Innis v. Wilson , 334 F. App'x 454 ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-10-2009
Innis v. Wilson
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-4909
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Recommended Citation
"Innis v. Wilson" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1200.
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DLD-197 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4909
ROBERT INNIS,
Appellant
v.
HARRY WILSON, Superintendent;
DR. MICHAEL J. HERBIK, M.D.;
MS. MARY ANN KUSHNER, Grievance Coordinator;
MS. SHARON M. BURKS, Chief Grievance Officer, D.O.C.;
D.O.C. BUREAU OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, et al.;
MR. CHRIS MYERS, Physician's Asst.;
MS. DEBRA COWDEN, Physician's Asst.;
MR. PAUL DONAGAUL, Physician's Asst.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-01343)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 29, 2009
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2009)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Robert Innis, a prisoner at SCI Fayette, appeals from the District Court’s order
granting defendants’ motion to dismiss and denying his motions to alter judgment and to
file a second amended complaint. Because Innis’s allegations do not state a claim for
deliberate indifference or otherwise entitle him to relief, we will affirm.
I.
Innis filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in October 2007
alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent in treating his back injury. He
alleged that in August 2006 he was sitting at a table that flipped over, causing him to fall
to the ground. He sustained injuries to his back and knee and was taken in a wheelchair
to the prison’s hospital. Medical personnel treated him by giving him a cane, an Ace
bandage for his knee, and aspirin. He was also placed on the “sick call list” and was seen
the next day by defendant Myers, a physician’s assistant, who administered an x-ray and
gave Innis more medication. Three days later, he informed a prison guard that he needed
medical attention and returned to the prison’s hospital to receive a cortisone shot. Since
the incident, Innis has been given various medications, but still complains of “back pain,
knee pains, lost [sic] of sleep and headaches” at least once every five days.
The Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending dismissal of Innis’s complaint
because Innis failed to sufficiently plead an Eighth Amendment claim that defendants
acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Magistrate Judge
determined that Innis’s mere disagreement with the treatment offered by the medical
defendants and his assertions that a different type of medical care might be more effective
did not state a claim for relief. Furthermore, Innis could not hold non-medical prison
personnel liable based on a claim of supervisory liability. In response, Innis filed
objections asserting that he was completely denied medical treatment on one occasion by
defendant Myers. Although the District Court agreed with the analysis set forth in the
R&R, the court permitted Innis to amend his complaint based on these assertions.
In his amended complaint, Innis asserted two new deliberate indifference claims
against defendant Myers and two maintenance supervisors. Specifically, Innis alleged
that Myers denied him medical care after he complained of numbness and pain in his back
on January 18, 2008. Innis also claimed that two maintenance supervisors, who were not
named as defendants in the original complaint, were responsible for failing to “fix and
repair[] all maintenance equipment” because they did not adequately repair the table that
collapsed. Finally, Innis asserted that defendant Wilson failed to protect Innis from
defendant Meyer’s “unlawful medical mistreatment.”
The Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending dismissal of Innis’s amended
complaint. The Magistrate Judge declined to revisit the claims from the initial complaint,
finding that the court already indicated that it agreed that Innis failed to state a claim for
relief. The report concluded that Innis’s new claims bore the same deficiencies as those
in the original complaint. For example, Innis’s assertion that he did not receive treatment
on one occasion did not state a claim for deliberate indifference, especially given Innis’s
admissions that defendants repeatedly attempted to treat him. In addition, Innis’s
negligence claims against the maintenance supervisors failed to state a cognizable basis
for relief. The court agreed with these recommendations and adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s report as the opinion of the court. Innis filed motions to alter judgment and for
leave to file a second amended complaint. The court denied both motions and this appeal
followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and conduct de novo review of the
District Court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). We must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable
to a pro se plaintiff. Id. at 229; See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per
curiam). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015, slip op. at 14 (May 18, 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We must dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (e)(2)(B) if it is legally frivolous and may summarily affirm if the appeal presents
no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
To state a claim for a violation under the Eighth Amendment, Innis must allege
“(1) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his] medical needs and (2) that
those needs were serious.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Deliberate indifference requires that prison
officials know of an excessive risk to an inmate’s health or safety and affirmatively
disregard that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 937-88 (1994).
Assuming Innis’s injury amounted to a serious medical need, we agree with the
District Court that his allegations do not indicate deliberate indifference to his medical
condition. To the contrary, Innis conceded that he received medical treatment after the
incident, including being examined by medical personnel and receiving aspirin, a walking
cane, and an Ace bandage. The next day, after he requested a sick call visit, he received
more medication and an x-ray. He also received a cortisone injection in response to his
request for treatment. To the extent that Innis’s allegations indicate that he disagreed
with the course of treatment, he does not state a viable claim for relief. Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (“mere disagreement as to the proper medical
treatment” is insufficient to state a constitutional violation). Absent a belief or actual
knowledge that medical personnel mistreated or failed to treat a prisoner, the non-medical
defendants cannot be charged with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of
deliberate indifference. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Thus, Innis’s deliberate indifference
claims from his original complaint were properly dismissed.
Innis’s claim against Myers in his amended complaint also does not state a claim
for relief under the Eighth Amendment. Even if he had a serious medical need, Innis has
not sufficiently pled deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Farmer, 511 U.S. at
835. Innis’s allegation against Wilson also fail because Innis is attempting to establish
liability based on supervisory liability. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3d Cir. 1988) (liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat
superior, as a defendant must have personal involvement in a civil rights action). Innis
does not allege that Wilson had personal knowledge of his injury and subsequently acted
with deliberate indifference. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Accordingly, these claims were
properly dismissed.
The remaining claims against the maintenance supervisors for failing to fix and
repair the table that collapsed, causing Innis’s injury, were also properly dismissed. Mere
negligence claims do not constitute “deliberate indifference.” See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t
of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197); see also
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). Innis does not allege that defendants
Bailey or Monovich were aware of a risk of a serious injury that could occur and
purposefully failed to take appropriate steps. As the District Court noted, the United
States Constitution is not a “font of tort law.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 847 n. 8 (1998). Accordingly, Innis fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.
IV.
As Innis’s appeal presents no substantial question,1 we will summarily affirm the
District Court judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
1
We perceive no error in the District Court’s denial of Innis’s post-judgment motions.