson: reviewed
relevant Mack cab and door designs; examined numerous patents for
latches and door designs in order to provide a safer alternative
8
design; directed a third-party engineering firm to conduct force
tests on the Mack latch; and analyzed the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards (FMVSS) data published by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration to determine the strength of the Mack
latch as compared to an alternate design. (In addition, he
calculated the deformation to the Mack cab door frame and its
effect on the Mack latch in order to analyze Mack’s theory
concerning Hodges’ injuries — that, after Hodges was outside the
cab, his body somehow opened the passenger door. Mack abandoned
this theory during oral argument here.)
Mack challenges Syson’s testimony as unreliable for a number
of reasons, including: he is not a door-latch specialist; he was
previously found to be an unreliable expert witness by a Texas
court; he has not published any peer-reviewed articles purporting
to show the weaknesses in the Mack latch; and he did not conduct
his own tests or force calculations on the latches, but instead
relied upon third-party testing.
Of course, whether a proposed expert should be permitted to
testify is case, and fact, specific. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at
150-51. Trial judges retain “broad latitude” both in deciding how
to determine whether an expert’s testimony is reliable, and
ultimately, whether the testimony is, in fact, reliable. Id. at
142. Syson, an engineer with many years experience working in, and
testifying against, the automobile industry, presented very complex
9
and technical testimony about the Mack latch and how it failed. He
opined: Hodges was injured because Mack’s passenger-side door
latch failed (Mack does not dispute the latch failed at some
point); and a safer alternative design existed which would not have
broken and, thus, would have prevented Hodges’ injuries.
As discussed, Mack and Indiana Mills filed numerous Daubert
motions prior to trial challenging some of the Hodges’ experts. A
magistrate judge held hearings on evidentiary matters and
questioned counsel in detail. Mack’s challenge to the magistrate
judge’s ruling was considered, and denied, by the district judge
then assigned to the case. A month before trial, that judge denied
additional Daubert motions concerning Syson and the Hodges’
accident-reconstruction expert.
At trial, many of Mack’s challenges to Syson’s testimony were
developed by its cross-examination of him; the judge and jury were
able to determine his credibility. The trial (second) judge denied
Mack’s renewed request to exclude that testimony and denied Mack’s
two JML requests during trial based in part on that challenge.
(During Syson’s extensive testimony, despite Mack’s numerous
challenges to the bases for it, it objected only once. Along that
line, the Hodges’ counsel continuously asked Syson extremely
leading questions.)
Based on our review of the record, and as reflected infra, it
was not manifestly erroneous for the district court to find Syson’s
10
testimony relevant and reliable. Therefore, it did not err in
admitting it pursuant to Rule 702.
2.
As noted, Mack next contends: even if Syson’s testimony was
properly admitted, Mack should be awarded JML because the testimony
failed to prove the existence of a safer alternative design. Mack
preserved this issue by moving for JML at the close of the Hodges’
evidence, at the close of all the evidence, and post-trial.
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 980,
986 (2006) (holding appellate court cannot review JML claim unless
JML requested both pre- and post-trial); FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (pre-
2006 Amendments); see also Advisory Committee Notes on FED. R. CIV.
P. 50(b) (2006 Amendments). (In this regard, Mack’s extremely
brief and conclusory JML motion at the close of the Hodges’ case
was, at best, barely sufficient. To make matters worse, Mack
simply “renew[ed] it on the same points” at the close of the
evidence. Although we conclude dubitante that Mack preserved the
alternate-design issue for appeal, issues presented in such a
perfunctory manner run the risk of being forfeited. See, e.g.,
Bridas S.A.I.P.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 356 n.7 (5th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1083 (1993).)
A JML motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict. E.g., Ford v. Cimarron Ins. Co., 230 F.3d
11
828, 830 (5th Cir. 2000). Our review is de novo, using the same
standard as the district court. E.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Pendleton Detectives of Miss., Inc., 182 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 1999).
In reviewing the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in the
non-movant’s favor, and “disregard all evidence favorable to the
moving party that the jury is not required to believe”. Green v.
Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 653 (5th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation omitted).
To establish a design-defect claim under Texas law, the
following must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
a safer alternative design existed; and (2) the design defect
caused the injury. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 82.005. A safer
alternative design is
a product design other than the one actually
used that in reasonable probability
(1) would have prevented or significantly
reduced the risk of the claimant’s personal
injury ... without substantially impairing the
product’s utility; and
(2) was economically and technologically
feasible at the time the product left the
control of the manufacturer or seller by the
application of existing or reasonably
achievable scientific knowledge.
Id. § 82.005.
A design is not a safer alternative if, “under other
circumstances, [it would] impose an equal or greater risk of harm”
than the design at issue. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez,
977 S.W.2d 328, 337 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1040
12
(1999); see Costilla v. Crown Equip. Corp. D/B/A Crown Lift Trucks
Co., 148 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. App. 2004). Similarly, the
plaintiff must show “the safety benefits from [the] proposed design
are foreseeably greater than the resulting costs, including any
diminished usefulness or diminished safety”. Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d
at 337; see also Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 520
(5th Cir. 2001) (reversing verdict where plaintiff “conceded ... he
made no risk-benefit analysis, including what additional hazards”
his new design would have caused).
