Tamara Sue Forrester v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    DAVID W. STONE IV                              GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Lawrenceburg, Indiana                          Attorney General of Indiana
    ANGELA N. SANCHEZ
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    FILED
    Mar 14 2012, 9:29 am
    IN THE
    CLERK
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA                               of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    TAMARA SUE FORRESTER,                          )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )      No. 48A04-1108-CR-453
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                              )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Rudolph R. Pyle III, Judge
    Cause No. 48C01-0512-FD-487
    March 14, 2012
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BRADFORD, Judge
    Appellant-Defendant Tamara Sue Forrester appeals following the trial court‟s
    revocation of her probation, contending that the trial court erred in calculating the credit
    time to which she was entitled. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On February 2, 2007, Forrester pled guilty to operating a vehicle as a habitual
    traffic violator, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Forrester to three years of
    incarceration, with six months to be served on home detention and two and one-half years
    suspended to probation. Forrester successfully completed home detention. On June 2,
    2010, the trial court found that Forrester had violated the terms of her probation and
    extended her probationary term by one year to February 11, 2012.
    On November 22, 2010, the trial court again found that Forrester had violated the
    terms of her probation and ordered that two years of her sentence be executed. The trial
    court ordered the sanction to be stayed pending Forrester‟s successful completion of
    Mental Health Court. On January 12, 2011, Forrester was rejected for Mental Health
    Court. On February 23, 2011, the trial court ordered 294 days of Forrester‟s sentence to
    be served. The trial court gave Forrester credit for 147 days served between September
    29, 2010, and February 23, 2011, plus Class I credit time for that period.
    On August 1, 2011, the trial court again found that Forrester had violated the terms
    of her probation and ordered that 725 days of her previously-suspended sentence be
    executed. The trial court credited Forrester for 182 days of incarceration plus Class I
    credit for that amount of time.
    2
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    Whether the Trial Court Correctly Calculated Forrester’s Credit Time
    “Generally, because pre-sentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right, trial
    courts „do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit.‟” James v. State, 
    872 N.E.2d 669
    , 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Molden v. State, 
    750 N.E.2d 448
    , 449
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). “However, „those sentencing decisions not mandated by statute
    are within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of
    abuse of that discretion.‟” 
    Id.
     (quoting Molden, 
    750 N.E.2d at 449
    ).
    Forrester‟s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erroneously failed to
    give her Class I credit time, in addition to credit for time served, for the time she served
    on home detention. Forrester relies on this court‟s decision in Cottingham v. State, 
    952 N.E.2d 245
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. granted. In Cottingham, we concluded that a
    statutory amendment effective July 1, 2010, allowing persons serving home detention to
    earn Class I credit time, was retroactive in application. 
    Id. at 249
    . On December 19,
    2011, however, the Indiana Supreme Court granted the State‟s petition for transfer in that
    case, vacating our opinion.
    For its part, the State draws our attention to our decision in Brown v. State, 
    947 N.E.2d 486
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, in which we concluded that the
    amendments effective July 1, 2010, did not have retroactive effect. 
    Id. at 489-90
    . Brown
    is still good law (indeed, Forrester does not argue that it was wrongly decided), and we,
    finding its analysis to be compelling, see no reason to stray from its holding. We
    conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to give Forrester Class I credit for time
    3
    she served on home detention.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    KIRSCH, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 48A04-1108-CR-453

Filed Date: 3/14/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021