U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Federal Labor Relations Authority , 995 F.2d 46 ( 1993 )


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  •                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 92-4652
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
    SERVICE,
    Petitioner/Cross-
    Respondent,
    versus
    FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,
    Respondent/Cross-
    Petitioner.
    Petition for Review and Cross-Application for Enforcement
    of an Order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
    (June 25, 1993)
    Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, REAVLEY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    POLITZ, Chief Judge:
    The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service seeks
    review   of   the   determination   by   the   Federal    Labor   Relations
    Authority that it committed an unfair labor practice.             The FLRA
    seeks enforcement of its order. For the reasons assigned, we grant
    the petition for review in part and order enforcement in part.
    Background
    This dispute has its genesis in revisions by the INS in its
    policy on the use of firearms by employees.                Negotiations between
    the       agency   and        the    employees'         collective    bargaining
    representatives,        the   National   Border    Patrol     Council   and    the
    National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council of the
    American Federation of Government Employees AFL-CIO, concluded with
    several unresolved disputes.           The INS contended that six proposals
    advanced by the unions were nonnegotiable because they addressed
    matters reserved to management's discretion.                After mediation was
    deemed likely to be ineffective, the unions asked the Federal
    Service Impasses Panel to review the matter.                Before the Impasses
    Panel acted, however, the INS implemented its revisions, both those
    agreed upon and those in dispute.            The Impasses Panel thereafter
    determined that it did not have jurisdiction because negotiability
    was controverted.        At the unions' request, the FLRA reviewed the
    negotiability      of   the    six   proposals    and    determined   that    only
    Proposal 5 and portions of Proposals 1 and 2 were negotiable.                  The
    INS sought our review of the negotiability of Proposal 5.                     In a
    decision rendered on October 20, 1992, we ruled that Proposal 5 was
    not negotiable.1
    Shortly after seeking FLRA review of the negotiability issue,
    the unions brought unfair labor practice charges against the INS
    for implementing the revisions before the Impasses Panel had ruled.
    1
    Dept. of Justice, INS v. FLRA, 
    975 F.2d 218
    (5th Cir.
    1992).
    2
    On April 30, 1992, prior to our decision on the petition for review
    of the negotiability order, the FLRA decided that the INS had
    violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (6) of the Federal Service
    Labor-Management Relations Statute.2 The INS timely petitioned for
    review and the FLRA cross-applied for enforcement of its order.
    Analysis
    The issue before us is whether an agency commits an unfair
    labor    practice   by   implementing   a   change   in   a   condition   of
    employment when a union challenge is pending before the Impasses
    Panel and it is subsequently determined that the change is a
    nonnegotiable management prerogative. We conclude that neither the
    agency's refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Impasses
    Panel nor its unilateral implementation of the change is an unfair
    labor practice.
    The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, part
    of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, was enacted in an effort
    to make the government function more efficiently and effectively.3
    The legislation codifies the right of federal employees to organize
    and the duty of management to bargain, but tailors these rights and
    responsibilities "to meet the special requirements and needs of the
    2
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et seq.
    3
    S.Rep. No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in
    1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2726.
    3
    Government."4     In   section   7101(b)   Congress   directed   that   the
    statute "be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement
    of an effective and efficient Government."5
    If the parties bargain to impasse and mediation does not
    resolve their differences, the statute authorizes either side to
    invoke the services of the Federal Service Impasses Panel.6             The
    Impasses Panel is empowered to impose specific contract terms on
    the parties "unless [they] agree otherwise."7         While a matter is
    pending before the Impasses Panel, under FLRA rule the parties must
    maintain the status quo to the extent consistent with the necessary
    functioning of the agency.8      Failure to do so constitutes an unfair
    labor practice.
    Certain matters, however, statutorily are exempted from the
    scope of mandatory bargaining, including, as pertinent herein, an
    4
    5 U.S.C. § 7101(b).
    5
    See also Dept. of Justice, INS v. FLRA, 
    991 F.2d 285
    (5th
    Cir. 1993).
    6
    5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)(1).
    7
    5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(C); see also American Federation of
    Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. FLRA, 
    778 F.2d 850
    (D.C. Cir.
    1985).
    8
    Dept. of the Treasury, BATF and National Treasury
    Employees Union, 18 F.L.R.A. (No. 61) 466 (1985); see also National
    Ass'n of Government Employees v. FLRA, 
    893 F.2d 380
    (D.C. Cir.
    1990).
    4
    agency's internal security practices and the assignment of work.9
    If management contends that a change falls within an exempted area,
    the Impasses Panel lacks authority to proceed unless and until the
    negotiability issues are resolved,10 subject to a limited exception
    defined by the FLRA.        We agree with the reasoning of the FLRA as
    expressed in Commander Carswell Air Force Base, Texas and AFGE11
    that the purposes of the statute are best furthered by allowing the
    Impasses Panel to resolve those disputes involving negotiability
    that are controlled by existing FLRA precedents.             To that we would
    add "and existing controlling judicial precedents."
    In   the   case   at    bar,    claiming    nonnegotiability        the   INS
    implemented its policy revisions before the Impasses Panel declined
    jurisdiction.     Ultimately        it   was   determined   that   all    of   the
    changes, except for portions of two of the union's proposals, were
    nonnegotiable.    The INS concedes that it committed an unfair labor
    practice with respect to implementation of those measures found
    negotiable, but otherwise it denies wrongdoing.             The FLRA insists
    that it was an unfair labor practice to implement any of the
    changes, negotiable or not.
    Our 1984 decision in U.S. Dept. of Justice, INS v. FLRA12
    9
    5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1), (2)(B).
    10
    American Federation of Gov't Employees, supra.
    11
    31 F.L.R.A. (No. 37) 620 (1988).
    12
    