Mack relies upon Louisville Ladder, which concerned whether an
extension ladder’s cable-hook assembly mechanism was defective.
Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515. As reflected above, our court
held: the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony was insufficient to
establish a safer alternative design; and, therefore, as a matter
of Texas law, the plaintiff was unable to prove the ladder was
defective. Id. at 520. The action at hand, however, differs. In
Louisville Ladder, the expert testified that the proposed design
“was a preliminary concept” not currently in use and “not ready to
[be] recommend[ed] [] to a manufacturer”. Id. at 519. Moreover,
as noted supra, the expert never evaluated the risk associated with
the proposed design and did not conduct a risk-benefit analysis.
Id. Ultimately, he was unable to opine whether the proposed
alternative would have prevented the injury in question. Id.
13
Unlike the expert’s testimony in Louisville Ladder, Syson’s
was not mere speculation. Instead, he described in detail the
latch at issue and how, and why, the proposed alternative latch
would be safer. Syson examined several hundred door-latch patents
on file with the Patent and Trademark Office to determine whether
suitable alternative designs existed. When he found possible
alternative designs, he examined how they performed compared to the
Mack latch in the FMVSS-206 test, which examines the maximum
longitudinal and transverse forces a door latch will maintain
before it breaks. Based on that information and an analysis of the
accident, Syson calculated the maximum amount of force required
before deformation of the Mack latch would break it.
Syson concluded: the door latch used by Mack was defective;
and another latch, the Eberhard latch, was a safer alternative and
would have prevented Hodges’ injuries. Among other things, Syson
noted the Eberhard latch is 25% thicker at the stress point and
provides 12,000 pounds of additional holding strength compared to
the Mack latch, all factors that, in his opinion, would have
prevented it from breaking in the accident.
Syson also testified that, based on his review of the above-
discussed FMVSS-206 tests, Mack’s latch was weaker than the latches
used by 75 to 80% of similar vehicles. Based on his experience
working with, and designing, parts for vehicles, Syson testified it
would be easy, and inexpensive, for Mack to switch to the Eberhard
14
latch. Along that line, he noted that, at the time of the
accident, the Eberhard latch existed and was used in fire trucks.
Syson also conducted the requisite risk-utility analysis. He
testified: a driver faces a significant risk if a door opens
during an accident; engineers do not, and cannot, design for one
particular accident; and the Eberhard latch would not impair the
door’s usefulness. In other words, part of a latch’s utility is
its ability to keep a door shut during a vehicle crash and using
the Eberhard latch would not diminish the door’s utility.
Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Syson’s
testimony satisfied the requisite risk-utility test.
Syson provided the analysis required to allow the Hodges’ to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that, under Texas
law, a safer alternative design existed. See GMC v. Sanchez, 997
S.W.2d 584, 591-92 (Tex. 1999) (holding that more than a “bald
assertion” that the alternative design is safer is required).
Based upon his testimony, and drawing all reasonable inferences in
the non-movant’s favor, the evidence was sufficient to support the
verdict. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying
JML to Mack.
B.
Concerning Mack’s contesting the seatbelt-evidence exclusion,
Texas began mandating seatbelt use in 1985. See Act of 15 June
1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 804, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6062
15
(Vernon 1985) (current version at TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413
(Vernon 2006)). A person greater than 15 years of age is guilty of
a traffic violation if he or she “is riding in the front seat of a
passenger car while the vehicle is being operated ... and ... is
not secured by a safety belt”. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.413(a). The
statute provides defenses for failure to wear a seatbelt,
including, inter alia, a medical reason evidenced by a doctor’s
note. Id. at § 545.413(e)(1).
Pertinent to this issue, subsection (g) of § 545.413
provided: “Use or nonuse of a safety belt is not admissible
evidence in a civil trial, other than a proceeding under Subtitle
A or B, Title 5, Family Code”. Id. at § 545.413(g) (subsection
(g)) (emphasis added). In 2003, however, the Texas legislature
repealed subsection (g). See Acts 11 June 2003, 78th Leg., ch.
204, § 8.01, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 863 (Vernon 2003). In doing
so, the legislature specified: subsection (g) is not applicable to
“action[s] filed on or after July 1, 2003. [But a]n action filed
before July 1, 2003, is governed by the law in effect immediately
before the change in law ... and that law is continued in effect
for that purpose.” Acts 11 June 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204, §
23.02(c), 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 898 (Vernon 2003).
As noted, this action was filed in May 2003, a few weeks
before the 1 July 2003 effective date for the repeal of subsection
(g). In other words, its repeal is not applicable to this action.
16
Accordingly, Texas statutory law proscribed the use of seatbelt
evidence.
Nevertheless, Mack contends such evidence should be admitted
because this action involves a secondary, not a primary, collision.
