Maynard v. Price Realty Co. , 102 F. App'x 854 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                           United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 23, 2004
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT         Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-11339
    Conference Calendar
    BRIAN K. MAYNARD,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    PRICE REALTY CO.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:03-CV-2030-R
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Brian K. Maynard, a Texas resident, moves to proceed
    in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal from the district court’s
    order granting the defendants’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) motion to
    dismiss his complaint, purportedly filed pursuant to the civil
    rights provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a claim
    on which relief may be granted.    By moving for IFP, Maynard is
    challenging the district court’s certification that IFP status
    should not be granted because the appeal is not taken in good
    faith.   See Baugh v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997);
    28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(3).     Maynard’s IFP
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 03-11339
    -2-
    “motion must be directed solely to the trial court’s reasons for
    the certification decision.”     
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    .
    Maynard alleged that he formerly lived in and worked for a
    Dallas apartment complex operated by Price Realty Co., and that,
    after such relationship was terminated, Price Realty maliciously
    caused fraudulent information to appear in Maynard’s credit
    report.   Maynard alleged that these actions violated various
    constitutional rights and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.      He
    also asserted several state-law claims.
    The district court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion on the ground that Maynard’s allegations failed to
    establish that Price Realty had acted under “color of state law.”
    See Morris v. Dearborne, 
    181 F.3d 657
    , 666 n.6 (5th Cir. 1999).
    In his pro se appellate brief, Maynard has made no allegations to
    suggest that Price Realty either acted under color of state law
    or conspired with a state actor.     See id.; Mills v. Criminal
    Dist. Ct. No. 3, 
    837 F.2d 677
    , 678 (5th Cir. 1988).      Maynard has
    not made allegations sufficient to establish an employment-
    discrimination claim under Title VII.       See Shackelford v.
    Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 
    190 F.3d 398
    , 403 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Maynard has not explicitly argued that the court abused its
    discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
    over his state-law claims.     See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), ©)(3);
    Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 
    179 F.3d 217
    , 226 (5th Cir.
    1999).
    Maynard’s appeal is without arguable merit, Howard v. King,
    
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983), and his motion to proceed
    No. 03-11339
    -3-
    IFP on appeal is DENIED.   We also DISMISS the appeal as
    frivolous.   5TH CIR. R. 42.2; 
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    & n.24.
    IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.