Directv Holdings, L.L.C. v. NLRB , 650 F. App'x 846 ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 15-60257      Document: 00513526777         Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/31/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-60257                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    DIRECTV HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,                                                   May 31, 2016
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Petitioner, Cross-Respondent                                      Clerk
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Respondent, Cross-Petitioner
    On Petitions for Review of an Order
    of the National Labor Relations Board
    NLRB No. 21-CA-39546
    Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    HAYNES, Circuit Judge:*
    DIRECTV Holdings, L.L.C. (“DirecTV”) petitions this court for review of
    a final order of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), which affirmed
    the determination of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that DirecTV
    unlawfully discharged Gregory Edmonds due to his union activity. The NLRB
    cross-petitions for enforcement of the order. 1 Because we determine that the
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1 Both petitions concern only the NLRB’s decision regarding Edmonds.                     The
    lawfulness of DirecTV’s work rules and policies is not before us.
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    decision of the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence, we GRANT the
    petition for review and DENY the cross-petition for enforcement.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    DirecTV provides satellite television to its customers. Gregory Edmonds
    began working for DirecTV Home Services as an Installer in the fall of 2007.
    He worked out of DirecTV’s Riverside facility, at which Freddy Zambrano was
    the Site Manager. Scott Thomas was the Regional Director of Operations, and
    Adrian Dimech was the Vice President of Operations for Southern California,
    including the Riverside facility. The International Union of Machinists and
    Aerospace Workers filed a charge with the NLRB, alleging in part that
    Edmonds was terminated for engaging in protected activity. Beginning on July
    19, 2011, a two-day hearing was conducted before the ALJ.
    According to the evidence presented before the ALJ, during Edmonds’s
    tenure at DirecTV, he scored well for customer satisfaction and received two
    raises. Edmonds testified before the ALJ that Zambrano asked him to apply
    for a supervisor position, although Edmonds ultimately decided not to submit
    an application. At the same time, however, Edmonds was subject to corrective
    actions on nine occasions while employed at DirecTV, and, for the most part,
    these corrective actions concerned performance issues.      He received seven
    warnings, at least two of which were “final” warnings, meaning that future
    incidents could be grounds for termination.
    At some point in the spring or summer of 2010, Edmonds met with union
    representatives at the home of his coworker Brandon Ojeda. According to
    Edmonds, the union representatives told him to get a feel for who would be
    interested in joining the union, and Edmonds subsequently spoke to several
    coworkers about this topic.
    2
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    After the meeting at Ojeda’s home, on a Saturday morning in either May
    or June of 2010, 2 there was a mandatory meeting at the Riverside facility. The
    precise purpose of and topics discussed at this meeting are the subject of some
    dispute between the parties. According to Dimech, who led the meeting, its
    purpose was to notify the Riverside facility about the results of a union election
    that had occurred at the Rancho Dominguez facility. 3 According to Edmonds,
    Dimech was inquiring about what issues he could address because “[i]f
    everything was taken care of on that level, then there really wouldn’t be a need
    for a union in his mind.” Edmonds further testified that at the meeting, he
    complained about not being compensated for time that he spent driving to help
    the facility in San Diego, as well as other compensation issues.                  He also
    testified that he stated that “if we were a collective body[,] . . . maybe the
    company might hear us,” and that in response to this comment Dimech “just
    kind of turned red faced and didn’t really have much of a response at all.”
    Immediately following this meeting, Dimech approached Edmonds to