(A primary collision concerns injuries sustained in the collision
with another vehicle; a secondary collision concerns enhanced
injuries caused by a collision with the interior of the vehicle or
with an exterior object, if ejected.) This interpretation, Mack
claims, is in line with a Texas Court of Appeals decision that
seatbelt evidence is admissible in secondary-collision cases. See
Vasquez v. Hyundai Motor Co., 119 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App. 2003) (en
banc).
Mack notes subsection (g) was repealed only approximately one
month after the Hodges filed this action and well before they added
the defective-door-latch claim. At the time of trial on that
claim, according to Mack, the intent of the Texas legislature was
to allow seatbelt evidence, particularly in a crashworthiness
action such as this. (Crashworthiness involves a claim that a
defect in the automobile caused the plaintiff’s injuries, rather
than the underlying accident causing them.) According to Mack,
without seatbelt evidence, the jury received a distorted view of
the evidence, especially in the light of the Hodges’ counsel’s
telling the jury: Hodges was ejected from the truck solely due to
17
the defective door latch; and he did nothing to contribute to his
injuries.
In addition, Mack also claims this circuit has affirmed the
introduction of such evidence under other States’ laws, despite
statutory prohibition. Hermann v. GM Corp., 720 F.2d 414 (5th Cir.
1983) (Louisiana law). Finally, Mack insists it is sound public
policy to permit such evidence because federal law mandates truck
drivers’ wearing seatbelts.
Noting that, when they filed this action, subsection (g) was
effective, and remained effective for all actions filed prior to 1
July 2003, the Hodges contend the district court properly excluded
the seatbelt evidence because subsection (g) and Texas case law
mandate its prohibition. They maintain: under Texas law, seatbelt
evidence is admissible only under one rare exception — where the
plaintiff makes a product-liability claim against a seatbelt
manufacturer alleging a defective restraint system and must
introduce evidence of his seatbelt use to prove causation. See
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134-35
(Tex. 1994). During trial, the district court stated it had based
its eve-of-trial exclusion ruling on a similar understanding of
Texas law: it provided only “one statutory exception” to the
seatbelt-evidence prohibition; and, unless that exception was met,
neither side could offer Hodges’ use or nonuse of his seatbelt.
18
In addition, the Hodges claim: had the district court allowed
seatbelt evidence, they would have offered “substantial evidence”
that Hodges was belted at the time of the accident. In that
regard, prior to settlement of the seatbelt claim, they contended
the seatbelt was defective because it became unlatched during the
accident.
The Hodges also insist Mack did not make the required proffer
of its seatbelt evidence after it was excluded. See FED. R. EVID.
103(a)(2). Mack did, however, do so at trial: an investigating
officer at the scene of the accident would have testified that
Hodges was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident.
For their final response, the Hodges dispute, on two bases,
Mack’s claim that subsection (g) is not applicable for secondary-
collision actions. First, the statute’s plain language does not
support such an interpretation. Second, the statement in Vasquez
that such evidence was never intended to be excluded for secondary
collisions is dicta, found in a footnote no less.
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
E.g., United States v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 774 (5th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1405 (2006); see FED. R. EVID. 103. A
trial court “abuses its discretion if, inter alia, it bases its
decision on an error of law”. United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d
483, 486-87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 713 (2005). “If
this court finds an abuse of discretion in admitting or excluding
19
evidence, this court will review the error under the harmless error
doctrine, affirming the judgment, unless the ruling affected
substantial rights of the complaining party.” Ragsdale, 426 F.3d
at 774-75 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see FED.
R. EVID. 103(a).
Subsection (g) is substantive, rather than procedural. See,
e.g., Milbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 601, 604
(E.D. Tex. 2000) (§ 545.413(g) is a substantive law because it
falls under the Texas Transportation Code and is part of the same
section mandating seatbelt use). Accordingly, we apply Texas law
in interpreting it. In doing so, we first determine whether it is
clear and unambiguous. See Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d at 133. If it
is unclear, we determine “whether ... any final decisions of the
[Texas] Supreme Court are dispositive”. Centennial Ins. Co. v.
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 149 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 1998). If no
final disposition is directly on point, we must make an “Erie-
guess”, predicting how that court would rule. Id.; see also Am.
Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. 1906 Co., 129 F.3d 802, 807 (5th Cir.
1997). We make our forecast based on
(1) decisions of the [Texas] Supreme Court in
analogous cases, (2) the rationales and
analyses underlying [Texas] Supreme Court
decisions on related issues, (3) dicta by the
[Texas] Supreme Court, (4) lower state court
decisions, (5) the general rule on the
question, (6) the rulings of courts of other
states to which [Texas] courts look when
formulating substantive law and (7) other
20
available sources, such as treatises and legal
commentaries.
Centennial Ins. Co., 149 F.3d at 382.
