Thomas Washam v. Louis Stesis , 321 F. App'x 104 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    4-10-2009
    Thomas Washam v. Louis Stesis
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 08-3869
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    Recommended Citation
    "Thomas Washam v. Louis Stesis" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1551.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1551
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    DLD-121                                                     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 08-3869
    THOMAS S. WASHAM,
    Appellant
    v.
    LOUIS G. STESIS;
    DEBORAH GASTON;
    KAREN J. CUBA, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
    AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-2907)
    District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    March 5, 2009
    Before: BARRY, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: April 10, 2009)
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM
    Thomas Washam, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the decision of the District
    Court granting the Defendant-Appellees’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6). We agree with the decision of the District Court and will dismiss the appeal
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
    I
    In October 1987, Washam was convicted in the Delaware County Court of
    Common Pleas (DCCCP) of first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life
    imprisonment. He received no relief on direct appeal and, between 1991 and 2006, filed
    several petitions for post-conviction relief, both at the state and federal levels. All such
    petitions were denied or dismissed.
    In August 2007, Washam filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
    Washam’s complaint alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by the
    “malfeasance” of Louis Stesis, a Delaware County Assistant District Attorney; the
    “nonfeasance” of Deborah Gaston, the Director of the Office of Judicial Support for the
    DCCCP; and the “misfeasance” of Karen Cuba, the Administrator of the Jury
    Commission for the DCCCP. In effect, Washam argues that the Defendants’ acts amount
    to a Batson violation. Stesis, followed by Gaston and Cuba, filed motions to dismiss
    Washam’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
    which the District Court granted. Washam filed a timely notice of appeal.
    II
    A federal court must dismiss the complaint or appeal of a plaintiff proceeding in
    2
    forma pauperis if the action is “frivolous.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The United States
    Supreme Court clarified this standard in Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    (1989),
    stating that a complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
    
    fact.” 490 U.S. at 325
    .
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review
    over the District Court order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See McGovern v.
    Philadelphia, 
    554 F.3d 114
    , 115 (3d Cir. 2009). “We accept all well-pleaded allegations
    in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [Washam’s] favor.” 
    Id. Because Washam
    is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See Haines v.
    Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 521 (1972). “The District Court’s judgment is proper only if,
    accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most
    favorable to [Washam], we determine that [Washam] is not entitled to relief under any
    reasonable reading of the complaint.” 
    McGovern, 554 F.3d at 115
    .
    The District Court reasoned that Washam’s § 1983 complaint is barred on three
    grounds. First, Washam’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. A two-year statute
    of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising from conduct in Pennsylvania. See
    Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 
    142 F.3d 582
    , 599 (3d Cir. 1998). A §
    1983 “cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury
    upon which [the] action is based.” 
    Id. The District
    Court determined that because
    Washam seeks relief based on an alleged Batson violation at his 1987 murder trial, his
    3
    complaint was filed long after the expiration of the limitations period. We agree.
    We also agree with the District Court’s determination that Washam’s claim is
    barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    (1994). Under Heck, a plaintiff may not
    pursue a claim under § 1983 for actions that would directly or implicitly call into question
    the validity of his conviction unless he demonstrates that the “conviction or sentence has
    been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
    tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
    court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 
    Id. at 486-87.
    Because Washam’s § 1983
    complaint seeks relief for conduct that he alleges resulted in an improper conviction due
    to a Batson violation, and because that conviction still stands, dismissal under Rule
    12(b)(6) is appropriate.
    Finally, the District Court reasoned that Washam’s claim must be dismissed
    because all three defendants are entitled to immunity. Defendants Gaston and Cuba are
    entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity, which applies to court staff acting in their
    official capacities. See Marcedes v. Barrett, 
    453 F.2d 391
    , 391 (3d Cir. 1971). Likewise,
    because prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil suits under § 1983 for their
    performance of typical prosecutorial functions and activities, Defendant Stesis is entitled
    to prosecutorial immunity.1 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 
    509 U.S. 259
    , 272-73 (1993);
    1
    Notably, Stesis was not even the prosecutor involved in Washam’s murder trial.
    Rather, he represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in Washam’s PCRA
    proceedings.
    4
    Impler v. Pactman, 
    424 U.S. 409
    , 430 (1976). We agree with the District Court.
    Accordingly, Washam’s complaint “lacks an arguable basis [] in law,” Neitzke v.
    Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325 (1989), and we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).2
    2
    Washam also seeks to appeal the District Court’s denial of his “motion in opposition”
    to the Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions. The District Court correctly denied his motion
    as moot because the Rule 12(b)(6) motions were granted one month prior to Washam’s
    opposition, and concluded that his motion could not be construed as a motion to
    reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because it was untimely. As such, an appeal from
    that order would also be frivolous under Neitzke.
    5