United States v. Bruce Thron , 360 F. App'x 943 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JAN 04 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 08-50448
    Plaintiff - Appellee,             D.C. No. 5:07-cr-00103-SGL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    BRUCE THRON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Stephen G. Larson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 15, 2009 **
    Before:        GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    Bruce Thron appeals from the 48-month sentence imposed following his
    guilty-plea conviction for possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    SZ/Research
    § 2252A(a)(5)(B). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm,
    but remand to correct the judgment.
    Thron contends that his sentence is unreasonable. The record reflects that
    the district court did not procedurally err and the sentence is reasonable in light of
    the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United States v. Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
    , 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
    Thron also contends that the district court erred when it imposed a condition
    of supervised release which restricts his computer use (Condition 7). The district
    court did not err because the ban is not absolute and is reasonably related to the
    offense and the important goal of deterrence. See United States v. Rearden, 
    349 F.3d 608
    , 620-21 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Thron also challenges several conditions of his supervised release
    (Conditions 13-16) which prevent him from being near or contacting individuals
    under age 18. The district court did not plainly err when it imposed these
    conditions because the conditions are reasonably related to the offense, the goal of
    rehabilitation, and protection of the public. See United States v. Daniels, 
    541 F.3d 915
    , 928 (9th Cir. 2008).
    Thron contends that the condition which requires him to undergo Abel
    testing (Condition 5) should be vacated because the district court failed to apply
    SZ/Research                                2                                     08-50448
    the heightened scrutiny analysis set forth in United States v. Weber, 
    451 F.3d 552
    ,
    560-61 (9th Cir. 2006), and involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is
    reasonably necessary. This contention is foreclosed. See United States v. Stoterau,
    
    524 F.3d 988
    , 1004-07 (9th Cir. 2008).
    We remand to the district court with instructions to modify Condition 12 to
    clarify that the prohibition against possessing materials describing child
    pornography does not apply to materials necessary to, and used for, a collateral
    attack, or to materials prepared or used for the purposes of Thron’s court-mandated
    sex offender treatment. See United States v. Cope, 
    527 F.3d 944
    , 958 (9th Cir.
    2008).
    We also remand with instructions that the district court amend the written
    judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence because Condition 16
    in the written judgment includes a sentence restricting Thron’s residence that was
    not included in the oral pronouncement. See United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa,
    
    495 F.2d 253
    , 256 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). On remand, the district court shall
    delete the first sentence of Condition 16 in the written judgment which provides,
    “The defendant shall not reside within direct view of school yards, parks, public
    swimming pools, playgrounds, youth centers, video arcade facilities, or other
    places primarily used by persons under the age of 18.”
    SZ/Research                                 3                                   08-50448
    AFFIRMED; REMANDED to correct the judgment.
    SZ/Research                      4                   08-50448