Jeanette Seaman v. Comm Social Security , 321 F. App'x 134 ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-9-2009
Jeanette Seaman v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-3425
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3425
___________
JEANETTE B. SEAMAN,
Appellant
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-01855)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas M. Golden
__________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 24, 2009
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 9, 2009)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM
Jeanette Seaman appeals the District Court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of her request for benefits. We will affirm.
In February 2002, Seaman filed an application for disability insurance benefits.
Seaman alleged a disability beginning January 17, 2002, based on a degenerative disease
of the neck and back and a vision problem. After the initial denial of Seaman’s
application, she received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The
ALJ found that Seaman was not disabled under the Social Security Act and the Appeals
Council denied her request for review.
While the ALJ concluded that Seaman did not have a severe visual impairment, he
found that the medical evidence of record established that Seaman’s cervical and lumbar
disc diseases were severe medically determinable impairments which limited her to the
exertional requirements of sedentary work. The ALJ further determined, however, that
Seaman retained the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of sedentary
exertional work, including the requirements of her past relevant work as a medical
transcriptionist both as she performed it and as it is generally performed in the national
economy. See Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546, 550-51 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing 5-
step process). Seaman sought review of the ALJ’s decision, which became the final
decision of the Commissioner, in the District Court. The District Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation over Seaman’s objections and affirmed
the ALJ’s decision. This timely appeal followed.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have
jurisdiction over Seaman’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s legal conclusions. Allen v. Barnhart,
417 F.3d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2005). We review the factual findings in the ALJ’s decision
for substantial evidence. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).
Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions, we agree with the
District Court and will adopt its reasoning. Other than the exceptions noted below,
which, like the District Court, we find harmless, the ALJ properly considered, discussed
and weighed the relevant evidence pertaining to Seaman’s disability allegations. See
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001).
Consistent with the regulations, the ALJ determined that while Seaman had an
impairment or combination of impairments considered severe, the subjective allegations
of her limitations and complaints of pain were not fully credible in light of the medical
evidence and Seaman’s self-reported activities of daily living. See Hartranft v. Apfel,
181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover, we agree that, even assuming arguendo the
ALJ erred in failing to find evidence of spinal stenosis, such error was harmless insofar as
Seaman failed to establish the remaining requirements set forth in Listed Impairment
1.04.
The same holds true with respect to the ALJ’s apparent failure to consider the
combined effect of all of Seaman’s impairments (including her non-severe vision
problem), given the ALJ’s finding that Seaman was capable of performing her past work
as a medical transcriptionist. The District Court properly noted that, despite Seaman’s
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perceived inability to remain a productive member of the work force given certain
technological advances in her chosen profession, substantial evidence exists in the record
to support the ALJ’s finding that she is not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 22 (2003) (“SSA may determine that
a claimant is not disabled because she remains physically and mentally able to do her
previous work, without investigating whether that previous work exists in significant
numbers in the national economy.”). We are not at liberty to engage in the type of de
novo review that Seaman requests we undertake in this appeal. Like the District Court,
we review the ALJ’s findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard, and we
must affirm if those findings are supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). On
the record presented, a reasonable mind could certainly accept as adequate the evidence
supporting the ALJ’s finding that Seaman’s impairments did not result in functional
limitations which prevented her from “lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers and small tools,” see 20
C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), and, as such, that she retains the residual functional capacity to
perform a full range of sedentary exertional work, including the requirements of her past
relevant work as a medical transcriptionist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565.
Finally, Seaman’s request that we “change the law” in this case is not one we can
grant inasmuch as the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress and not the courts.
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The District Court provided Seaman with a full and fair opportunity to present her case
and reviewed her claims under the appropriate standard. Accordingly, we will affirm the
order of the District Court.
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