    discuss what he could do about the issues that were brought up at the meeting.
    He also gave Edmonds his business card. Corporate later informed Edmonds
    that he was going to be paid for the travel-time issue that he raised at the
    meeting. Edmonds testified that a couple of days after the meeting, Zambrano
    said, “[w]ell, we’re going to go out and [Quality Control] all of [Edmonds]’s jobs
    today.” Quality control refers to quality checks on an installer’s work. A
    coworker who overheard the comment testified that it was equivalent to saying
    that Edmonds was going to be kept under surveillance.
    2The precise date of this meeting was a matter of dispute before the ALJ, and the ALJ
    did not make a finding as to the date of the meeting. While DirecTV contended the meeting
    occurred on May 22, 2010, the General Counsel maintained it did not occur until June.
    3The ALJ apparently discredited this testimony, finding that Dimech attended the
    meeting to prevent the unionization efforts at Rancho Dominguez from spreading to
    Riverside.
    3
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    The parties also entered evidence relating to two incidents that occurred
    May 30, 2010, and June 14, 2010, respectively. On May 30, 2010, Edmonds
    was involved in a car accident while driving the company vehicle. On June 14,
    2010, a customer complaint was elevated to the Office of the President. In this
    complaint, a customer alleged that Edmonds was late to an appointment and
    did not adequately apprise him of the actual arrival time. Edmonds was not
    disciplined for either of these incidents.
    On the morning of July 21, 2010, Edmonds was waiting to get equipment
    for his day’s work, 4 when he saw Zambrano enter the warehouse. In front of
    approximately fifty coworkers, Edmonds told Zambrano, “Freddy, can’t you do
    something about this f*ing line? I stand in this f*ing line ten hours a day.” In
    response, Zambrano walked over to Edmonds, put his arms out, and said
    “[n]obody cut in front of Greg. Okay?”
    The next day, Edmonds’s supervisor told him that Zambrano wanted to
    talk to him. Zambrano gave Edmonds an Employee Consultation Form that
    noted Edmonds was being suspended for insubordination due to the July 21
    incident. Edmonds subsequently apologized to Zambrano for his outburst.
    According to Edmonds, when he asked Zambrano if he was going to be fired,
    Zambrano responded, “No. When you get back from your suspension, you’ll go
    back to work.” After the suspension, however, Zambrano told Edmonds that
    after talking with Scott Thomas and the human resources department,
    4   The wait to get equipment was a large source of frustration among installers.
    Edmonds testified that on some occasions he would wait for materials upwards of an hour.
    Installers are paid on a piecework basis for the installations they complete. The more
    installations they complete, the more money they make. However, they also have an hourly
    rate if an Installer does not make a certain amount of pay via the piecework pay system.
    Edmonds was concerned that by waiting in line, he had less time to complete installations,
    and thus his effective hourly rate would be lower.
    4
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    Edmonds’s employment was being terminated. According to Zambrano, 5 he
    had to advise Thomas and human resources of termination decisions, and
    Zambrano told an employee from human resources that he reviewed
    Edmonds’s personnel file and Edmonds was on a final warning. Zambrano
    testified that he made the decision to terminate Edmonds on July 23.
    Edmonds was not the only employee to be terminated for directing
    profanity at a superior. DirecTV entered evidence of six other employees who
    were disciplined in the Southern California region for similar conduct.
    After the hearing, the ALJ determined that Edmonds had been engaged
    in protected union activity, but that the July 21, 2010, outburst did not itself
    constitute protected activity. He further determined that DirecTV was aware
    of this activity and disliked unionization. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that
    Edmonds was discharged in violation of the National Labor Relations Act
    (“NLRA”). After a lengthy procedural history, 6 the NLRB issued the order at
    issue in this case on March 31, 2015, affirming the decision of the ALJ as it
    related to Edmonds’s termination. DirecTV now petitions this court for review
    of the NLRB’s decision, and the NLRB cross-petitions for enforcement.
    5The ALJ found that Zambrano was not a credible witness because he “gave succinct