Texas law mandates drivers wear a seat belt. The statute “was
enacted to mandate the use of seat belts and to provide a criminal
penalty for the failure to wear [one]”. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d at
134. The use, or nonuse, of a seatbelt’s not being allowed in
evidence in a civil trial was “to make clear that the sole legal
sanction for the failure to wear a seatbelt [was] the criminal
penalty provided by the statute and that the failure could not be
used against the injured person in a civil trial”. Id. As
discussed infra, however, the Texas Supreme Court noted in Glyn-
Jones: when viewed in the context of the entire statute, there is
“ambiguity about the legislature’s purpose”; this is because the
seatbelt-evidence prohibition for civil trials falls within the
criminal penalties of the Texas Transportation Code, see id. at
133-34, an unlikely place for a provision that has been read to
have such an expansive scope.
In the light of that ambiguity, we look to Texas Supreme Court
decisions in analogous cases to determine the admissibility of
seatbelt evidence. In Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.
1986), the Texas Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility of
seatbelt evidence under subsection (g). Pool claimed a defective
U-bolt in his automobile’s suspension system failed, causing an
21
accident. Ford maintained Pool was contributorily negligent for
not wearing his seatbelt. The court held: as a matter of law,
plaintiffs “should not have the damages awarded to them reduced or
mitigated because of their failure to wear available seat belts”.
Id. at 633 (internal citations and quotations omitted). It noted
that the enactment of subsection (g) was a ratification of a prior
Texas Supreme Court decision, Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116
(Tex. 1974), and held: “[F]ailure to wear a seat belt is not any
evidence of contributory negligence”. Id. (emphasis added).
In 1994, however, in Glyn-Jones, the Texas Supreme Court
created an exception to the strictures of subsection (g). Glyn-
Jones claimed her seatbelt and shoulder harness had been
defectively designed and/or manufactured. 878 S.W.2d at 133. A
motion for summary judgement against the claim was based on the
assertion that, under subsection (g), Glyn-Jones could not
introduce evidence she was wearing her seatbelt at the time of the
accident. Under this theory, however, as a matter of law, the
claimant could not prove the essential element of causation. The
trial court granted summary judgment. Id. at 134.
In the intermediate appellate court, Glyn-Jones “contend[ed]
that the prohibition against the use of seat belt evidence [did]
not apply to products liability cases involving the crashworthiness
of an automobile. Alternatively, she argue[d] that the statute
violate[d] the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution.”
22
Glyn-Jones v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 640, 642
(Tex. App. 1993) (emphasis added). As had the trial court, the
intermediate appellate court, held subsection (g) proscribed
admission of such evidence. Id. It did so on concluding
subsection (g) is unambiguous and “does not differentiate between
negligence actions and products liability cases”. Id.
On the other hand, relief was granted under the open-courts
provision of the Texas Constitution because subsection (g) “is
arbitrary and unreasonable insofar as it prohibits the introduction
of seat belt evidence in a crashworthiness case”. Id. at 643-644
(emphasis added). Earlier, the court noted: Crashworthiness has
been a recognized cause of action in Texas since” it was adopted by
the Texas Supreme Court in 1979. Id. at 643. Moreover, subsection
(g) “unreasonably denie[d] Glyn-Jones ... redress for [her]
injuries”. Id at 644. Therefore, subsection (g) “violate[d] the
open courts provision of the Texas Constitution”. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate appellate
court, but did so on a statutory, not the constitutional, basis.
In beginning its analysis, it stated: “We must initially determine
whether [subsection (g)] actually precludes Glyn-Jones from
offering evidence that she used her seat belt in this case.
Because we conclude that the legislature did not intend to bar use
of such evidence, we need not reach the posed constitutional
question”. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d at 133 (emphasis added).
23
In construing subsection (g), the court stated it could not
apply the usual rules of construction just to that subsection but
instead had to view it in the light of the entire statute. Id. It
then stated: “While the context normally provides clarity ... here
it creates ambiguity about the legislature’s purpose”. Id.
Therefore, it ruled it had to look beyond the language in the
statute “to even determine the true purpose of the provision”. Id.
(emphasis in original).
Concerning subsection (g)’s proscription against seatbelt
evidence, the court stated the defendant
contends this sentence was intended to abolish
crashworthiness actions against manufacturers
of seatbelts. If the legislature did so
intend, it seems unlikely that it would
utilize a subsection of a traffic statute to
effect such a change. Instead, read in the
context of the entire statute, we hold that
the legislature did not intend [subsection
(g)] to preclude evidence necessary to a cause
of action against a seat belt manufacturer for
injuries allegedly caused by a defective
seatbelt.
Id. at 134 (emphasis added). As it had in Pool, the court further
stated that subsection (g) was not intended “to forge new ground in
tort law, but merely to preserve the status quo [under Carnation]”.
Id. That status quo, pursuant to Carnation, was a defendant’s not
being “permitted to introduce evidence of a plaintiff’s failure to
wear a seat belt as evidence of contributory negligence”. Id.
(emphasis added).
24
The dissent at 2 asserts “the Texas Supreme Court ... had an
excellent opportunity” in Glyn-Jones to adopt the “broad
crashworthiness exception” urged by Glyn-Jones in the intermediate
appellate court for such cases, but declined to do so. This
assertion overlooks the proper, narrow basis on which the Texas
Supreme Court decided Glyn-Jones. First, in deciding the case by
construing the statute, it was able to avoid the more broad, open-
courts constitutional basis on which the intermediate appellate
court decided the case. The Texas Supreme Court followed the
longstanding, prudential rule of not deciding constitutional issues
when the case can be resolved on another basis.
