Bert Allen, III v. Amer Fedr Govt Empl ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    3-18-2009
    Bert Allen, III v. Amer Fedr Govt Empl
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 08-3616
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    Recommended Citation
    "Bert Allen, III v. Amer Fedr Govt Empl" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1725.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1725
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    CLD-91                                                      NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-3616
    ___________
    BERT JOHN ALLEN, III,
    Appellant
    v.
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES;
    AFL-CIO; NATIONAL COUNCIL OF PRISONS LOCAL C-33;
    ALL KNOWN AND UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES; UNKNOWN TITAN GROUP
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-02213)
    District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
    __________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    January 29, 2009
    Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: March 18, 2009)
    _________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Bert John Allen, III, filed pro se this civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
    1331, against the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, the
    National Council of Prisons Local C-33, all known and unknown employees, and the
    Titan Group. In his complaint, Allen alleged that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to
    permit torture, rape, and abuse to white Christian inmates throughout the prison system.
    In addition, Allen alleged that Defendants retaliated against him because of prior lawsuits
    and interfered with his access to the courts. The District Court for the Middle District of
    Pennsylvania dismissed his entire claim, sua sponte, as frivolous. Allen timely appealed.
    We affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the conspiracy claims, but vacated the
    dismissal of Allen’s retaliation and access to the courts claims and remanded the matter
    for further proceedings. Allen v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, No. 06-4943, 
    2008 WL 1823425
    (3d Cir. April 24, 2008). On June 25, 2008, the District Court issued an order
    directing Allen to file within fifteen days an amended complaint setting forth his claims
    of retaliation and access to the courts. An amended claim was not filed. On July 23,
    2008, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to comply with a
    court order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(2). Allen timely appeals. For the foregoing
    reasons, we will summarily affirm.
    We review the district court’s dismissal under an abuse of discretion standard. See
    Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 
    804 F.2d 805
    , 807 (3d Cir. 1986). We acknowledge
    2
    that dismissal with prejudice is a harsh remedy which a court should resort to only in rare
    cases, as the law favors the resolution of a litigant’s claim on the merits. Spain v.
    Gallegos, 
    26 F.3d 439
    , 454 (3d Cir. 1994). A court may dismiss a case with prejudice for
    want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) in order to achieve the orderly and
    expeditious disposition of cases, however. 
    Id. Ordinarily, when
    a court determines either
    sua sponte or upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, the court must consider
    the following factors: 1) extent of the party’s personal responsibility; 2) prejudice to the
    opponent; 3) any history of dilatoriness; 4) whether the conduct of the party or the
    attorney was willful or in bad faith; 5) whether effective alternative sanctions are
    available; and 6) the meritoriousness of the claim or the defense. See Poulis v. State
    Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
    747 F.2d 863
    , 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
    In this case, the District Court directed Allen to file an amended complaint within
    15 days of the order being issued. No complaint was filed on Allen’s behalf. Allen’s
    failure to file an amended complaint plausibly signaled to the Court that he was not
    pursuing his claim. Moreover, the refusal to file an amended complaint, would have left
    the District Court uncertain of the contours of Allen’s claims. Under these particular
    circumstances, we do not think it was error that the District Court did not explicitly weigh
    the Poulis factors. Allowing the matter to continue would not have helped Allen take
    steps to prosecute his claim. See 
    id. (the district
    court was relieved from addressing the
    Poulis factors and correctly dismissed a suit where the plaintiff refused to prosecute her
    3
    claim); Guyer v. Beard, 
    907 F.2d 1424
    , 1429 (3d Cir. 1990) (dismissal of a habeas
    petition, without balancing the Poulis factors was proper because the petitioner refused to
    obey the district court’s order). The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
    dismissed Allen’s claim for failure to prosecute.         We note that after he filed his
    notice of appeal, Allen filed an affidavit with the District Court indicating, perhaps, that
    he did not receive the District Court’s order requiring him to respond within 15 days.1 As
    the affidavit post-dated the filing of Allen’s notice of appeal, its handling is not properly
    before us. The District Court may wish, however, to consider whether Allen’s arguments
    provide a basis for reopening the matter. See Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b); Haines v. Kerner 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972).
    Accordingly, we will summarily affirm. See I.O.P. 10.6. The motion for
    appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace, 
    6 F.3d 147
    , 153-54 (3d Cir.
    1993).
    1
    Allen makes this contention more clearly in his notice of appeal and a statement
    submitted in support of his appeal.
    4