    responses to leading questions in a manner that he believed would be most beneficial to
    [DirecTV]’s position, regardless of their accuracy.”
    6 The NLRB issued its initial order in this case on January 25, 2013, and the parties
    petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review and enforcement of that order. While that petition
    was pending, the Supreme Court issued NLRB v. Noel Canning, 
    134 S. Ct. 2550
    (2014),
    wherein it determined that the appointments of three members of the NLRB were invalid.
    In accordance with Noel Canning, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the NLRB for
    further consideration. In its March 31, 2015, decision and order, the NLRB reviewed the
    ALJ’s decision de novo as well as the NLRB’s January 25, 2013, decision and order. The
    NLRB generally agreed with the rationale set forth in the January 25, 2013, decision and
    order, and incorporated its reasoning by reference.
    5
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    II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    We have jurisdiction to review or enforce the NLRB’s order pursuant to
    29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f).
    We will affirm the NLRB’s factual findings if they are supported by
    substantial evidence on the record, considered as a whole. Poly-Am., Inc. v.
    NLRB, 
    260 F.3d 465
    , 476 (5th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence is that which
    is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion.     It is more than a mere scintilla, and less than a
    preponderance.” El Paso Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 
    681 F.3d 651
    , 656 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (emphasis omitted) (quoting Spellman v. Shalala, 
    1 F.3d 357
    , 360 (5th Cir.
    1993)). Under this deferential standard of review, “the ALJ’s decision must be
    upheld if a reasonable person could have found what the ALJ found, even if
    the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion had the matter
    been presented to it in the first instance.” Standard Fittings Co. v. NLRB, 
    845 F.2d 1311
    , 1314 (5th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, we are bound by the ALJ’s
    credibility determinations unless “(1) the credibility choice is unreasonable,
    (2) the choice contradicts other findings, (3) the choice is based upon
    inadequate reasons or no reason, or (4) the ALJ failed to justify his choice.”
    Asarco, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    86 F.3d 1401
    , 1406 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing NLRB v.
    Motorola, Inc., 
    991 F.2d 278
    , 282 (5th Cir. 1993)).
    We review questions of law de novo, but will defer to the NLRB’s legal
    conclusions if they are reasonably grounded in the law and not inconsistent
    with the NLRA. 
    Poly-Am, 260 F.3d at 476
    .
    III. Discussion
    A.
    Under the NLRA, an employer may not engage in “discrimination in
    regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
    to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C.
    6
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    § 158(a)(3). Additionally, an employer may not “interfere with, restrain, or
    coerce employees in the exercise of [their collective bargaining rights].” 
    Id. § 158(a)(1).
    7 An employer violates the NLRA by taking an adverse employment
    action against an employee for engaging in protected union activity. New
    Orleans Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., Ltd. v. NLRB, 
    201 F.3d 592
    , 600 (5th
    Cir. 2000).
    Under the so-called Wright Line test, the NLRB’s General Counsel must
    first establish that the employee’s protected union activity was a motivating
    factor in the employer’s adverse employment decision. 
    Id. at 600–01
    (adopting
    the test set forth in Wright Line, 
    251 N.L.R.B. 1083
    (NLRB 1980)). Once the
    General Counsel meets this burden, the burden shifts to the employer to show
    that the adverse employment action would have occurred in the absence of the
    protected activity. 
    Id. at 601.
                                                 B.
    Evidence supporting the “motivating factor” determination is very weak.
    Evaluating this issue is complicated by the lack of ALJ finding on when the
    disputed “May or June” meeting occurred.                  If it occurred in May, then
    Zambrano’s failure to use the car accident and customer complaint to fire
    Edmonds substantially undercuts the “motivating factor” conclusion.                      See
    