It was that open-courts constitutional basis, properly avoided
by the Texas Supreme Court, that involved the crashworthiness
doctrine that was well-settled law in Texas. And, in construing
the statute, the Texas Supreme Court properly limited its holding
to the case before it — a plaintiff’s right to introduce seatbelt
evidence in a product-liability action against the seatbelt
manufacturer.
The Texas Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Glyn-Jones
supports subsection (g)’s proscription not precluding the
introduction of seatbelt evidence in the case at hand by Mack, the
defendant. The Texas Supreme Court held the proscription did not
bar all use of such evidence. On the other hand, contrary to the
dissent’s analysis, the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion can not be
25
read as holding — or even suggesting — such evidence cannot be
introduced by a defendant, such as Mack.
In 2003, Vasquez reiterated the holding in Glyn-Jones that
subsection (g) was intended to preserve the status quo concerning
failure to wear a seatbelt not being contributory negligence. In
Vasquez, the parents of a child killed by a deploying air bag in an
automobile accident pursued a product-liability action against the
manufacturer on a crashworthiness theory. See Vasquez, 119 S.W.3d
at 850. Although the Texas Court of Appeals, en banc, decided the
case on other grounds, and therefore did not reach whether seatbelt
evidence should be allowed in civil trials, it nonetheless noted:
the statute was never intended to exclude evidence of seatbelt use
in “secondary collision” cases; as in Vasquez, where the
functionality of the passenger’s passive restraint system (which
included the seatbelt) is at issue, seatbelt evidence is relevant
to proving causation and the ultimate effectiveness of the
restraint system; and the manufacturer’s interest in offering
seatbelt evidence was not to mitigate the “product defendant’s
liability for damages, but [was] offered ... to support [its]
defense that the air bag, in conjunction with seatbelt use, was not
defective as designed”. Id. at 850, n.2. (emphasis added).
In discussing the above dicta in Vasquez, the dissent at 2
states the seatbelt evidence in that case, which would have been
offered by the defendant, was
26
arguably ... admissible under the Texas
Supreme Court’s exception in Glyn-Jones
because the plaintiff alleged that the air bag
component of the restraint system was
defective. The defendant argued that the air
bag, when used with a seatbelt, was not
defective. So whether the seatbelt was in use
was certainly closely related to the
plaintiff’s suit against the manufacturer of
the restraint system and even more relevant to
the air bag manufacturer’s defense.
Simply put, this concession that seatbelt evidence would be
“arguably admissible” in Vasquez demonstrates why it is admissible
here.
Just as the seatbelt and air bag were part of the restraint
system in Vasquez, so are a seatbelt and door latch each part of
the restraint system here. As noted, it is undisputed that, had
Hodges remained in the cab, his injuries, if any, would have been
far less severe. The seat belt and door latch are each part of the
system for keeping a driver in the truck’s cab in an accident.
In sum, Pool and Glyn-Jones, together with Vasquez, are
instructive. Subsection (g) prohibits the introduction of seatbelt
evidence to show the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. On
the other hand, in secondary—collision product-liability actions,
such evidence may be admissible to show, or, as in this action,
rebut, the essential element of causation. Seatbelt evidence was
necessary for Mack to rebut the essential element of causation —
whether its door latch was the proximate cause of Hodges’ injuries
— and, ultimately, to defeat a crashworthiness claim. Such
27
evidence is not prohibited by subsection (g). Arguably, this is
also demonstrated by the repeal of subsection (g), even though that
subsection applies here.
Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it
categorically excluded seatbelt evidence. Needless to say, this
error was not harmless. Therefore, a new trial is required.
C.
On several bases, ABF challenges the district court’s
disbursement of the settlement funds from Indiana Mills (the
seatbelt manufacturer). As noted, ABF, Hodges’ employer, is a
certified self-insured under Texas’ workers’-compensation laws. It
began paying such benefits to Hodges after the accident and
intervened in this action to protect its subrogation rights. At
the time it intervened, it had already paid Hodges over $500,000 in
benefits.
Post-trial, in November 2004, ABF moved for disbursement of
the $1.4 million settlement. That December, it moved for an
evidentiary hearing regarding its workers’-compensation lien,
attorney’s fees and expenses, and credit and offset against future
benefits. The hearing was held on 21 December. By order the next
day, without providing its reasons for doing so, the court
disbursed the settlement funds in the following amounts: ABF
received $187,709.67; James Hodges, $512,290.33; and Beverly
Hodges, $700,000.
28
1.
Texas law provides: “The net amount recovered by a claimant
in a third-party action shall be used to reimburse the insurance
carrier for benefits ... that have been paid for the compensable
injury”. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.002(a). According to the
pretrial settlement agreement between the Hodges and Indiana Mills,
$ 1.4 million was to be distributed equally between James and
Beverly Hodges. ABF claims that apportionment scheme improperly
reduced its reimbursement, pursuant to § 417.002(a), for past
benefits paid to Hodges.
