Monty Shelton v. Beinvenido Leon , 648 F. App'x 491 ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 14-41292      Document: 00513514567         Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/20/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-41292
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    May 20, 2016
    MONTY SHELTON,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    BEINVENIDO LEON, Unit Counselor; MICHAEL MATTIS, Treatment
    Specialist; PATRICK POWDRILL, Treatment Specialist,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:12-CV-461
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Monty Shelton, federal prisoner # 10426-078, brought this Bivens action
    against the defendants, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment
    rights by failing to protect him from another inmate.                 The district court
    dismissed Shelton’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 after determining that
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-41292        Document: 00513514567           Page: 2     Date Filed: 05/20/2016
    No. 14-41292
    the complaint was time barred. Our review is de novo. Harris v. Hegmann,
    
    198 F.3d 153
    , 156 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, exhaustion of administrative
    remedies is “required for any suit challenging prison conditions,” including a
    Bivens claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 
    548 U.S. 81
    , 85 (2006). As the district court
    noted, Shelton concedes that even to date, he has never exhausted his
    administrative remedies. See Huff v. Neal, 555 F. App’x 289, 292–93 (5th Cir.
    2014) (describing the Bureau of Prisons’ four-step administrative process for
    resolving grievances by inmates, which generally requires an inmate to file
    within twenty days of the incident both an informal resolution form (BP–8) and
    a formal Administrative Remedy Request (BP–9) to begin the process).
    Shelton argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was
    transferred to state custody a mere three days after the assault and was not
    provided federal administrative forms. However, he was returned to federal
    custody in 2005 and yet still waited until 2012 to file any administrative form
    with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). 1 Even if Shelton had had the benefit of
    equitable tolling during the time he was in state custody, his 2012 filing still
    would not have met the twenty-day deadline for filing the BP-8 and BP-9
    forms. Furthermore, Shelton has never filed the remaining administrative
    forms necessary to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Huff, 555 F.
    App’x at 293 (explaining that there are four steps to exhausting BOP
    1 Shelton argues that he should be exempt from the administrative deadlines because
    when he returned to federal custody in 2005 and attempted to utilize the administrative
    process, his counselor told him it was too late to file a grievance since the assault had occurred
    thirteen months earlier. While we have granted equitable tolling when a defendant “has
    actively misled a plaintiff about the cause of action or has prevented him ‘in some
    extraordinary way from asserting his rights,’” Shelton’s counselor’s advice was technically
    correct and, more importantly, there is no evidence the defendants actually prevented
    Shelton from filing an administrative form. Wilson v. US Penitentiary Leavenworth, 450 F.
    App’x 397, 399 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Teemac v. Henderson, 
    298 F.3d 452
    , 456 (5th Cir.
    2002)).
    2
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    No. 14-41292
    administrative remedies, which requires filing forms BP–8 through BP–11,
    and “[a]n inmate has not exhausted his administrative remedies until his claim
    has been denied at all levels”).      Because Shelton has not exhausted his
    administrative remedies, the district court properly dismissed his complaint.
    
    Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90
    , 93–94 (holding that exhaustion of administrative
    remedies is still required to bring a federal suit, even when administrative
    remedies are no longer available due to the inmate’s failure to meet the
    administrative deadlines: “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an
    agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . . .”).
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-41292

Citation Numbers: 648 F. App'x 491

Filed Date: 5/20/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023