Crock v. Comm Social Security , 332 F. App'x 777 ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-8-2009
Crock v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-4410
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"Crock v. Comm Social Security" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1214.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4410
THOMAS D. CROCK,
Appellant
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-00680)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 21, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2009)
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Thomas Crock appeals pro se from an order of the District Court
dismissing his case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b), for failure to
1
effectuate service of the summons and his complaint within the time limit prescribed by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 4(m). For the reasons that follow, we will vacate
the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
I.
On May 19, 2008, Crock filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the
Western District of Pennsylvania. He sought the District Court’s review of the Social
Security Commissioner’s final determination disallowing his claim for disability benefits.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On May 20, 2008, the District Court granted Crock’s motion and
issued a summons as to Appellee, the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“the Commissioner”). On that same date, Crock filed his complaint with
the District Court. He did not serve the complaint upon the Commissioner.
On September 18, 2008, the District Court issued an order under Rule 4(m),
requiring Crock to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to
serve the Commissioner within 120 days of filing the complaint. Crock was given until
September 29, 2008, to answer. On September 30, 2008, Crock had yet to respond, and
the District Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 4(m). Crock then moved for
reconsideration, and the District Court denied that motion on October 17, 2008. Crock
timely appealed.
II.
2
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review dismissals
pursuant to Rule 41(b) and Rule 4(m) for abuse of discretion. See Boley v. Kaymark, 123
F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir. 1997); Adams v. Trustees of the N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension
Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994).
III.
As a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis, Crock was not responsible for
the service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and
serve all process[.]”); Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1996) (“the court is
obligated to issue plaintiff’s process to a United States Marshal who must in turn
effectuate service upon the defendants . . . once reasonable steps have been taken to
identify for the court the defendants names in the complaint”); see also Young v. Quinlan,
960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2000).
Crock filed his complaint with the District Court, indicating that the
Commissioner was the defendant party, and specifying the Commissioner’s address.
Thus, the District Court was obligated to “order that service be made by a United States
marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the court.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(c)(3). For this reason, we will vacate the District Court’s order dismissing Crock’s
complaint and remand the case for further proceedings.