United States v. Oyorzaval-Vera , 184 F. App'x 398 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                         June 7, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-50552
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JAIME OYORZAVAL-VERA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    No. 3:04-CR-1976-2
    --------------------
    Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Jaime Oyorzaval-Vera challenges his conviction by a jury of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with
    intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marihuana.                 He was
    sentenced to concurrent terms of 60 months of imprisonment and four
    years of supervised release.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circum-
    stances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Oyorzaval-Vera contends that the district court’s refusal to
    admit, pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) and (3), his unavailable
    co-defendant’s plea hearing testimony was error that was not harm-
    less.   Oyorzaval-Vera asserts that the testimony was exculpatory;
    the testimony was reliable because it was given under oath and un-
    der penalty of perjury; and the testimony was corroborated by other
    trial evidence.   He contends that the government had a similar mo-
    tive and opportunity to develop the testimony at the co-defendant’s
    plea hearing.
    We review an issue concerning “the admissibility of evidence
    for abuse of discretion.”     United States v. Vega, 
    221 F.3d 789
    ,
    803-04 (5th Cir. 2000).     If an abuse of discretion is found, the
    error is reviewed for harmlessness.     United States v. Skipper, 
    74 F.3d 608
    , 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
    The government’s motive to develop the co-defendant’s testi-
    mony at the plea hearing was not similar to its motive at Oyorza-
    val-Vera’s trial.   See United States v. Atkins, 
    618 F.2d 366
    , 373
    (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Jackson, 
    335 F.3d 170
    ,
    176-79 (2d Cir. 2003).     Accordingly, the testimony was not admis-
    sible under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).   Even if the refusal to admit
    the testimony under rule 804(b)(1) was error, the error was harm-
    less in light of the evidence of Oyorzaval-Vera’s guilt.         See
    
    Skipper, 74 F.3d at 612
    .
    Oyorzaval-Vera does not identify specific testimony and cir-
    cumstances that corroborate his co-defendant’s plea hearing testi-
    2
    mony and that clearly indicate its trustworthiness.      Indeed, the
    testimony provided by Border Patrol agents does not only fail to
    corroborate Oyorzaval’s co-defendant’s plea hearing testimony, the
    agents’ testimony directly contradicts the plea hearing testimony.
    Accordingly, there are no corroborating circumstances that plainly
    indicate the trustworthiness of the co-defendant’s testimony, and
    the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
    admit it.   See 
    Vega, 221 F.3d at 803
    .
    Oyorzaval-Vera contends that the refusal to admit his co-de-
    fendant’s testimony deprived him of his constitutional right to
    compulsory process.    An accused’s right to compulsory process is
    not “an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent,
    privileged or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evi-
    dence.” United States v. Walker, 
    410 F.3d 754
    , 758 (5th Cir.) (in-
    ternal quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 633
    (2005).   The Sixth Amendment right of compulsory process must
    yield to a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
    ination.    United States v. Follin, 
    979 F.2d 369
    , 374 (5th Cir.
    1992).
    The plea hearing testimony was not admissible under FED. R.
    EVID. 804(b)(1) or (3). Further, Oyorzaval-Vera exercised his right
    to compulsory process, and his co-defendant invoked his right
    against self-incrimination without interference from the government
    or the district court.    Oyorzaval-Vera’s compulsory process rights
    were thus exhausted.     See United States v. Griffin, 
    66 F.3d 68
    , 70
    3
    (5th Cir. 1995).
    The judgment is AFFIRMED.
    4