“[T]he proper division of a settlement between beneficiaries
and non-beneficiaries presents an issue for the trier of fact based
on the relative merits and worth of the claims involved.” United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 918 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. App.
1996). Because the district court was the trier of fact in
apportioning the settlement, we review for clear error. FED. R.
CIV. P. 52(a).
Well-settled Texas law provides: a “workers’ compensation
carrier has a statutory right to reimbursement from the first
monies paid to an injured employee ... by a third-party tortfeasor,
up to the amount of compensation paid, and can recover the amount
from the employee or the third-party tortfeasor”. Hernandez, 918
S.W.2d at 578 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 417.001, 417.002);
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. 2002). An
29
injured employee does not have any right to receive payment from
that tortfeasor until the carrier has been paid in full. Tex.
Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v. Travis, 912 S.W.2d 895, 897-98 (Tex.
App. 1995). The carrier only has rights, however, “over that
portion of an award or settlement which represents ... a workers’
compensation beneficiary[’s interest]”. Hernandez, 918 S.W.2d at
579.
It is also well settled that “[t]he carrier’s right to reduce
its liability from a payment of a third-party must not be
compromised”. Id. at 578 (emphasis added). A trial court cannot
arbitrarily compromise this right by structuring the settlement “so
that a non-beneficiary recovers, but a beneficiary does not”. Id.
at 579.
Accordingly, at issue is whether the allocation of half of the
Indiana Mills settlement to Beverly Hodges, a non-beneficiary,
improperly compromised ABF’s subrogation rights. ABF contends: at
the evidentiary hearing, the district court erroneously imposed on
it the burden to show the settlement was an attempt to “settle
around” ABF’s lien; and, because, unlike her husband, the jury
found Beverly Hodges was not entitled to any damages, it was error
to approve a settlement scheme awarding her $700,000. The Hodges
respond: the court correctly found the settlement was not an
attempt to settle around ABF’s lien; and Beverly Hodges’ award of
$700,000 from the settlement was fair and reasonable.
30
Our review of the 21 December evidentiary-hearing record
reveals the district court did place an improper burden on ABF to
prove that, at settlement, the Hodges and Indiana Mills intended to
structure it to circumvent ABF’s lien. The court began the hearing
by stating: “I’m more interested in [whether] the settlement
agreements between the [Hodges and Indiana Mills were] an attempt
to settle around [ABF’s] worker’s compensation carrier’s lien”. It
then asked ABF: “What proof do you have that at the time that
settlement was made[, it] was an attempt to settle around [ABF’s]
lien?” When ABF responded that the court should look to the effect
of the apportionment, rather than the parties’ intent, the court
replied:
But, I’m trying to get at what you would tell
me that I can hang my hat on as a Judge to say
that I find as a fact, that the settlement
agreement at the time [it was] entered into
... was an attempt to settle around a worker’s
compensation lien, and [to] deny [ABF its]
rights to [its] full recovery of [its] lien?
(Emphasis added.)
The court’s inquiries regarding intent were misdirected.
Under Texas law, the effect of the apportionment, not the settling
parties’ intent at the time of settlement, is the controlling
factor when determining whether the settlement compromised ABF’s
lien. Hernandez, 918 S.W.2d at 579 (“[A settlement] is not binding
upon the carrier for purposes of recovery of its subrogation
interest, regardless of the settling parties’ intent, if the effect
31
of the apportionment is to circumvent the statute and to compromise
the carrier’s right to subrogation.” (emphasis added)); Travis,
912 S.W.2d at 898 (“It is not the intent of the apportionment, but
the effect of the apportionment, that is the determining factor.”
(emphasis added)).
Accordingly, on remand, the district court is to reconsider
the reasonableness and fairness of Beverly Hodges’ apportionment
amount by examining whether the effect of the settlement agreement
compromises ABF’s lien. This remand makes it unnecessary to
consider any of ABF’s remaining contentions on this appointment-of-
settlement point, including its assertion, for which it cites no
authority, that the verdict should control that apportionment.
2.
ABF also claims the district court erred in: (1) awarding the
Hodges’ counsel attorney’s fees out of ABF’s subrogation recovery;
(2) calculating the amount of litigation expenses to be deducted
from that recovery; and (3) calculating ABF’s right to future
credit. Such rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Buckland, 882 S.W.2d 440, 447
(Tex. App. 1994).
a.
As a certified self-insurer, ABF is an “[i]nsurance carrier”
(carrier) under the Texas workers’ compensation laws. TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN § 401.011(27)(B) (defining “carrier” to include “a certified
32
self-insurer for workers’ compensation insurance”). Section
417.003 of the Texas Labor Code provides for attorney’s fees for
representation of a carrier’s interest in a third-party action.
