William Singleton v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                                                        FILED
    Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    Mar 20 2012, 9:11 am
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.                                CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    TIMOTHY J. LEMON                                         GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Knox, Indiana                                            Attorney General of Indiana
    RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    WILLIAM SINGLETON,                                       )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                           )
    )
    vs.                                    )       No. 75A05-1106-CR-346
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                        )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                            )
    APPEAL FROM THE STARKE CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Lizbeth W. Pease, Special Judge
    Cause No. 75C01-0301-FA-0011
    March 20, 2012
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BAILEY, Judge
    1
    Some documents list the trial court cause number as 75C01-0301-FA-001; others use 75C01-0304-FA-001.
    Case Summary
    Pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2, William Singleton (“Singleton”)
    belatedly appeals his convictions for Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter, a Class A felony,2
    and Aggravated Battery, a Class B felony.3              We affirm the Attempted Voluntary
    Manslaughter conviction and remand with instructions to vacate the Aggravated Battery
    conviction and sentence.
    Issues
    Singleton presents three issues for review:
    I.      Whether there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction for
    Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter;
    II.     Whether his multiple convictions violate double jeopardy principles;
    and
    III.    Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to
    properly instruct the jury on Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter.
    Facts and Procedural History
    During the evening of January 8, 2003, Michael Berg (“Berg”) was home watching
    television, when he saw headlights from a vehicle pulling into the driveway. Berg went to
    investigate and saw someone puncture the tires of his vehicle and smash the windshield.
    Berg yelled at the person, who then ran back to a waiting van. When the dome-light of the
    van illuminated, Berg recognized the man as Singleton, the brother-in-law of Berg’s
    deceased wife.
    Singleton started running toward Berg, who expected to be tackled and assumed a
    2
    
    Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1
    , 35-42-1-3.
    3
    
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1
    .5.
    2
    fighting stance. Singleton exclaimed, “I’m going to fuckin kill you,” and Berg felt a sharp
    pain in his chest. (Tr. 31.) Berg began to run. Singleton called after him “I’m going to
    fuckin kill your mom too” and pursued Berg as Berg ran around his mother’s trailer home.
    (Tr. 31.) Berg, who was applying pressure to a wound, could feel blood running through his
    fingers. He ran until he tumbled over a fence into a neighbor’s yard. Singleton gave up the
    pursuit.
    Berg’s neighbor called 9-1-1; emergency responders found Berg in a pool of blood.
    He was airlifted to a hospital in Fort Wayne, where he was treated for a “potentially lethal-
    type wound.” (Tr. 287.) An instrument, likely a knife, had entered Berg’s chest cavity,
    piercing his lung, partially slicing a rib, and passing within a few millimeters of his heart.
    Singleton was arrested and charged with Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter and
    Aggravated Battery. On April 7, 2005, a jury convicted him as charged; the trial court
    entered judgments of conviction upon both counts. Singleton received concurrent sentences
    of thirty and ten years, respectively. On June 1, 2011, Singleton filed a belated notice of
    appeal.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-5-1(a), a person attempts to commit a crime
    when, acting with the culpability required for commission of that crime, he engages in
    conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. A person
    commits voluntary manslaughter when he knowingly or intentionally kills another human
    3
    being while acting under sudden heat. 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3
    (a). The offense is elevated
    from a Class B felony to a Class A felony if it is committed by means of a deadly weapon.
    
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3
    .
    Accordingly, to support a conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, the
    evidence must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Singleton intentionally or
    knowingly attempted to kill Berg, while acting in sudden heat. Singleton claims that the
    evidence fails to establish that he intended to kill Berg.
    Intent is a mental function and therefore, absent an admission, the fact-finder must
    resort to reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances
    to determine whether, from the person’s conduct and the natural consequences thereof, a
    showing or inference of intent to commit that conduct exists. Isom v. State, 
    589 N.E.2d 245
    ,
    247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. Intent to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use
    of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury. Henley v. State, 
    881 N.E.2d 639
    , 652 (Ind. 2008).
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate
    courts must consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting
    the verdict. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind. 2007). In so doing, we do not assess
    witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. 
    Id.
     We will affirm the conviction unless no
    reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt. 
    Id.
    Here, the evidence in favor of the judgment indicates that Singleton shouted to Berg,
    4
    “I’m going to fuckin kill you,” ran toward Berg, and stabbed him in the chest. (Tr. 214.) As
    Berg fled, Singleton continued to chase him, threatening to kill Berg’s mother as well. Berg
    sustained a two-centimeter wide wound, just millimeters from his heart.
    The testimony regarding Singleton’s words and actions is sufficient to permit the jury
    to infer that Singleton intended to kill Berg. Berg’s insistence that the evidence is
    insufficient because a knife was never located is merely an invitation to reweigh the
    evidence. There is sufficient evidence to sustain Singleton’s conviction for Attempted
    Voluntary Manslaughter.
    II. Double Jeopardy
    The double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution provides, “No person shall be
    put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 14. Our Indiana Supreme
    Court has held that two or more offenses are the “same offense” in violation of Indiana’s
    double jeopardy clause if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged
    crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged
    offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense. Richardson v.
    State, 
    717 N.E.2d 32
    , 49 (Ind. 1999).
    Aside from the constitutional actual evidence test, our Indiana Supreme Court has
    identified five common law or statutory double jeopardy categories: (1) conviction and
    punishment for a crime which is a lesser-included offense of another crime for which the
    defendant has been convicted and punished, (2) conviction and punishment for a crime which
    consists of the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted
    5
    and punished, (3) conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act
    as an element of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished, (4)
    conviction and punishment for an enhancement of a crime where the enhancement is imposed
    for the very same behavior or harm as another crime for which the defendant has been
    convicted and punished, and (5) conviction and punishment for the crime of conspiracy
    where the overt act that constitutes an element of the conspiracy charge is the very same act
    as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. Guyton v. State,
    
