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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-11520
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cv-01667-GAP-DAB
EARNEST E. TILLMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al.,
Defendants,
TIMOTHY HENRIQUEZ,
individually and in his official capacity as
Deputy Sheriff of Orange County, FL,
ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 17, 2013)
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Before MARCUS, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Earnest Tillman, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his claims, arising under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law, against the Orange
County Sheriff’s Office; Sheriffs Kevin Beary and Jerry Demings; and Deputy
Sheriffs Phillips Parks Duncan, Timothy Henriquez, Carlos Torres, Sylvester
Herrera, and Donald Melville. In his complaint, Tillman alleged that he was
charged with aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an
officer with violence based on the falsified charging affidavits of Henriquez,
Duncan, and Melville, and convicted based on the false trial testimony of
Henriquez and Torres. Although Tillman’s conviction was initially affirmed in
Tillman v. State,
807 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), the Florida Supreme
Court later quashed it, concluding that Florida law only made it criminal to resist
an officer in an arrest situation, as opposed to an investigatory situation. Tillman
v. State (Tillman II),
934 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2006), superseded by statute, FLA.
STAT. § 776.051(1), as recognized in J.M. v. Gargett,
101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012).
On remand, the state trial court found that the deputy sheriffs were not lawfully
executing their legal duty at the time of Tillman’s arrest, and Tillman’s conviction
and sentences were set aside for lack of probable cause to arrest and prosecute.
Tillman then filed this lawsuit.
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In this appeal, Tillman argues that the district court erred by: (1) dismissing
his conspiracy to maliciously prosecute claim (against Henriquez, Duncan,
Melville, and Torres) and his intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
claim (against all defendants) as time-barred; and (2) granting summary judgment
against his malicious prosecution claim (against Henriquez) based on the
preclusive effect of a conviction that was entirely set aside. The Appellees argue
that the district court’s dismissal of Tillman’s conspiracy claim may be affirmed
under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. After careful review, we affirm in
part, and vacate and remand in part.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, accepting as true the
complaint’s factual allegations and construing them in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). We
also review the application of statutes of limitations de novo. Center for Biological
Diversity v. Hamilton,
453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006). And, we review de
novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard as
the district court. Burton v. Tampa Housing Auth.,
271 F.3d 1274, 1276-77 (11th
Cir. 2001). Finally, we review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions about
collateral estoppel. Richardson v. Miller,
101 F.3d 665, 667-68 (11th Cir. 1996).
First, we agree with Tillman that the district court erred in dismissing his
conspiracy and IIED claims as time-barred. Although § 1983 provides a federal
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cause of action, we look to the law of the state in which the cause of action arose to
determine the length of the statute of limitations. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384,
387 (2007). Florida has a four-year statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.
Chappell v. Rich,
340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003);
Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o)-
(p). However, the accrual date of a § 1983 claim, from which the statute of
limitations begins to run, is determined by federal law. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.
Section 1983 accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause
of action” and can thus “file suit and obtain relief.” See Bay Area Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,
522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)
(quotation omitted).
For § 1983 claims that “necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] conviction or
sentence,” plaintiffs have no cause of action and cannot file suit until that
conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477,
486-87 (1994). Heck thus institutes a rule of deferred accrual, “delay[ing] what
would otherwise be the accrual date of a tort action until the setting aside of an
extant conviction which success in that tort action would impugn.” Wallace, 549
U.S. at 393 (emphasis omitted).
Whether a claim necessarily implicates the invalidity of a conviction is a
“fact-specific question requiring careful review.” Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
405 F.3d 1298, 1315-17 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005); see Heck,
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512 U.S. at 489-90 (“[A] § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an
unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or
sentence has been invalidated.”).
As the record shows here, Tillman’s complaint alleges that his conspiracy
claim is based on a conspiracy to maliciously prosecute, a claim that benefits from
the Heck rule of delayed accrual. Construing Tillman’s pro se pleadings liberally,
see Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), Tillman
has also adequately alleged his IIED damages to be based on malicious
prosecution. Because Heck prevented Tillman from bringing his conspiracy and
IIED claims, both based on malicious prosecution, until the underlying conviction
was reversed, the district court erred in dismissing Tillman’s conspiracy and IIED
claims as time-barred.
Nevertheless, we conclude that Tillman’s conspiracy claim does not survive.
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, under which “a corporation cannot
conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope of their
employment, cannot conspire among themselves,” applies to § 1983 conspiracy
claims. Grider v. City of Auburn,
618 F.3d 1240, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quotation omitted). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine also applies to public
entities, like the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, and its personnel. See
id. at
1261. Because the subject of the alleged conspiracy in this case -- prosecution of
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Tillman by false charges -- “involves job-related functions well within [their]
scope of employment as police officers,” Tillman’s conspiracy to maliciously
prosecute claim must be dismissed. See
id. at 1261-62. Thus, the district court did
not err in dismissing Tillman’s conspiracy claim. See Bircoll v. Miami-Dade
Cnty.,
480 F.3d 1072, 1088 n.21 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that we may affirm the
district court’s decision on any grounds supported by the record).