The district court awarded Hodges’ counsel attorney’s fees under
subsection (a) of that statute, which states:
An insurance carrier whose interest is not
actively represented by an attorney in a
third-party action shall pay a fee to an
attorney representing the claimant in the
amount agreed on between the attorney and the
insurance carrier. In the absence of an
agreement, the court shall award to the
attorney payable out of the insurance
carrier’s recovery:
(1) a reasonable fee for recovery of the
insurance carrier’s interest that may not
exceed one-third of the insurance
carrier’s recovery; and
(2) a proportionate share of expenses.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.003(a) (emphasis added).
To determine whether Hodges’ counsel is due such fees, we must
first decide whether ABF actively represented its own interest in
obtaining recovery from Mack and Indiana Mills. (ABF claims it
should have been awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to § 417.003(c)
(awarding attorney’s fees where carrier is actively represented).
In short, the applicability of subsection (c) versus subsection (a)
turns on whether ABF actively represented its own interests.) An
attorney engages in active representation in a third-party action
by “tak[ing] steps, adequate when measured by the difficulty of the
case, toward prosecuting the claim”. Buckland, 882 S.W.2d at 447.
33
Active representation requires more than filing pleadings asserting
the carrier’s subrogation interest. See Hartford Ins. Co. v.
Branton & Mendelsohn, Inc., 670 S.W.2d 699, 702 (Tex. App. 1984).
Buckland affirmed the trial court’s finding the carrier’s
counsel did not “actively represent” its interest. Buckland, 882
S.W.2d at 447. The court noted the carrier filed only four papers
– “its plea in intervention, its amended plea in intervention, its
motion for summary judgment, and its motion for reconsideration and
motion for summary judgment seeking declaratory relief”. Id.
Although the carrier’s counsel reviewed the claimant’s compensation
file and provided a summary of his medical bills, it “did not
generate or send any written discovery or take any depositions in
the case”. Id. Furthermore, counsel did not: participate in the
hearings; assist in hiring experts; or share in any of the
litigation expenses. Id. Accordingly, the court held the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding the claimant’s attorney
one-third of the carrier’s subrogation recovery. Id.
On the other hand, Brandon v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 880 S.W.2d
488, 496 (Tex. App. 1994), affirmed the trial court’s finding the
carrier “actively participated” in obtaining its recovery. There,
its counsel played an active role by, inter alia: attending
depositions and responding to time-consuming discovery requests;
arranging for evidence to be examined by various experts; and
ultimately reaching a settlement agreement before trial with the
34
defendant as to its subrogation claim. Id. (“[T]he controlling
factor is not who aided in [plaintiff’s] recovery, but rather who
aided in [the carrier’s] recovery.”).
ABF claims it actively represented its own interest in
recovery by filing: a motion to intervene and brief in support,
pretrial disclosures, a complaint in intervention, and various
other motions and papers. Although it admits the Hodges’ counsel
took the lead in negotiating the settlement with Indiana Mills, ABF
points to its participation in two prior mediations, which it
contends ultimately culminated in the settlement. Finally, ABF
claims to have participated at trial by establishing the amount of
workers’-compensation benefits Hodges had received from ABF.
ABF did not intervene in this action until 15 June 2004, over
one year after it was filed and by which point a large portion of
the discovery had been completed and the 18 May 2004 Daubert
hearing had been held and ruled upon. ABF’s participation was
limited primarily to filing motions and briefs to protect its
subrogation interest. Although it claims to have established at
trial the amount of workers’-compensation benefits it had paid, the
record is void of any participation by ABF at trial. Rather, the
amount of ABF’s lien had been stipulated before trial. Finally,
ABF does not claim to have been present when the settlement
agreement between the Hodges and Indiana Mills was reached.
35
“By enacting section 417.003, the legislature intended to
compensate claimants who perform work for the benefit of a
subrogated insurance carrier and to prohibit the worker’s
compensation carrier from obtaining a ‘free ride’ from the efforts
of the claimant’s attorney.” Caesar v. Bohacek, 176 S.W.3d 282,
285 (Tex. App. 2004) (internal citation omitted). ABF benefitted
from the efforts of the Hodges’ counsel. Therefore, the court did
not abuse its discretion in proceeding under § 417.003(a).
Likewise, it was not an abuse of discretion to charge ABF one-third
of those fees, as authorized by § 417.003(a). See Branton &
Mendelsohn, Inc., 670 S.W.2d at 704 (stating that, when determining
the amount of attorney’s fees owed by the insurer, the court
“should take into account the benefit to the insurer” (emphasis
added)).
b.
Pursuant to § 417.003(a), ABF also claims the district court
erred in calculating the amount of litigation expenses to be
deducted from its subrogation recovery. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §
417.003(a)(2) (authorizing a court to award “out of the insurance
carrier’s recovery ... a proportionate share of expenses”). In
calculating ABF’s proportionate share of expenses, the court
determined Hodges’ total recovery was the pretrial settlement
amount of $750,000, which reflects his settlements with Indiana
Mills and the 16-year-old driver. For that calculation, the
36
district court did not include the jury verdict for Hodges. Under
the district court’s calculations, ABF’s lien of $577,213.83 (for
its compensation payments to Hodges) comprised 76% of the total
$750,000 settlement amount; and, on that basis, ABF’s pro-rata
share of the litigation expenses was 76%.