    Asarco, 86 F.3d at 1409
    ; Vermeer Mfg. Co., 
    187 N.L.R.B. 888
    , 892 & n.30
    (NLRB 1971). However, even if we assume arguendo that Edmonds’s protected
    union activity was a motivating factor in his termination, we conclude that the
    NLRB’s determination that DirecTV failed to establish that it would have
    7 “Although §§ [158(a)(1)] and (a)(3) are not coterminous, a violation of § [158(a)(3)]
    constitutes a derivative violation of § [158(a)(1)].” Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
    460 U.S. 693
    ,
    698 n.4 (1983).
    7
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    terminated Edmonds in the absence of his protected union activity was not
    supported by substantial evidence.
    It was undisputed that on July 21, 2010, Edmonds directed profanity
    toward his superior, Zambrano, in front of numerous coworkers. It was also
    undisputed that Edmonds had a lengthy disciplinary history at DirecTV, and
    had received nine violations in a period of less than three years. On multiple
    occasions, DirecTV warned Zambrano that “[i]mmediate satisfactory and
    sustained improvement must be shown or further disciplinary action may be
    taken up to and including termination.” In fact, at the time of the July 21,
    2010, incident, Zambrano was on a final warning, meaning that he could be
    terminated for further violations.
    The ALJ’s decision set forth Edmonds’s disciplinary history, but the ALJ
    engaged in minimal discussion regarding the implications of this tarnished
    record. The mere fact that Edmonds was not fired for previous violations
    should not be used against DirecTV. See Delco-Remy Div., Gen. Motors Corp.
    v. NLRB, 
    596 F.2d 1295
    , 1306 (5th Cir. 1979). Moreover, in a case in which
    the employee had a similar work history, we determined that the record lacked
    substantial evidence to support the NLRB’s conclusion that the employer had
    not met its burden to show that it would have discharged the employee in the
    absence of the union activity. Poly-Am., 
    260 F.3d 465
    . In Poly-America, “[t]he
    uncontradicted evidence in the record [was] that [the terminated employee] did
    not follow safety regulations with respect to his goggles, insulted one of his
    supervisors, and voiced his dislike for his job with 
    frequency.” 260 F.3d at 491
    .
    Although the employee was in a probationary period in Poly-America, there
    was no evidence that the company treated the employee’s probation different
    from other employees’ probation. 
    Id. In the
    case currently before us, the record
    reflects that Edmonds accumulated a substantial disciplinary history, and
    8
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    although he scored well on customer satisfaction, 8 he had a string of issues
    with his work performance and directed profanity at his supervisor in front of
    other employees. 9
    Moreover, “[w]e have often observed that the essence of discrimination
    in a [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)] violation consists of treating like cases differently.”
    