    771 N.E.2d 1141
    , 1143 (Ind. 2002).
    The second category is implicated here. The State alleged in Count I that Singleton
    committed Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter by stabbing Berg in the chest with a sharp
    object. Count II alleged that Singleton committed Aggravated Battery by stabbing Berg in
    the chest with a sharp object. As the State concedes, a single act having been alleged and
    proven, the multiple convictions cannot stand. We therefore vacate the Aggravated Battery
    conviction.
    III. Jury Instruction
    Finally, Singleton contends that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving
    a jury instruction that added “sudden heat” as an element of the crime of Attempted
    Voluntary Manslaughter to be proven by the State.
    At the time of Singleton’s offense, Indiana’s voluntary manslaughter statute provided:
    A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being while
    acting under sudden heat commits Voluntary Manslaughter, a Class B felony.
    The offense is a Class A felony if it is committed by means of a deadly
    weapon.
    6
    
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3
    . “Sudden heat” is characterized as “anger, rage, resentment, or terror
    sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, preventing deliberation and
    premeditation, excluding malice, and rendering a person incapable of cool reflection.”
    Dearman v. State, 
    743 N.E.2d 757
    , 760 (Ind. 2001). It is not an element of Voluntary
    Manslaughter. Boesch v. State, 
    778 N.E.2d 1276
    , 1279 (Ind. 2002). Rather, it is that which
    distinguishes Voluntary Manslaughter from Murder. 
    Id.
    Here, the jury was instructed:
    The crime of voluntary manslaughter is defined by statute as follows:
    A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being while
    acting under sudden heat and with the use of a deadly weapon commits
    voluntary manslaughter. A person attempts to commit voluntary manslaughter
    when, acting with the culpability required for commission of voluntary
    manslaughter, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward
    commission of voluntary manslaughter. To convict the defendant of attempted
    voluntary manslaughter, the State must have proved each of the following
    beyond a reasonable doubt:
    1.      The Defendant
    2.      knowingly or intentionally
    3.      with intent to kill
    4.      did stab Michael Berg in the chest
    5.      with a deadly weapon
    6.      under sudden heat
    7.      which was conduct constituting a substantial step toward the
    commission of the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
    If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
    you should find the defendant not guilty under Count I.
    If the State did prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you
    should find the defendant guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter under
    Count I.
    (App. 61.) As such, the instruction did not properly state that “sudden heat” is a mitigating
    factor, reducing what would otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter. However, the
    7
    fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes
    a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the
    resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. Delarosa v. State, 
    938 N.E.2d 690
    , 694 (Ind. 2010). This exception is available only in egregious circumstances. 
    Id.
    Here, the State did not charge Singleton with Attempted Murder. The jury was not
    asked to determine whether Attempted Murder should be reduced to Attempted Voluntary
    Manslaughter due to the existence of the mitigating factor of “sudden heat.” Rather, the
    State had conceded mitigation. In these circumstances, we fail to see how Singleton was
    prejudiced by the inclusion of “sudden heat” as if it were an element of the charged crime.
    Conclusion
    There is sufficient evidence to support Singleton’s conviction for Attempted
    Voluntary Manslaughter. His conviction for Aggravated Battery, arising from the same act,
    is vacated. He has demonstrated no fundamental error in the instruction of the jury.
    Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.
    BAKER, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 75A05-1106-CR-346

Filed Date: 3/20/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021