Next, we hold that the district court’s dismissal of the IIED claim can only
be affirmed as to certain defendants. As a federal court assessing a state-law
claim, we look to Florida law to determine the elements of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Lopez v. Target Corp.,
676 F.3d 1230, 1235-36 (11th Cir.
2012). To state an IIED claim under Florida law, a plaintiff must allege (1)
deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering, (2) outrageous conduct that (3)
caused the emotional distress, and (4) that the distress was severe. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Steadman,
968 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). For conduct
to be sufficiently outrageous, it must be “so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community.” Lopez,
676 F.3d at 1236 (quotation omitted). As a
result, the IIED claim against Herrera must be dismissed because Tillman does not
allege any conduct by Herrera related to emotional distress caused by malicious
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prosecution. Similarly, the dismissal of the IIED claim against Beary is affirmed
because Tillman does not allege that Beary was present at his arrest or prosecution.
A government entity cannot be liable for the willful and wanton actions of
its employees.
Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9); Ford v. Rowland,
562 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Police officers, like all witnesses, possess absolute immunity
for their testimony at trial. Briscoe v. Lahue,
460 U.S. 325, 342-345 (1982). Thus,
in this case, we affirm the dismissal of the IIED claim against the Orange County
Sheriff’s Office. See Ford,
562 So. 2d at 734. Tillman does not claim the district
court improperly dismissed Demings from his suit, and we do not disturb this
decision. Additionally, the IIED claim against Torres cannot stand because the
only remaining action upon which it can be based is his alleged false testimony at
trial, conduct for which he is immune. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342-45.
However, we do not believe that the dismissal of the IIED claim against
Duncan, Melville, and Henriquez should be affirmed. In his complaint, Tillman
asserted that Henriquez, Duncan, and Melville gave false, consistent statements in
their charging affidavits, leading to his malicious prosecution. Because this
allegation -- that police officers falsified charging documents in order to convict a
man of a nonexistent crime -- is the type of extreme conduct considered to be
intolerable in a civilized society, we remand this claim for reconsideration.
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We also conclude that the grant of summary judgment against Tillman’s
malicious prosecution claim should be largely affirmed. For Tillman’s § 1983
malicious prosecution claim to survive summary judgment, the facts viewed in a
light most favorable to Tillman must show “(1) the elements of the common law
tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [his] Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Kingsland v. City of Miami,
382 F.3d
1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). Under Florida law, malicious prosecution has six
elements: (1) an original judicial proceeding was commenced or continued; (2) the
defendants were the legal cause of the proceeding; (3) the proceeding was
terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (4) there was an absence of probable cause for
the underlying proceeding; (5) there was malice on the part of the defendants; and
(6) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the original proceeding.
Id. On the
motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled as to the fifth element,
malice, and concluded that Tillman’s previous conviction collaterally estopped him
from proving this element.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue that has
already been litigated and resolved in a prior proceeding. Pleming v. Universal-
Rundle Corp.,
142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998). In considering whether to
give preclusive effect to a Florida judgment, we apply Florida’s law of collateral
estoppel. Vasquez v. Metro. Dade Cnty.,
968 F.2d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Under Florida law, collateral estoppel applies if (1) an identical issue is
disputed; (2) that has previously been fully litigated; (3) by the same parties or
their privies; and (4) a final decision has been rendered by an appropriate court.
Quinn v. Monroe Cnty.,
330 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). Florida also
permits “defensive collateral estoppel,” which eliminates the mutuality of parties
requirement if a criminal defendant is attempting to relitigate an essential issue
from a separate criminal suit. Vasquez,
968 F.2d at 1106-07. “A judgment that
has been vacated, reversed, or set aside on appeal is thereby deprived of all
conclusive effect . . . .” Kobatake v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.,
162 F.3d 619,
624 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Quarles v. Sager,
687 F.2d 344,
346 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The judgment of the district court was vacated; thus, no
final judgment on the merits exists.”).
In Tillman’s situation, the conviction, verdict, and sentence was entirely set
aside based on a subsequent Florida Supreme Court decision that established
Henriquez was not lawfully executing a legal duty at the time of Tillman’s arrest.
See Dorsey v. Continental Casualty Co.,
730 F.2d 675, 678 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The
law of the case does not apply to a finding that is later vacated.” (emphasis in
original)). Any “issues” determined in Tillman’s trial are thereby denied
preclusive effect. Thus, we hold that the district court clearly erred in determining
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that Tillman could not establish the malice element due to the supposed preclusive
effect of a sentence and conviction set aside by the state trial court.
In short, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the IIED
claim against Henriquez, Duncan, and Melville; and that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Henriquez as to Tillman’s malicious
prosecution claim. As to these limited grounds, we reverse the district court’s
decision and remand for further consideration.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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