    Delco-Remy, 596 F.2d at 1305
    (citation omitted). “The [NLRA] does not prevent
    an employer from disciplining an employee for violating established company
    rules and policies, especially when the discipline is provided in a manner
    consistent with discipline given for similar conduct in the past.” 
    Asarco, 86 F.3d at 1409
    .
    Although our review is deferential, “a decision by the Board that ‘ignores
    a portion of the record’ cannot survive review under the ‘substantial evidence’
    standard.” Carey Salt Co. v. NLRB, 
    736 F.3d 405
    , 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
    Lord & Taylor v. NLRB, 
    703 F.2d 163
    , 169 (5th Cir. 1983)). Our deference has
    limits; we review the record as a whole. 
    Id. DirecTV entered
    evidence that
    six 10 employees were terminated for using profanity, and some of these
    8 Similarly, the employee in Poly-America received occasional praise for his 
    work. 260 F.3d at 491
    .
    9  Our opinion in Poly-America raises significant concerns about whether, given
    Edmonds’s work history, the decision of the NLRB was supported by substantial evidence.
    While the dissenting opinion is correct in noting that there are distinctions between this case
    and Poly-America, that case makes clear that the NLRB cannot ignore evidence of
    disciplinary history. Here, the NLRB did not adequately address the effect of Edmonds’s
    disciplinary history on its decision, and “a decision by the Board that ‘ignores a portion of the
    record’ cannot survive review under the ‘substantial evidence’ standard.” Carey Salt Co. v.
    NLRB, 
    736 F.3d 405
    , 410 (5th Cir. 2013).
    10  The NLRB contends that the discipline of five of these employees is not relevant
    because they did not work out of the Riverside facility, but rather worked out of other
    facilities in the Southern California region. But the ALJ, and subsequently the NLRB,
    determined that somebody intervened to change Zambrano’s mind about termination, and
    the only individuals identified as possibly being this intervenor worked at the regional level,
    not just at the Riverside facility. In fact, the individual at whom the charge of anti-union
    sentiment was perhaps most heavily directed throughout the hearing, Dimech, worked at the
    regional level. Accordingly, for comparison purposes, it is appropriate to consider employees
    9
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    terminations were based on conduct less flagrant than Edmonds’s outburst.
    The ALJ, however, considered only one of these employees, John Barrios, and
    found the conduct underlying Barrios’s termination to be distinguishable.
    Similarly, the NLRB did not address the remaining five employees. Given the
    evidence as a whole, we conclude that the NLRB’s decision that DirecTV failed
    to meet its burden to establish that it would have terminated Edmonds in the
    absence of his union activity is not supported by substantial evidence.
    Although the General Counsel attempted to rebut this evidence with
    testimony that profanity was somewhat commonplace in the workplace, there
    was no evidence that employees directed profanity at supervisors in front of a
    warehouse full of employees in a manner that would undermine the
    supervisor’s authority without repercussion. 11 Rather, the evidence showed
    that employees used profanity among themselves or in discussions and private
    meetings with supervisors. Moreover, there was no evidence that any of the
    individuals that generally used profanity had the same extensive disciplinary
    history or that any of these employees were on a final warning.
    Finally, the NLRB makes much of the fact that Edmonds’s initial
    suspension was transformed into a termination. The ALJ found that because
    Zambrano told Edmonds that he would not be terminated, “someone
    within the Southern California region, as this unit was an alleged source of discrimination,
    not just the Riverside facility.
    11   According to the ALJ,
    The record shows that employees, supervisors, and managers
    alike used profanity in the workplace. The record does not
    show, however, any prior instances of employees cussing out
    supervisors or managers in the workplace, in the presence of
    other employees, for failing to do the job that employees
    expected them to do. Accordingly, while there is precedent for
    the Respondent’s acceptance of profanity in the workplace,
    there is no precedent for the Respondent’s acceptance of profane
    outbursts in the workplace towards management.
    10
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    intervened . . . to cause Zambrano to change his mind and convert the
    suspension to a termination.” This statement is unsupported speculation. See
    Brown & Root, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    333 F.3d 628
    , 639 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that
    although a finding of a violation “may be supported through circumstantial,
    rather than direct evidence, . . . [t]hat evidence . . . must be substantial, not
    speculative, nor derived from inferences upon inferences”); cf. Berry Sch. v.
    NLRB, 
    627 F.2d 692
    , 704 (5th Cir. 1980) (determining that “inferences about
    events which might have happened ‘behind closed doors,’” were “speculations
    unsupported by the evidence”).      But even crediting this conclusion, this
    circumstantial evidence does not undermine the uncontradicted evidence in
    support of DirecTV’s position that it would have fired Edmonds anyway,
    namely Edmonds’s extensive disciplinary history and the termination records
    for employees engaged in similar conduct. “[A] company may discharge an
    employee even where union activity is a motivating factor in that discharge if
    the company can prove that the termination decision would have been the
    same regardless of the protected conduct.”        
    Poly-Am., 260 F.3d at 491
    .
    Substantial evidence does not support the NLRB’s decision that DirecTV failed
    to meet this burden.
    For the foregoing reasons, the NLRB’s determination that DirecTV
    violated the NLRA by terminating Edmonds is not supported by substantial
    evidence. Accordingly, DirecTV’s petition for review is GRANTED, and the
    NLRB’s petition for enforcement is DENIED. The NLRB’s order is set aside in
    accordance with this opinion.
    11
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    KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    Substantial evidence supports the NLRB’s decision. And substantial
    evidence supports the majority’s decision. In that situation, we are bound to
    enforce the NLRB’s decision. Accordingly, I would deny DirecTV’s petition for
    review and grant the NLRB’s petition for enforcement.
    This court reviews the NLRB’s factual determinations 1 under the
    substantial evidence standard announced by the Supreme Court in Universal
    Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
    340 U.S. 474
    (1951). See NLRB v. Cal-Maine Farms,
    Inc., 
    998 F.2d 1336
    , 1339 (5th Cir. 1993). “Substantial evidence is that which
    is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion,” El Paso Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 
    681 F.3d 651
    , 656 (5th Cir.
    2012) (quoting Spellman v. Shalala, 
    1 F.3d 357
    , 360 (5th Cir. 1993)), and “the
    ALJ’s decision must be upheld if a reasonable person could have found what
    the ALJ found, even if” this court would have reached a different conclusion
    had it heard the case in the first instance, Standard Fittings Co. v. NLRB, 
    845 F.2d 1311
    , 1314 (5th Cir. 1988). “In determining whether the Board’s factual
    findings are supported by the record, we do not make credibility
    determinations or reweigh the evidence.” NLRB v. Allied Aviation Fueling,
    