ABF contends: had the court instead considered both the
settlement and the judgement against Mack, its proportional share
of litigation expenses would be much lower. Restated, ABF claims
the judgment against Mack should have been considered, along with
the pretrial settlement of $750,000. On that basis, it asserts its
lien of $577,213.83 would have comprised only a small percentage of
the total amount Hodges was to have recovered (prior to our
vacating the judgment).
On remand, when determining the total amount recovered by
Hodges for use in calculating ABF’s pro-rata share of Hodges’
litigation costs, the district court should consider any verdict.
For example, a substantial part of the Hodges’ litigation expenses,
which at the date of the Indiana Mills settlement totaled
$372,220.37, were expended not only in reaching a settlement with
Indiana Mills, but also in obtaining the now-vacated multi-million
dollar verdict against Mack. Indeed, Hodges’ counsel testified at
the 21 December ABF subrogation-claim evidentiary hearing that it
was impossible to separate the litigation expenses between the
37
claims against Mack and those against Indiana Mills, because “many
of the same experts work[ed] on both defects”.
Therefore, following the new trial, the district court is to
consider both the total pretrial settlement amount it determines on
remand is due Hodges and any verdict in determining ABF’s pro-rata
share of litigation expenses. In doing so, it is to state its
underlying reasons for that ruling.
c.
Finally, ABF contends the district court erred in calculating
its right to a future credit. As discussed, “[t]he net amount
recovered by a claimant in a third-party action shall be used to
reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits, including medical
benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury”. TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.002(a). Subsection (b) provides: “Any amount
recovered that exceeds the amount of reimbursement required [by §
417.002(a)] shall be treated as an advance against future benefits”
(future credit). Id. § 417.002(b).
The $1.4 million settlement, when combined with the verdict,
awarded benefits in excess of ABF’s subrogation lien at the time of
trial. ABF contests the district court’s calculation of credits,
pursuant to § 417.002(b), against future benefits it owes Hodges.
Needless to say, because we remand for new proceedings, we need not
decide this issue. On remand, for any future-credit allocation,
38
the district court is to state its underlying reasons for that
determination.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment as to Mack and the
order as to ABF’s subrogation amount are VACATED and this matter is
REMANDED for a new trial and other proceedings, all consistent with
this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
39
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Dissenting
I agree with the resolution of all the issues in the
majority’s well-written opinion except for its treatment of the
seat belt issue.
I start with the plain language of the Texas statute: “Use
or non-use of a safety belt is not admissible evidence in a civil
trial . . .” Tex. Transp. Code § 545.413(g). When we look to
Texas Supreme Court case law for exceptions to this broad rule,
we find only one narrowly drawn exception in a case brought by an
occupant of a vehicle against a seat belt manufacturer. The
seat belt manufacturer sought to exclude evidence proffered by
the plaintiff that she had her seat belt on. The Texas Supreme
Court held that: “the legislature did not intend section 107C(j)
to preclude evidence necessary to a cause of action against a
seat belt manufacturer for injuries allegedly caused by a
defective seat belt.” Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones,
878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 1994). When this case was before the
Texas Court of Intermediate Appeals, the plaintiff, Glyn-Jones,
argued that an exception should be made to the statute for crash-
worthiness cases and the court declined to adopt this broad
exception. Glyn-Jones v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 857 S.W.2d
640, 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). The Texas Supreme Court also
declined to adopt this broad exception. As a practical matter,
40
in crash-worthiness cases where an injured occupant of a vehicle
sues various manufacturers of component parts of the vehicle, the
exception to the statute created by the majority would allow the
evidence to be admitted in almost all crash-worthiness cases
because causation is invariably at issue. If the Texas Supreme
Court wanted to create such a broad exception, it had an
excellent opportunity to do so and declined the invitation.
Support for the exception to the non-admissibility of use or
non use of a seatbelt the majority creates rests entirely on
dicta in a footnote in a single intermediate Texas Court of
Appeals decision, Vasquez v. Hyundai Motor Co., 119 S.W.3d 848,
851 n. 2 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). For a number of reasons this is a
slender reed to support an exception to an exceedingly clear
statute. First, the Vasquez court expressly declined to reach
the admissibility of the seat belt evidence. Also, arguably, the
evidence was admissible under the Texas Supreme Court’s exception
in Glyn-Jones because the plaintiff alleged that the air bag
component of the restraint system was defective. The defendant
argued that the air bag, when used with a seatbelt, was not
defective. So whether the seatbelt was in use was certainly
closely related to the plaintiff’s suit against the manufacturer
of the restraint system and even more relevant to the air bag
manufacturer’s defense.
41
In short, the passing reference in the Vasquez decision is
not enough for me to avoid the plain language of the statute. I
see nothing about the dicta in this factually dissimilar case or
its reasoning that suggests that the Texas Supreme Court would
create such a broad exception, particularly since the Supreme
Court declined to do so when it had the opportunity.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent from the grant of a
new trial.
42