Nancy East v. Kenneth Apfel ( 1999 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 98-1970
    _____________
    Nancy East,                          *
    *
    Appellant,              *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                             * District Court for the Eastern
    * District of Arkansas.
    Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of    *
    Social Security,                     *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.               *
    _____________
    Submitted: December 17, 1998
    Filed: May 28, 1999
    _____________
    Before BEAM, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
    _____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Nancy East appeals the district court's1 grant of summary judgment affirming the
    Social Security Commissioner's decision to deny her application for disability insurance
    benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). We affirm.
    1
    The HONORABLE HENRY L. JONES, JR., United States Magistrate Judge
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition
    by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994).
    East filed the instant applications for DIB and SSI alleging she was disabled due
    to hypertension, depression, and arthritis in her left shoulder. The administrative law
    judge (ALJ) found that East did not have a severe impairment and, therefore, was not
    disabled at any time through December 31, 1989.2 East contends that the ALJ's
    decision that she is not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence on the record
    as a whole. East further argues that the ALJ erred in discounting her subjective
    complaints of pain.3
    We review the ALJ's decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial
    evidence on the record as a whole. See Clark v. Apfel, 
    141 F.3d 1253
    , 1255 (8th Cir.
    1998). Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
    would accept as adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion. See 
    id. In our
    review, we must consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as
    well as evidence that supports it. See 
    id. We may
    not reverse the Commissioner's
    decision merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a contrary
    outcome. See 
    id. We have
    carefully reviewed the administrative record, the district court's well-
    reasoned opinion, and the parties' arguments on appeal. Upon review, we find that
    substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's determination that East did not
    2
    East's disability insured status expired on December 31, 1989, which is the date
    that she last met the special earnings requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § § 416(i)(3)(B),
    423(c)(1)(B) (1994). In determining eligibility for disability insurance benefits, we only
    consider an individual's medical condition as of the date that individual was last
    insured. See Long v. Chater, 
    108 F.3d 185
    , 187 (8th Cir. 1997).
    3
    We note that East further argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider her
    current condition, failing to make specific findings, failing to call a vocational expert,
    and failing to consider her nonexertional impairments.
    -2-
    have a severe impairment and, therefore, was not disabled at any time through
    December 31, 1989.
    Regarding East's hypertension, her medical reports indicate that this hypertension
    can be easily controlled with medication. Dr. Ted Brown, East's treating physician,
    also stated that East's hypertension is easily controlled when East has been in the
    hospital and that it is apparent that East adjusts her own medication and also has
    admitted to not taking her medication. Dr. Brown opined that these factors probably
    are the cause of her poor control of the hypertension. See Kisling v. Chater, 
    105 F.3d 1255
    , 1257 (8th Cir. 1997) (failure to follow a prescribed medical regimen without
    good reason may support ALJ's denial of benefits); Nguyen v. Chater, 
    75 F.3d 429
    , 431
    (8th Cir. 1996) (conditions that can be treated with medication are not disabling).
    Regarding East's depression, the ALJ concluded that East's depression did not
    interfere with her ability to remain oriented and in contact with reality, nor did East
    have deficiencies in concentration or lack the ability to perform work related tasks. On
    several occasions, East refused treatment for her depression. See McClees v. Shalala,
    
    2 F.3d 301
    , 303 (8th Cir. 1993) (failure to seek treatment is inconsistent with
    disability). When East did receive treatment for depression, Dr. John Beck noted that
    Lithium improved her mood and sleep, decreased her blood pressure, and terminated
    her withdrawn behavior. See 
    Nguyen, 75 F.3d at 431
    (conditions that can be treated
    with medication are not disabling).
    Regarding East's complaints of left shoulder pain, her EMGs, nerve conduction
    studies, and CT scans consistently showed normal findings. Dr. Stephen Snyder, an
    orthopedist, noted that the tests of East's shoulder were within normal limits, that he
    could find no significant pathology in her shoulder to explain her complaints, and that
    no further orthopedic evaluation was necessary. See Stephens v. Shalala, 
    50 F.3d 538
    ,
    541 (8th Cir. 1995) (lack of objective findings to support pain is strong evidence of
    lack of a severe impairment); Onstead v. Sullivan, 
    962 F.2d 803
    , 805 (8th Cir. 1992);
    -3-
    Matthews v. Bowen, 
    879 F.2d 422
    , 424 (8th Cir. 1989) (medical opinion of a treating
    physician is to be given substantial weight). Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ's
    findings that East's hypertension, depression, and left shoulder pain were not severe
    were supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
    In addition, we find that the ALJ relied upon the proper factors in discounting
    East's subjective complaints of pain under the standards set out in Polaski v. Heckler,
    
    739 F.2d 1320
    , 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ considered the lack of objective
    medical evidence as well as East's daily activities.4 See Haynes v. Shalala, 
    26 F.3d 812
    , 814-15 (8th Cir. 1994) (ALJ may consider daily activities inconsistent with
    complaints of disabling pain); Beeler v. Bowen, 
    833 F.2d 124
    , 126-27 (8th Cir. 1987)
    (absence of objective medical evidence is one factor ALJ may consider).
    Finally, we have carefully considered East's remaining arguments on appeal and
    find them to be without merit. In sum, we hold that the ALJ has fully and fairly
    developed the record and that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports
    the ALJ's grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner. The order of the district
    court is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    4
    East's daily activities included: cooking, cleaning, and yard work. East also
    stated that she walks, bicycles, and drives as well as visits family.
    -4-