    490 F.3d 374
    , 378 (5th Cir. 2007); accord Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
    Co., 
    385 U.S. 57
    , 69 (1966) (“It is not for the court [on substantial evidence
    review] to strike down conclusions that are reasonably drawn from the
    evidence and findings in the case.”). And “[o]nly in the most rare and unusual
    cases will an appellate court conclude that a finding of fact made by the . . .
    Board is not supported by substantial evidence.” Merchs. Truck Line v. NLRB,
    1 As does the majority, I focus on the ALJ’s decision as opposed to the NLRB’s decision
    here because the ALJ engaged in the initial fact-finding with which the NLRB agreed. See,
    e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Gulf States United Tel. Co., 
    694 F.2d 92
    , 95 (5th Cir. 1982) (focusing on the
    findings of the ALJ, which were later adopted by the NLRB).
    12
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    577 F.2d 1011
    , 1014 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Ward v. NLRB, 
    462 F.2d 8
    , 9
    (5th Cir. 1972)).
    Before turning to the application of the substantial evidence test here, I
    briefly recount the relevant facts and procedural history to provide greater
    context for that test. Applying the two step analysis from Wright Line, a Div.
    of Wright Line, Inc., 
    251 N.L.R.B. 1083
    (1980), the ALJ in this case concluded
    that (1) Gregory Edmonds’s protected union activity was a motivating factor in
    DirecTV’s decision to terminate Edmonds and (2) DirecTV failed to establish
    that it would have terminated Edmonds absent his protected activity. In
    reaching these conclusions, the ALJ made a number of specific factual findings.
    As to Edmonds’s history, the ALJ noted that, while Edmonds was not a model
    employee given his disciplinary record, he had received higher-than-average
    customer satisfaction ratings, been recommended to apply for a supervisor
    position, received the highest salary possible given his position following
    several raises, and attained the classification of “service technician” based on
    his demonstrated skills and the work that he could competently perform. The
    ALJ noted that Edmonds first engaged in union activity in the spring or
    summer of 2010, when he met with union representatives at the home of
    coworker Brandon Ojeda.
    Following the Ojeda meeting, in either May or June of 2010, Adrian
    Dimech, a DirecTV superior, conducted a meeting at the Riverside facility and
    expressed his opposition to unionization of the employees at that facility. At
    the Dimech meeting, Edmonds voiced several complaints and implied a desire
    for the employees at the Riverside facility to unionize. A few days after this
    meeting, Freddy Zambrano informed Edmonds that all of his work in the field
    for the day would be monitored, reviewed, and evaluated (although apparently
    the monitoring, etc. never actually occurred). On July 21, 2010, Edmonds
    loudly cursed at his supervisor, Zambrano, in front of a number of other
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    employees, expressing concern about the long wait times required to obtain
    equipment. The next day, Zambrano suspended Edmonds, stating explicitly
    that Edmonds was not going to be terminated. However, during Edmonds’s
    suspension, Zambrano communicated with Scott Thomas and the “HR
    department” and decided to terminate Edmonds.
    Based on these facts, the ALJ found that Edmonds had been engaged in
    protected activity at the Dimech meeting, and that “Zambrano warned
    Edmonds that his work was to be monitored as a result of his protected . . .
    union activity.” The ALJ further found that these actions, combined with
    Edmonds’s subsequent suspension and firing, were sufficient under Wright
    Line to establish that Edmonds’s protected union activity was a motivating
    factor in DirecTV’s termination decision. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that
    DirecTV had the burden to prove that it would have terminated Edmonds
    absent his union activity under the second step of the Wright Line analysis.
    With respect to the second step, the ALJ found that “from the date of the
    Dimech meeting until July 22, Edmonds was never disciplined . . . for any
    reason.” When he received his initial suspension, Zambrano explicitly told
    Edmonds that he would not be terminated, and the form indicating his
    suspension did not include the term “pending investigation.” Based on this,
    the ALJ found that “Zambrano had . . . decided . . . shortly after the incident .
    . . that Edmonds would be suspended but would not be discharged for his
    outburst.” The ALJ then found that “someone intervened between July 22
    [when Edmonds was initially suspended] and July 28 [when Edmonds was
    terminated] to cause Zambrano to change his mind and convert the suspension
    to a termination.” The ALJ specifically discredited Zambrano’s testimony that
    “he did not have his mind made up to discharge Edmonds” when Edmonds was
    initially suspended and noted that Zambrano “implicated others by telling
    Edmonds that after talking with Scott Thomas—Zambrano’s boss and
    14
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    No. 15-60257
    Dimech’s subordinate—and the HR department, it had been determined that
    his employment was being terminated.” Based on these findings, the ALJ
    concluded that DirecTV had not “affirmatively demonstrated that whatever it
    was that caused Zambrano to change his mind and convert Edmonds’[s]
    suspension to a discharge was not motivated by unlawful considerations.”
    With respect to the first step of the Wright Line analysis, the majority
    characterizes the evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination that Edmonds’s
    union activity was a motivating factor in his termination as “very weak,”
    especially given that the ALJ made no specific finding as to when the Dimech
    meeting occurred. 2 However, in light of the fact that Edmonds engaged in
    protected activity, was singled out shortly after this activity for monitoring,
    and was later terminated, a “reasonable mind” could accept this evidence as
    “adequate to support [the] conclusion” that Edmonds’s union activity was a
    motivating factor in DirecTV’s decision to terminate his employment. El Paso
    Elec. 
    Co., 681 F.3d at 656
    (quoting 
    Spellman, 1 F.3d at 360
    ). Accordingly, I
    would hold that the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence—
    even if that decision was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence—
    instead of simply assuming arguendo this conclusion, as the majority does. See
    
