United States v. Sanchez ( 2018 )


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  •    17-2358
    United States of America v. Sanchez
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@).     A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 19th day of July, two thousand eighteen.
    PRESENT:
    DENNIS JACOBS,
    REENA RAGGI,
    PETER W. HALL,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    -v.-                                    17-2358
    ERICK SANCHEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    PABLO MARIZAN,
    Defendant.
    __________________________________
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:      Daniel Habib, Federal Defenders
    of New York, Inc., New York, NY.
    1
    FOR APPELLEE:              Michael Krouse and Michael D.
    Maimin, Assistant United States
    Attorneys, for Geoffrey S.
    Berman, United States Attorney
    for the Southern District of New
    York, New York, NY.
    Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    Court for the Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Erick Sanchez appeals from a judgement of the United
    States District Court for the Southern District of New York
    (Sullivan, J.) revoking his term of supervised release and
    sentencing him to two years’ imprisonment, as well as an
    additional year of supervised release with the special
    condition of a curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Sanchez
    challenges only the curfew component of the revocation
    sentence. Although Sanchez objected to a home detention
    condition initially contemplated (but not imposed) by the
    district court, he did not specifically object to the
    imposition of a curfew, despite the district court’s
    mentioning that condition during the sentencing hearing and
    later soliciting the government’s view as to its
    permissibility during post-hearing briefing. Because we
    conclude that Sanchez had the opportunity but did not raise
    a curfew challenge below, our review is for plain error.
    See United States v. Dupes, 
    513 F.3d 338
    , 343 (2d Cir.
    2008). Applying that standard of review, we conclude that
    Sanchez is not entitled to relief.1 We assume the parties’
    familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
    history, and the issues presented for review.
    1 Even if we determined that the circumstances giving
    rise to this appeal warranted application of “a ‘relaxed’
    form of plain error review,” United States v. Matta, 
    777 F.3d 116
    , 121 (2d Cir. 2015), we would still conclude that
    Sanchez is not entitled to relief.
    2
    Sanchez’s revocation sentence arose from his earlier
    sentence for conspiracy to commit access device fraud. See
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1029
    (b)(2). Sanchez pleaded guilty to that
    offense and was sentenced (by the same judge who imposed
    the revocation sentence) to 30 months’ imprisonment, plus
    three years’ supervised release. As a condition of that
    supervised release, Sanchez was required to “not commit
    another . . . crime.” App’x at 24. The district court
    found (and Sanchez does not contest on appeal) that Sanchez
    committed at least ten additional crimes while on
    supervised release. The revocation sentence followed.
    Sanchez concedes that the district court was permitted
    to impose the statutory maximum revocation sentence of two
    years’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release; he
    contends only that the court was precluded from
    supplementing that sentence with the special condition of a
    curfew. Sanchez argues that the curfew constitutes a
    condition requiring him to “remain at his place of
    residence during nonworking hours,” within the meaning of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3563
    (b)(19), and that the statute permits its
    imposition “only as an alternative to incarceration.”
    Relying on our observation in United States v. Leaphart, 
    98 F.3d 41
     (2d Cir. 1996), that a district court imposing the
    maximum possible term of imprisonment “[can]not also
    sentence [a defendant] to home detention . . . during his
    term of supervised release,” 
    id. at 43
    , Sanchez urges error
    by the district court in ordering a curfew after imposing
    the two-year maximum incarceratory sentence.
    This court has never held that § 3563(b)(19)
    encompasses a curfew condition, nor has it ever recognized
    home detention and a curfew as “equivalent” for sentencing
    purposes. United States v. Blackwell, 651 F. App’x 8, 9
    (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order). On the contrary, we have
    noted that the Sentencing Guidelines “explicitly
    distinguish between the two,” id. (citing U.S.S.G. §
    5D1.3(e)(2) & (5)), and no superseding statute or precedent
    equates them. On plain error review, for an error to be
    “plain,” it must, “at a minimum, be clear under current
    3
    law,” United States v. Weintraub, 
    273 F.3d 139
    , 152 (2d
    Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), and we
    “typically will not find such error where the operative
    legal question is unsettled, including where there is no
    binding precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court,”
    United States v. Whab, 
    355 F.3d 155
    , 158 (2d Cir. 2004)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, insofar
    as Sanchez urges error here, it was not plain and, thus,
    the curfew condition stands.
    We have considered Sanchez’s remaining arguments and
    find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons,
    we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    4