Stefanoff v. Hays County, Texas ( 2000 )

No. 99-50464
-1-
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-50464
Summary Calendar
JEFFREY ZEAL STEFANOFF,
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
versus
HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL.,
Defendants,
HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS,
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. A-95-CV-296-SC
--------------------
March 30, 2000
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Hays County, Texas, appeals from the grant of summary
judgment giving injunctive relief to Jeffrey “Zeal” Stefanoff and
from the order granting attorneys fees to Stefanoff. Stefanoff
appeals from the denial of compensatory damages for the Equal
Protection Clause violation that we noted in Stefanoff v. Hays
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-50464
-2-
County, Texas, 154 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 1998), regarding former
Sheriff Paul Hastings’s exercise of his statutory discretion to
grant good-time credits to prisoners in the Hays County Jail.
Stefanoff moves conditionally for appellate costs and attorneys
fees; Stefanoff’s motion is DENIED. Stefanoff also moves to
supplement the record or for us to take judicial notice of a
complaint filed by another individual; Stefanoff’s motion is
DENIED.
Stefanoff contends that the magistrate judge erred by
failing to allow him to present evidence of actual injury arising
from the Equal Protection violation. He argues that this court’s
earlier opinion as to Sheriff Hastings’s immunity had no
preclusive effect as to Hays County. Hays County contends that
the magistrate judge erred by finding any liability because
Stefanoff suffered no actual injury.
Compensatory damages “should be awarded only to compensate
actual injury[.]” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). We
found in the earlier appeal that Stefanoff’s disruptive media
activities provided a constitutionally legitimate reason for
Sheriff Hastings to deny Stefanoff good-time credits, and we
determined that Hastings was entitled to immunity from suit.
Stefanoff, 154 F.3d at 527. Our earlier opinion is conclusive on
this matter, see United States v. Lawrence, 179 F.3d 343, 351
(5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 836 (2000); Stefanoff
suffered no actual injury. The district court did not err by
denying compensatory damages.
No. 99-50464
-3-
A plaintiff may obtain nominal damages for a constitutional
violation, even absent actual injury. Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d
649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988). Because Sheriff Hastings adopted an
unconstitutional policy as Hays County’s policymaker, Stefanoff
was entitled to nominal damages from Hays County. The magistrate
judge did not err by finding Hays County liable and awarding
Stefanoff nominal damages.
Hays County contends that the magistrate judge’s grant of
injunctive relief to Stefanoff was improper. Hays County is
correct, and we vacate the grant of injunctive relief.
The evidence in the record indicated that current Sheriff
Don Montague has never considered employing the policy found
constitutionally invalid in our earlier opinion. Thomas Morrow’s
affidavit did not refute Sheriff Montague’s affidavit – Montague
was elected in 1996, and Morrow swore that he was told of the
former policy in 1994. Stefanoff swore that in January 1999 he
was arrested again in Hays County for possession of marijuana.
He does not state that he has been convicted and sentenced on
that charge. The question of good-time credit has not arisen
because good-conduct credit applies only to a sentence. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 42.032 § 2 (West Supp. 2000). Even were
Stefanoff convicted, in light of Sheriff Montague’s affidavit, it
is speculative whether Sheriff Hastings’s offending policy will
be applied to Stefanoff to deny good-conduct time. Whether
Stefanoff will suffer any future injury due to the policy we
found to violate the Equal Protection Clause was, and is,
No. 99-50464
-4-
entirely speculative. Stefanoff lacked standing to obtain
injunctive relief, Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959
F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1992); the grant of injunctive relief
was an abuse of discretion. Alcatel, USA, Inc. v. DGI
Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 1999).
Hays County contends that the magistrate judge erred by
awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Stefanoff. We vacate the
award and remand the issue of attorney’s fees and costs for
reconsideration by the district court.
“[A] plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing
party under [42 U.S.C.] § 1988.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,
112 (1992). The degree of success, however, is the most critical
factor in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee
award. Id. at 114. “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal
damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of
his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually
no fee at all.” Id. at 115 (internal citation omitted). A
plaintiff who obtains nominal damages may be entitled to
attorney’s fees if the goal of his lawsuit was achieved and the
suit itself caused the defendant to remedy the complained-of
conditions. Pembroke v. Wood County, Texas, 981 F.2d 225, 230
(5th Cir. 1993).
With the grant of injunctive relief invalidated, Stefanoff’s
award of attorney’s fees and costs is based solely on his award
of nominal damages. The district court should consider on remand
whether attorney’s fees and costs should be awarded in light of
the invalidation of the grant of injunctive relief and, if so,
No. 99-50464
-5-
what the amount of those fees and costs should be. We express no
views on this issue in this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.