    id. (“[Substantial evidence]
    is more than a mere scintilla, and less than a
    preponderance.” (emphasis omitted)).
    2  The majority also notes that, assuming the Dimech meeting occurred in May,
    DirecTV had two opportunities to terminate Edmonds that it did not take advantage of,
    suggesting that anti-union animus was not a motivating factor in its ultimate termination
    decision. Evidence introduced by the parties showed that Edmonds was involved in a car
    accident while driving a company vehicle in May 2010 and that a customer complaint
    concerning Edmonds was forwarded to the Office of the President in June 2010. However,
    the ALJ explicitly found that Edmonds was not responsible for the car accident and that the
    complaint lacked merit. Therefore, according to the ALJ, DirecTV had no opportunity to use
    these incidents to terminate Edmonds, so the failure to previously terminate Edmonds did
    not suggest a lack of anti-union animus in the ultimate decision to terminate Edmonds.
    15
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    With respect to the second step of the Wright Line analysis, I similarly
    disagree with the majority’s conclusion as to whether substantial evidence
    supported the ALJ’s conclusion that DirecTV failed to carry its burden to show
    that it would have terminated Edmonds absent his union activity.                          The
    majority offers three general reasons for why substantial evidence did not
    support the ALJ’s determination: (1) the “ALJ engaged in minimal discussion”
    of Edmonds’s disciplinary record; (2) DirecTV has terminated at least six other
    employees for similar reasons as it terminated Edmonds; and (3) the ALJ
    improperly inferred, based on the evidence, that Zambrano’s decision to
    terminate Edmonds was motivated by unlawful considerations.                        However,
    none of these reasons supports the conclusion that substantial evidence did not
    support the ALJ’s conclusion.
    As to the majority’s first criticism of the ALJ’s decision: while Edmonds
    did have a disciplinary record, he had also been promoted, received raises, and
    been invited to apply for a supervisor position.                 Therefore, the relative
    importance of Edmonds’s disciplinary history and his workplace achievements
    in DirecTV’s decision to terminate Edmonds was an inherently fact-intensive
    inquiry. And the ALJ ultimately emphasized Edmonds’s achievements over
    his failings in the workplace in concluding that DirecTV would not have
    terminated Edmonds absent his union activity. Given the record before the
    ALJ, “a reasonable person could have found what the ALJ found,” and I would
    not disturb that finding here. 3 Standard Fittings 
    Co., 845 F.2d at 1314
    .
    3 The majority’s reliance on Poly-Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    260 F.3d 465
    (5th Cir. 2001), in
    reasoning that this court has held that the termination of an employee in a similar situation
    as Edmonds was not supported by substantial evidence is misplaced. As the majority notes,
    the employee in that case was still on a probationary period. 
    Id. at 491.
    And while the
    majority recognizes that the employee received occasional praise in addition to exhibiting
    disciplinary issues, 
    id., the praise
    received did not involve a promotion, multiple raises, and
    suggestions of applying for a supervisor position as in this case.
    16
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    As to the majority’s second criticism, the majority emphasizes that the
    ALJ discussed only one of the six other employees DirecTV had terminated for
    similar reasons as Edmonds.            However, the ALJ did not conclude that
    Edmonds would not have been fired absent union activity because his
    disciplinary issues were less egregious than other employees’ issues. Instead,
    the ALJ concluded that Edmonds would not have been fired for his profane
    outburst because he made a specific factual finding that Zambrano had decided
    not to terminate Edmonds before speaking to his superiors.                  This factual
    finding was independent of how DirecTV had addressed disciplinary problems
    with other employees in the past. The ALJ concluded that Zambrano only
    decided to terminate Edmonds after speaking with the HR department and
    Scott Thomas, inferring from the facts before him that Zambrano decided to
    terminate Edmonds as a result of anti-union animus following this discussion.
    This factual finding, combined with the ALJ’s consideration of the only
    employee who had been terminated for profanity while working at the same
    facility as Edmonds, is sufficient to survive this court’s substantial evidence
    review. 4
    With respect to the majority’s final criticism, I cannot agree with the
    majority as to the impropriety of the ALJ’s inference that Zambrano’s
    conversation with his superiors caused him to change his mind and terminate
    Edmonds and that this change was motivated by unlawful considerations. As
    described above, the ALJ carefully analyzed the facts surrounding Zambrano’s
    4 Moreover, I agree with the NLRB’s explanation that these five other employees, who
    worked at a different facility than Edmonds, were not directly comparable to Edmonds and,
    thus, the ALJ was under no obligation to consider them. The majority claims that, because
    it was Zambrano’s superiors who imparted anti-union animus to Zambrano’s decision to
    terminate Edmonds, the proper point of comparison is all employees in the Southern
    California region. However, these other employees were not supervised by Zambrano, and
    other facilities may have enforced DirecTV’s rules and policies differently.
    17
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    No. 15-60257
    change of heart and reasonably inferred that anti-union animus motivated
    Zambrano’s termination decision after Zambrano admitted that he discussed
    Edmonds’s punishment with his superiors. While I agree that this inference
    was not compelled based on the facts in the record, I would not hold that this
    inference was unreasonable. 5
    Granting that Zambrano’s inference was reasonable, the majority
    concludes that “this circumstantial evidence does not undermine the
    uncontradicted evidence in support of DirecTV’s position that it would have
    fired Edmonds anyway.”             However, “this circumstantial evidence” was
    anything but uncontradicted, as Zambrano had decided not to terminate
    Edmonds until he spoke with his superiors. Additionally, Edmonds’s extensive
    workplace achievements, as emphasized by the ALJ, are evidence that DirecTV
    would not have terminated Edmonds absent his union activity.
    Overall, the majority points to a number of reasons as to why the ALJ
    and NLRB could have reached a different result in this case. The majority
    correctly points out that substantial evidence supports findings contrary to
    those of the ALJ. However, the Supreme Court has explained that “[a] court
    reviewing an agency’s adjudicative action should accept the agency’s factual
    findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence . . . [and]
    should not supplant the agency’s findings merely by identifying alternative
    findings that could be supported by substantial evidence.”                    Arkansas v.
    Oklahoma, 
    503 U.S. 91
    , 112–13 (1992).                 Because I would conclude that
    substantial evidence supports the NLRB’s decision in this case, I would deny
    5 Moreover, the ALJ’s inference regarding Zambrano’s motives in terminating
    Edmonds rested, at least in part, on the ALJ’s finding that Zambrano was not a credible
    witness. And “this court will accord special deference to the [Board’s] credibility findings.”
    Cal-Maine 
    Farms, 998 F.2d at 1339
    –40.
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    DirecTV’s petition for review and grant the NLRB’s petition for enforcement.
    I respectfully dissent.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-60257

