James McElhaney v. CIR , 651 F. App'x 256 ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 15-60546      Document: 00513530475         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/02/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 15-60546                                 FILED
    June 2, 2016
    JAMES LEE MCELHANEY,                                                          Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Petitioner - Appellant
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
    Respondent - Appellee
    Appeal from the Decision
    of the United States Tax Court
    TC No. 17561-14
    Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    James Lee McElhaney appeals from the Tax Court’s grant of summary
    judgment to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue regarding McElhaney’s
    outstanding tax liability from 1998. We AFFIRM.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 2004, James Lee McElhaney pled guilty to wire fraud. As part of his
    plea agreement, McElhaney agreed to file corrected federal tax returns for the
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 15-60546    Document: 00513530475      Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/02/2016
    No. 15-60546
    years 1998 through 2002 and pay any resulting back taxes, interest, and
    penalties. This appeal concerns his outstanding tax liability for the year 1998.
    In February 2005, McElhaney and his ex-wife, Lisa Price, entered into an
    agreement with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) regarding additional
    taxes owed and a fraud penalty for 1998. They both signed a Form 4549, in
    which they consented to immediate assessment and collection of the
    outstanding amount and waived their appeal rights with the IRS or the Tax
    Court. At that time, Price requested “innocent spouse” relief from joint and
    several liability. The IRS subsequently assessed the agreed-upon tax and
    penalty for 1998 along with interest and filed notice of a tax lien.
    In January 2006, McElhaney was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment
    and three years of supervised release for his wire fraud conviction. McElhaney
    began serving his sentence in March 2006. In January and March 2006,
    McElhaney received notices of the IRS’s federal tax lien and his right to a
    Collection Due Process (“CDP”) hearing, at which he could challenge the
    collection action and request payment alternatives. He did not request a CDP
    hearing in response to either notice.
    In November 2006, because of Price’s earlier “innocent spouse” relief
    request, the IRS followed internal procedures to create separate “mirrored”
    accounts for each spouse. The balance from the joint filing account for the 1998
    tax liability was transferred to separate accounts for McElhaney and Price. In
    December, Price was granted “innocent spouse” relief, and the tax liability
    balance in her separate account was abated. The full tax liability balance
    remained in McElhaney’s separate account.
    McElhaney was released from incarceration and began his period of
    supervision in September 2009. One of the conditions of his supervised release
    required him to cooperate with the IRS and pay outstanding taxes, interest,
    and penalties. McElhaney claims that his probation officer instructed him to
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    No. 15-60546
    request from the IRS statements for tax years 1998 to 2003. He did so. The
    IRS sent transcripts for the joint filing account for McElhaney and Price, which
    showed that the balance of the 1998 tax liability had been “transferred to split
    liability account” and then the liability had been subtracted from the account
    under the entry “Write-off of balance due.” The transcript for 1998 had a zero
    balance. He claims he provided these transcripts to his probation officer.
    In 2010, while still on supervised release, McElhaney claims he received
    a notice of tax due from the IRS for the tax years 1998 to 2003. He asserts that
    he sent copies of the joint filing account transcripts he had received previously
    and explained he thought the balance had been written-off. In August 2012,
    McElhaney received a letter from the probation office informing him that his
    supervised release period had ended.
    McElhaney did not hear any more about his 1998 tax liability until
    February 2014, when he received a “Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your
    Right to Hearing.” He requested a CDP hearing and sent copies of the joint
    filing account transcripts that showed a zero balance.       The IRS Office of
    Appeals sent McElhaney a letter scheduling a telephonic CDP hearing and
    explaining that the joint filing account transcript reflected a zero balance
    because the 1998 tax liability had been transferred to the spouses’ separate
    accounts.   The letter instructed McElhaney that he would be unable to
    challenge the underlying tax liability at the CDP hearing because he had not
    taken previous opportunities to do so. McElhaney also received a transcript
    for his separate account, which showed the balance due for 1998 was
    $113,588.58. After the telephonic CDP hearing, the IRS Office of Appeals
    issued a “Notice of Determination” sustaining the proposed levy action because
    all statutory, administrative, and procedural requirements had been met and
    McElhaney had offered no collection alternative.