    727 F.2d 481
    (5th Cir. 1984).
    5
    persuades that the position taken herein by the FLRA is untenable.
    In the cited case, the INS implemented changes in employment
    conditions    while   a     representation   election      was   pending.
    Determining   that    the    changes    involved   areas    reserved   to
    management's discretion, we held that the INS had not committed an
    unfair labor practice because the FLRA was not authorized to
    suspend management rights.     We therein stated:
    Congress provided specifically in 5 U.S.C. § 7106 that
    "nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of
    any management official of any agency" to exercise the
    rights reserved to management by that section. . . . By
    using the word "nothing" . . ., Congress clearly
    expressed its intent with regard to management's exercise
    of the rights which had been reserved to it. The use of
    such words makes it obvious that Congress did not intend
    to let the Authority decide whether, in its judgment, it
    was "necessary" for the INS to [make the desired changes]
    during the pendency of the election. . . . Construing
    the statute to allow the Authority to promulgate a rule
    which would bar management from exercising its reserved
    rights during the pendency of a representation question
    would hardly lead to an INS which was as effective and
    efficient as possible.13
    Similarly here, the position urged by the FLRA would suspend
    management rights pending Impasses Panel action.             Neither the
    language nor spirit of the statute would so permit.14            Whereas
    unilateral implementation during Impasses Panel proceedings of a
    change that is determined to be negotiable might be an unfair labor
    practice, we hold that unilateral implementation of a change
    
    13 727 F.2d at 488
    .
    14
    We therefore do not accord the deference normally owed to
    the interpretation of the agency charged with implementing the
    statute. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
    INS, 975 F.2d at 225
    .
    6
    determined to be nonnegotiable is not.15
    The petition for review is GRANTED with respect to Proposal 5.
    Conversely, the cross-application for enforcement is DENIED with
    respect to Proposal 5 but is GRANTED with respect to the negotiable
    parts of Proposals 1 and 2.
    15
    See also American Federation of Gov't 
    Employees, 778 F.2d at 857
    ("although the Labor-Management Act makes it an unfair labor
    practice to 'fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse procedures and
    impasse decisions . . .,' § 7116(b)(6), an agency is not guilty of
    an unfair labor practice if the FLRA or a reviewing court later
    determines that the issue was nonnegotiable"); Dept. of Treasury,
    
    BATF, supra
    (agency did not commit an unfair labor practice in
    implementing an Order while Impasses Panel proceedings were pending
    because the Order was not subject to the duty to bargain).
    7