Springer v. US Marshal , 137 F. App'x 657 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                        June 16, 2005
    _______________________                 Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-40551
    _______________________
    GREG SPRINGER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    JAVIER MANCHA, in his official capacity as mayor of the
    City of Encinal; SEAN CHADWELL, in his personal and official
    capacity as a council member for the City of Encinal,
    Intervenors Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    U. S. MARSHAL, The United States Marshal’s Service,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    U. S. MARSHAL,
    Intervenor Defendant-Appellee,
    LASALLE COUNTY PUBLIC FACILITIES DETENTION CORPORATION;
    LASALLE COUNTY, TEXAS,
    Intervenors-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    5:03-CV-1
    Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellants seek a review of the district court’s denial
    of a temporary injunction in this National Environmental Policy Act
    (“NEPA”)   case,   and   they    seek   a    remand   with   instructions     to
    (1) issue an injunction prohibiting any further funding by the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    federal government of the LaSalle County Detention Center and
    (2) requiring further consideration of the issues outlined by the
    trial court at a February 12, 2004, status conference.       Having
    carefully reviewed the briefs and pertinent portions of the record
    in this case, we conclude that because the case as a whole has
    become moot, we must remand for dismissal and need not reach the
    denial of preliminary injunction.
    The mootness of a controversy is a jurisdictional issue
    that we must raise sua sponte.    To qualify as a case for federal
    adjudication, a case or controversy must exist at all stages of the
    litigation, not just at the time the suit was filed.      Harris v.
    City of Houston, 
    151 F.3d 186
    , 189 (5th Cir. 1989).   Whether a case
    is moot is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.   
    Id. This court
    has consistently held that when a construction project
    is complete and operating, plaintiffs can obtain no meaningful
    judicial relief based on alleged non-compliance with NEPA, and
    their cases are moot.   See Bayou Liberty Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps,
    
    217 F.3d 393
    , 396-98 (5th Cir. 2000); Richland Park Homeowners
    Ass’n v. Pierce, 
    671 F.2d 935
    , 950 (5th Cir. 1982).     Appellants’
    contention is that because the U. S. Marshals Service conducted an
    inadequate and “bad faith” environmental assessment of the proposal
    to construct a detention facility for use by the federal government
    in LaSalle County, the federal courts must shut down the facility
    until NEPA is more strictly followed.      The problem with their
    argument at this juncture is that the Marshals Service contributed
    2
    its three million dollars to funding the construction of the
    detention facility, construction was completed in March 2004, and
    the facility is presently housing a full complement of three
    hundred detainees, paying LaSalle County for this service at a
    daily rate per inmate.
    The granting of relief requiring further NEPA documenta-
    tion would avail the plaintiffs nothing.          Moreover, their request
    to   eliminate   federal   funding       from   the   detention   center   is
    completely at odds with the public interest, inasmuch as it would
    create serious economic problems for LaSalle County, would disad-
    vantage the federal government’s ongoing efforts to house inmates
    in south Texas, and would either lead to the closure of the
    facility or its sale, after foreclosure, to another operator who
    might not have to comply with NEPA at all.                  These factors,
    carefully articulated by the district court as weighing heavily
    against the grant of preliminary injunctive relief, also serve to
    demonstrate why no further effective judicial relief can be granted
    in this case.
    Because this case is now moot, we need not rule on the
    district court’s denial of Appellants’ request for a preliminary
    injunction.
    ACCORDINGLY, THIS CASE IS REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
    DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-40551

Citation Numbers: 137 F. App'x 657

Filed Date: 6/16/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023