United States v. Theresa Flieger , 364 F. App'x 290 ( 2010 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 09-1712
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                  * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    v.                                * Eastern District of Missouri.
    *
    Theresa Flieger,                        *     [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: January 22, 2010
    Filed: February 4, 2010
    ___________
    Before BYE, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Theresa Flieger appeals the district court’s1 judgment, entered upon a jury
    verdict finding her guilty of possession of pseudoephedrine, knowing it would be used
    to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). She was
    sentenced at the bottom of the calculated advisory Guidelines range to 151 months in
    prison and two years of supervised release. On appeal, Flieger’s counsel has filed a
    brief under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), challenging the sufficiency of
    the evidence to support the jury’s verdict and the district court’s application of an
    1
    The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Upon careful review, see United States v. Coleman, 
    584 F.3d 1121
    , 1125 (8th
    Cir. 2009) (denial of motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo, and
    evidence is viewed in light most favorable to verdict, giving verdict benefit of all
    reasonable inferences; reviewing court does not weigh evidence or assess witness
    credibility, and reverses only if no reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty
    beyond reasonable doubt), we find that the government’s evidence was sufficient. In
    particular, the evidence at trial included the testimony of witnesses who observed
    Flieger give boxes of pseudoephedrine pills to a methamphetamine manufacturer in
    exchange for methamphetamine, and use methamphetamine. See United States v.
    Hudspeth, 
    525 F.3d 667
    , 677 (8th Cir. 2008) (to convict under § 841(c), government
    must prove defendant possessed or distributed pseudoephedrine “knowing, or having
    reasonable cause to believe, that . . . [it] will be used to manufacture a controlled
    substance”); see also United States v. Khattab, 
    536 F.3d 765
    , 769-70 (7th Cir. 2008)
    (affirming § 841(c)(2) conviction where evidence supported conclusion that defendant
    knew pseudoephedrine he attempted to purchase would be used to manufacture
    methamphetamine).
    In addition, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that
    Flieger had given intentionally false testimony at trial in an effort to mislead the jury.
    While Flieger testified that she had merely consumed the pseudoephedrine pills she
    purchased over the years in question and had not used methamphetamine during this
    time, others testified as to their observations to the contrary. Thus, we hold that the
    district court did not err in applying the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. See
    United States v. Boesen, 
    541 F.3d 838
    , 851-52 (8th Cir. 2008) (reviewing district
    court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of advisory Guidelines de
    novo; affirming imposition of § 3C1.1 enhancement where district court found by
    preponderance of evidence that defendant willfully gave false testimony concerning
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    material matter, rather than as result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory); United
    States v. Titlbach, 
    300 F.3d 919
    , 924 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming imposition of § 3C1.1
    enhancement where defendant’s testimony that he had not participated in
    methamphetamine manufacturing conflicted with other witnesses’ testimony); United
    States v. Simms, 
    285 F.3d 1098
    , 1101-02 (8th Cir. 2002) (although § 3C1.1 is not
    intended to punish defendant for testifying, defendant who commits perjury is subject
    to enhancement).
    Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    ,
    80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the
    judgment of the district court, and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
    ______________________________
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