LA Banque Societe v. Butan Valley N V, et a ( 2001 )


Menu:
  •               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-20152
    LA BANQUE SOCIETE GENERALE; LA BANQUE DE NEUFLIZE
    SCHLUMBERGER MALLETT,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    versus
    BUTAN VALLEY N V,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    LA BANQUE SOCIETE GENERALE; LA BANQUE DE NEUFLIZE
    SCHLUMBERGER MALLETT,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    versus
    SHEIKH ABDILLAH OTHMAN ABDULLAH AL-KASABI,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 00-20153
    LA BANQUE SOCIETE GENERALE; LA BANQUE DE NEUFLIZE
    SCHLUMBERGER MALLETT,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    versus
    BUTAN VALLEY N V,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    LA BANQUE SOCIETE GENERALE; LA BANQUE DE NEUFLIZE
    SCHLUMBERGER MALLETT,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    versus
    SHEIKH ABDILLAH OTHMAN ABDULLAH AL-KASABI,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    For the Southern District of Texas
    (H-98-CV-2118 & H-99-CV-560)
    May 24, 2001
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellees contend that Appellants filed premature notices of
    appeal, depriving this Court of jurisdiction. We agree and now
    dismiss these appeals.
    The appeals before this Court were not taken from a final
    appealable judgment.1 The district court's January 21, 2000 orders
    did not resolve Appellees' claims for declaratory judgment and
    enforcement of the arbitration award against Butan Valley. Nor did
    the February 4, 2000 "Final Judgment" finally dispose of the
    remaining    issues   and   parties,       as   the   district   court   later
    recognized. The court also did not enter a certification under Rule
    54 or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1
    See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2001).
    2
    The "extraordinarily limited" scope of the collateral doctrine
    provides no      refuge     for   Appellants.2     Enforcement   of   the   award
    against Al-Kasabi does not resolve an issue completely separate
    from the merits of the declaratory judgment and enforcement claims
    asserted against Butan Valley. For instance, Appellees' alter ego
    argument is central to their response to Appellants' contention
    that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Al-
    Kasabi. In addition, the merits of the confirmation order could be
    reviewed    on     appeal    alongside       the   declaratory   judgment    and
    enforcement claims.3
    Subsequent actions taken by the district court did not "cure"
    these defects. Rule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
    Procedure "permits a notice of appeal from a non-final decision to
    operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a
    district court announces a decision that would be appealable if
    immediately followed by the entry of judgment."4 The court's Order
    for Summary Judgment on March 21, 2001 ostensibly disposed of the
    remaining issues in these cases.5 However, this order was not
    2
    See Pan Eastern Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 
    798 F.2d 837
    ,
    839 (5th Cir. 1986).
    3
    See 
    id. 4 FirsTier
    Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Co., 
    498 U.S. 269
    , 276 (1991).
    5
    Appellees contend that even this order lacked the requisite
    finality. We need not decide this question, however, as the appeals
    must be dismissed regardless.
    3
    merely a formal, ministerial entry of the January 21, 2000 orders.6
    Indeed, the summary judgment order disposed of issues not resolved
    or properly addressed by the court on January 21, 2000. As the
    notices    of   appeal   were   prematurely   filed,   our   Court   has   no
    jurisdiction.7 We must therefore DISMISS the instant appeals.8
    DISMISSED.
    6
    See United States v. Cooper, 
    135 F.3d 960
    , 963 (5th Cir.
    1998).
    7
    See 
    id. 8 We
    note that the district court entered yet another judgment
    in this case on April 24, 2001. This latest judgment appears to be
    a final judgment. That the Appellants filed the appeal pending
    before us prematurely does not foreclose their ability to appeal
    from this most recent judgment. Moreover, with respect to this
    April 24 judgment, the Appellees apparently have pending before the
    district court a “Motion to Correct Final Judgment.” Such motions
    may suspend the time for filing a notice of appeal. See FED. R.
    APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A) (West 2001); Madison v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc.,
    
    114 F.3d 514
    , 516 (5th Cir. 1997).
    4