Micheal Taylor v. United States , 615 F. App'x 659 ( 2015 )


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  •            Case: 14-12961   Date Filed: 09/04/2015   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-12961
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cv-00006-DHB-BKE
    MICHAEL TAYLOR,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,
    Defendants,
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (September 4, 2015)
    Case: 14-12961        Date Filed: 09/04/2015      Page: 2 of 6
    Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Michael Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order
    dismissing his Georgia state law claims against the United States of America for
    false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and negligence, all brought
    pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 
    28 U.S.C. § 2674
    . Taylor’s brief,
    construed liberally, see Powell v. Lennon, 
    914 F.2d 1459
    , 1463 (11th Cir. 1990),
    asserts the district court erred in dismissing his claims based on its conclusion that
    the Government had probable cause to arrest Taylor for identity fraud, in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1028
    (a)(7), and for threatening federal judges, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 115
    (a)(1), in Taylor’s prior criminal prosecution from which all of his
    claims arise. After review, we affirm.
    The parties are familiar with the facts, so we will move straight to the legal
    analysis. The district court did not err in concluding the Government had probable
    cause in the prior criminal case to arrest Taylor for both identity fraud and
    threatening federal judges—and since each of Taylor’s claims depended on the
    illegality of his arrest, the district court did not err in dismissing his claims. 1
    1
    Specifically, Taylor’s four claims each arise out of his 2006 arrest and prosecution in
    United States v. Taylor, Case No. 3:06-004 (S.D. Ga. 2006), in which Taylor was indicted on
    two counts of threatening two federal judges and one count of identity fraud. See 
    id.,
     DE. 9. In
    the instant civil lawsuit, Taylor contends unnamed federal employees committed false arrest,
    false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and negligence during the previous criminal
    2
    Case: 14-12961       Date Filed: 09/04/2015       Page: 3 of 6
    With regard to the identity fraud charge, the district court did not err in
    concluding the Government had probable cause to arrest Taylor because Taylor
    admittedly used federal district judge Tim Leonard’s name to apply for a credit
    card. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1028
    (a)(7) (prohibiting a person from knowingly using,
    without lawful authority, a “means of identification” of another person in
    connection with any violation of federal law). We reject the theory that Taylor did
    not use a “means of identification,” as required to commit identity fraud under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1028
    (a)(7), simply because Taylor used Judge Tim Leonard’s name only,
    not his social security number. The statute clearly defines “means of
    identification” as “any name or number that may be used . . . to identify a specific
    individual.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 1028
    (d)(7) (emphasis added).
    We likewise reject Taylor’s argument that the name he used did not identify
    a “specific individual” because there is more than one Tim Leonard in Oklahoma.
    The statute does not require that the name Taylor used on the fraudulent credit card
    application, standing alone, identify a unique individual. The statute specifically
    provides that a “name” may constitute a “means of identification” if it “may be
    prosecution and seeks over $3 trillion in damages. An essential element of each claim is a lack
    of probable cause for Taylor’s prior arrests. See False Arrest, O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1 (requiring an
    arrest made “without probable cause”); False Imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20 (requiring an
    “unlawful detention”); Malicious Prosecution, O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40 (requiring a criminal
    prosecution carried on “maliciously and without any probable cause”); Negligence, O.C.G.A.
    § 51-1-6 (requiring a “breach of . . . legal duty”—in this case, an alleged breach of duty by
    arresting Taylor without probable cause).
    3
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    used[] . . . in conjunction with any other information[] to identify a specific
    individual.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district court did not err in
    concluding the Government had probable cause to arrest Taylor for identity fraud.
    With regard to the charge of threatening federal judges, the district court did
    not err in concluding the Government had probable cause to arrest Taylor because
    the FBI agent’s affidavit—upon which the magistrate judge who issued the arrest
    warrant relied—stated that federal agents searched Taylor’s home and found a
    copy of one of the threatening letters to Judge Leonard and other letters directed to
    Judge Miles-LaGrange. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 115
    (a)(1) (prohibiting a person from
    threatening to assault or murder a federal judge with the intent to impede,
    intimidate, or interfere with the judge in the performance of official duties). We
    find meritless Taylor’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
    considering the FBI agent’s affidavit simply because neither party formally
    submitted it as evidence. “A district court may take judicial notice of public
    records within its files relating to the particular case before it or other related
    cases.” 2 Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 
    938 F.2d 1239
    , 1243 (11th
    Cir. 1991).
    2
    Furthermore, in his response to the Government’s motion to dismiss Taylor expressly
    asked to present the FBI agent’s affidavit to the court. See United States v. Brannan, 
    562 F.3d 1300
    , 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here a party invites the trial court to commit error, he cannot
    later cry foul on appeal.”).
    4
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    For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in concluding the
    Government had probable cause in the prior criminal case to arrest Taylor for both
    identity fraud and for threatening federal judges. Since lack of probable cause laid
    the foundation for Taylor’s civil claims against the United States, the district court
    did not err in granting the Government’s motion to dismiss.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
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    JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I concur in the judgment and join most of the majority opinion. As to the
    district court’s consideration of the FBI agent’s affidavit, I am not sure that the
    court could take judicial notice for the truth of the matters set forth in the affidavit.
    See United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 
    776 F.3d 805
    , 811 (11th Cir.
    2015); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 
    187 F.3d 1278
    -79 (11th Cir. 1999); United
    States v. Jones, 
    29 F.3d 1549
    , 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, as the
    majority indicates, Mr. Taylor invited any error by asking the district court to
    consider the affidavit.
    6