Citation Numbers: 650 F. App'x 846

Filed Date: 5/31/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023

Authorities (19)

Poly-America, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 260 F.3d 465 ( 2001 )

Standard Fittings Company v. National Labor Relations Board , 845 F.2d 1311 ( 1988 )

Brown & Root, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 333 F.3d 628 ( 2003 )

Asarco, Inc., Petitioner-Cross-Respondent v. National Labor ... , 86 F.3d 1401 ( 1996 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Allied Aviation Fueling ... , 490 F.3d 374 ( 2007 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Gulf States United ... , 694 F.2d 92 ( 1982 )

Bobby Nick Ward v. National Labor Relations Board, and ... , 462 F.2d 8 ( 1972 )

Delco-Remy Division, General Motors Corporation v. National ... , 596 F.2d 1295 ( 1979 )

Merchants Truck Line, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 577 F.2d 1011 ( 1978 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc. , 998 F.2d 1336 ( 1993 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Motorola, Inc. , 991 F.2d 278 ( 1993 )

New Orleans Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., Ltd. v. National ... , 201 F.3d 592 ( 2000 )

Neva SPELLMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, M.... , 1 F.3d 357 ( 1993 )

lord-taylor-a-division-of-associated-dry-goods-corporation , 703 F.2d 163 ( 1983 )

The Berry Schools v. National Labor Relations Board, N. ... , 627 F.2d 692 ( 1980 )

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board , 71 S. Ct. 456 ( 1951 )

Arkansas v. Oklahoma , 112 S. Ct. 1046 ( 1992 )

Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning , 134 S. Ct. 2550 ( 2014 )

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board , 103 S. Ct. 1467 ( 1983 )

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