LA Banque Societe v. Butan Valley N V, et a ( 2001 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-20152
LA BANQUE SOCIETE GENERALE; LA BANQUE DE NEUFLIZE
SCHLUMBERGER MALLETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
BUTAN VALLEY N V,
Defendant-Appellant.
LA BANQUE SOCIETE GENERALE; LA BANQUE DE NEUFLIZE
SCHLUMBERGER MALLETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
SHEIKH ABDILLAH OTHMAN ABDULLAH AL-KASABI,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 00-20153
LA BANQUE SOCIETE GENERALE; LA BANQUE DE NEUFLIZE
SCHLUMBERGER MALLETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
BUTAN VALLEY N V,
Defendant-Appellant.
LA BANQUE SOCIETE GENERALE; LA BANQUE DE NEUFLIZE
SCHLUMBERGER MALLETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
SHEIKH ABDILLAH OTHMAN ABDULLAH AL-KASABI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(H-98-CV-2118 & H-99-CV-560)
May 24, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellees contend that Appellants filed premature notices of
appeal, depriving this Court of jurisdiction. We agree and now
dismiss these appeals.
The appeals before this Court were not taken from a final
appealable judgment.1 The district court's January 21, 2000 orders
did not resolve Appellees' claims for declaratory judgment and
enforcement of the arbitration award against Butan Valley. Nor did
the February 4, 2000 "Final Judgment" finally dispose of the
remaining issues and parties, as the district court later
recognized. The court also did not enter a certification under Rule
54 or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2001).
2
The "extraordinarily limited" scope of the collateral doctrine
provides no refuge for Appellants.2 Enforcement of the award
against Al-Kasabi does not resolve an issue completely separate
from the merits of the declaratory judgment and enforcement claims
asserted against Butan Valley. For instance, Appellees' alter ego
argument is central to their response to Appellants' contention
that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Al-
Kasabi. In addition, the merits of the confirmation order could be
reviewed on appeal alongside the declaratory judgment and
enforcement claims.3
Subsequent actions taken by the district court did not "cure"
these defects. Rule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure "permits a notice of appeal from a non-final decision to
operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a
district court announces a decision that would be appealable if
immediately followed by the entry of judgment."4 The court's Order
for Summary Judgment on March 21, 2001 ostensibly disposed of the
remaining issues in these cases.5 However, this order was not
2
See Pan Eastern Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 798 F.2d 837,
839 (5th Cir. 1986).
3
See id.
4
FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Co., 498 U.S.
269, 276 (1991).
5
Appellees contend that even this order lacked the requisite
finality. We need not decide this question, however, as the appeals
must be dismissed regardless.
3
merely a formal, ministerial entry of the January 21, 2000 orders.6
Indeed, the summary judgment order disposed of issues not resolved
or properly addressed by the court on January 21, 2000. As the
notices of appeal were prematurely filed, our Court has no
jurisdiction.7 We must therefore DISMISS the instant appeals.8
DISMISSED.
6
See United States v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960, 963 (5th Cir.
1998).
7
See id.
8
We note that the district court entered yet another judgment
in this case on April 24, 2001. This latest judgment appears to be
a final judgment. That the Appellants filed the appeal pending
before us prematurely does not foreclose their ability to appeal
from this most recent judgment. Moreover, with respect to this
April 24 judgment, the Appellees apparently have pending before the
district court a “Motion to Correct Final Judgment.” Such motions
may suspend the time for filing a notice of appeal. See FED. R.
APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A) (West 2001); Madison v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc.,
114 F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1997).
4