Conn v. Lavan , 331 F. App'x 122 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-28-2009
    Conn v. Lavan
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-4444
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    Recommended Citation
    "Conn v. Lavan" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1300.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1300
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4444
    ____________
    JOHN CONN,
    Appellant
    vs.
    THOMAS LAVAN; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE
    COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE ATTORNEY
    GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
    ____________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Civ. No. 04-CV-01990)
    District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    March 2, 2009
    Before: BARRY, WEIS and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: May 28, 2009)
    ____________
    OPINION
    WEIS, Circuit Judge.
    John Conn appeals the District Court’s order denying his habeas corpus
    petition. We will affirm.
    1
    On February 20, 1981, a jury empaneled in the Court of Common Pleas of
    Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, convicted Conn of second degree murder, arson,
    burglary, and theft. The convictions arose from a series of events in which Martha
    Greiss, an elderly, deaf woman was killed and her house was burgled and set ablaze.
    Conn was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for murder and a
    consecutive term of five to ten years for arson.
    After exhausting his direct appeal capabilities, Conn filed a pro se petition
    under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.,
    raising a number of claims for relief. The Court of Common Pleas denied his petition.
    The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed on October 2, 2003, and the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on February 18, 2004.
    On May 7, 2004, Conn filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus in the
    District Court. In that petition, Conn set forth a claim he had pursued during his PCRA
    proceedings – that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel
    failed to investigate or call Robert Dugan as a witness. On June 7, 2004, Conn filed a
    motion to amend his habeas corpus petition. The District Court granted Conn’s motion
    on June 9, stating, “Petitioner’s amendment shall be filed by July 9, 2004.” Conn filed an
    amended petition on July 7, 2004, that raised seven additional issues.
    A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on Conn’s petition
    on January 31, 2005. With respect to the claim that he received ineffective assistance of
    2
    counsel because his trial counsel failed to call for Dugan’s testimony, the magistrate
    judge found that the Pennsylvania Superior Court reasonably applied Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984). The magistrate judge also determined that the
    remainder of Conn’s claims, which were presented in his amended petition, were barred
    by the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).1 Accordingly, the magistrate
    judge recommended that Conn’s petition be denied.
    In an order entered August 31, 2005, the District Court approved and
    adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation over Conn’s objections and
    denied his habeas corpus petition in its entirety. Subsequently, on January 22, 2008, we
    granted Conn’s petition for a certificate of appealability as to the following issues:
    “1) whether [Conn’s] trial attorney was ineffective for failing
    to investigate or call Robert Dugan as a witness; and 2)
    whether the District Court erred in denying appellant
    equitable tolling because the Magistrate Judge’s order
    granting his motion to amend misled him into believing he
    had until July 9, 2004, to add his new claims.”
    Since the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review of
    its order is plenary. Holland v. Horn, 
    519 F.3d 107
    , 111 (3d Cir. 2008).
    We will address the ineffective assistance of counsel issue first. Conn
    argues that the Pennsylvania Superior Court “utterly failed” in applying Strickland to his
    1
    28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides, with qualifications, a general one-year
    period of limitations for persons in custody pursuant to a state court judgment to file a
    petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    3
    PCRA petition.
    We agree with the District Court that the Superior Court’s application of
    Strickland was not unreasonable. “[A] federal court may not grant a state prisoner’s
    habeas application unless the relevant state-court decision ‘was contrary to, or involved
    an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
    Supreme Court of the United States.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 
    129 S. Ct. 1411
    , 1418
    (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Given the overwhelming qualitative and
    quantitative evidence of Conn’s guilt at trial and our “doubly deferential” review in this
    case, 
    id. at 1420,
    we cannot say that the Superior Court’s conclusion was unreasonable.
    Conn did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of his trial
    would have been different had counsel investigated Dugan’s knowledge of the events at
    issue or called Dugan as a witness. See 
    id. at 1422
    (to establish the “prejudice” that
    Strickland requires, a claimant of ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate “a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
    proceeding would have been different” (quoting 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    )).
    Consequently, Conn is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his claim that he received
    ineffective assistance of counsel.
    We do not have authority to review the second issue identified in the
    certificate of appealability – whether the District Court erred in denying equitable tolling
    of § 2244(d)’s statute of limitations for the remaining claims presented in the amended
    4
    habeas corpus petition.
    The Supreme Court has held that when a District Court denies a habeas
    corpus petition on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability “should issue . . .
    when the prisoner shows . . . ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
    petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
    would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’”
    Jimenez v. Quarterman, 
    129 S. Ct. 681
    , 684 n.3 (2009) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000)).
    The District Court’s denial of the seven habeas claims first presented in the
    amended petition of July 7, 2004, was founded on a procedural basis. Conn has not
    demonstrated that jurists of reason would debate that any of the seven issues first
    presented in that petition state a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. After
    further review, we conclude that we improvidently granted the certificate of appealability
    on the equitable tolling issue. See Khaimov v. Crist, 
    297 F.3d 783
    , 786 (8th Cir. 2002) (a
    certificate of appealability initially granted by the Court of Appeals was improvidently
    granted in an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition because, while the
    District Court’s resolution of procedural issues was debatable, the substantive
    constitutional claims raised by the petitioner were meritless). Consequently, we lack
    jurisdiction over the equitable tolling issue we identified in the certificate of appealability.
    See Lambert v. Blackwell, 
    387 F.3d 210
    , 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[w]e only have jurisdiction
    5
    if this Court or a District Court has properly issued a certificate of appealability pursuant
    to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)”).
    In sum, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the procedural issue, but
    will affirm the District Court’s order denying Conn’s habeas corpus petition.
    6