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    McElhaney petitioned the Tax Court for review of the IRS Office of
    Appeals’ decision. Both McElhaney and the Commissioner moved for summary
    judgment.    The Tax Court denied McElhaney’s motion, but granted the
    Commissioner’s.      The Tax Court held McElhaney could not challenge the
    underlying tax liability both because he had signed Form 4549, which
    contained a waiver of appeal, and because he had not taken previous
    opportunities to request a CDP hearing. The Tax Court also held the IRS
    Office of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the proposed levy
    because McElhaney had failed to offer collection alternatives or submit the
    necessary financial information to proceed with a collection alternative. The
    Tax Court denied his motion for reconsideration. McElhaney appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    On a petition for review from a CDP hearing, the Tax Court reviews the
    decisions of the IRS Office of Appeals regarding the underlying tax liability de
    novo and the other administrative determinations for an abuse of discretion.
    Jones v. Comm’r, 
    338 F.3d 463
    , 466 (5th Cir. 2003). We apply these same
    standards on de novo review of the Tax Court’s decision to grant the
    Commissioner summary judgment.         
    Id.
       We must determine whether the
    Commissioner has carried the burden of proving that there is “no genuine
    dispute as to any material fact” and that the Commissioner is “entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). McElhaney cannot rely on
    “[m]ere conclusory allegations” to survive summary judgment. See Moss v.
    BMC Software, Inc., 
    610 F.3d 917
    , 922 (5th Cir. 2010).
    As a preliminary matter, we note that McElhaney does not challenge
    parts of the Tax Court’s ruling in his briefing. First, he does not address the
    Tax Court’s holding that the IRS Office of Appeals did not abuse its discretion
    because he failed to offer any collection alternatives or submit the necessary
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    financial information to proceed with a collection alternative. He also does not
    address the Tax Court’s reliance on Form 4549.        These issues are treated as
    abandoned. See Cinel v. Connick, 
    15 F.3d 1338
    , 1345 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Instead, McElhaney argues that the tax liability was “written-off” or
    “settled” when the United States District Court, United States Attorney, and
    probation officer released him from supervision in 2012. He contends that he
    can raise this argument now because the alleged settlement occurred after his
    earlier opportunities for a CDP hearing and is analogous to a bankruptcy
    discharge, which can be raised at a CDP hearing as a challenge to the
    appropriateness of collection actions. See 
    26 U.S.C. § 6330
    (c)(2)(A)(ii). He
    theorizes that the IRS directed him to settle his tax liability with the United
    States Attorney’s office in a May 2007 letter. He then claims that an August
    2012 letter from the probation office concerning the end of his supervised
    release demonstrates that he satisfied all conditions of his supervised release,
    including resolving his tax liability.       McElhaney urges that his probation
    officer relied on the joint filing account transcripts with a zero balance to
    release him from supervision.
    First, McElhaney cites no evidence supporting his speculation that the
    probation officer relied on the transcripts. More fundamentally, his argument
    incorrectly assumes his supervised release could only end when he completed
    all of the conditions.     As the Commissioner argued below in Tax Court,
    supervised release simply ends when the time period expires, unless modified
    or terminated under Section 3583.        
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    .       Aside from this
    argument, McElhaney fails to provide any evidence showing the 1998 tax
    liability was settled.     The letters he relies on do not demonstrate any
    settlement occurred. Accordingly, McElhaney fails to show a genuine dispute
    of material fact to survive summary judgment.
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    McElhaney also claims summary judgment was improper because the
    Tax Court identified a question of fact when it denied McElhaney’s summary
    judgment motion. This argument lacks merit. When a court reviews cross-
    motions for summary judgment, it must consider each independently. White
    Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
    420 F.3d 366
    , 370 (5th Cir.
    2005).   McElhaney’s failure to meet his burden does not preclude the
    Commissioner from meeting his burden, especially when the Commissioner
    submitted more evidence with its motion.
    Finally, McElhaney argues that the Commissioner is equitably estopped
    from collecting amounts owed for the year 1998 because the IRS had previously
    sent the joint filing account transcripts showing a zero balance. McElhaney
    never presented this argument to the Tax Court, so we do not consider it. See
    Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Reetz, 
    888 F.2d 1497
    , 1501 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989).
    AFFIRMED.
    6