Alix Laincy v. Chatham County , 520 F. App'x 780 ( 2013 )


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  •           Case: 12-15345   Date Filed: 05/28/2013   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-15345
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 4:09-cv-00098-DHB-GRS
    ALIX LAINCY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant.
    versus
    CHATHAM COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSORS, et al.,
    Defendants,
    CHATHAM COUNTY,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (May 28, 2013)
    Case: 12-15345      Date Filed: 05/28/2013   Page: 2 of 8
    Before MARCUS, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges:
    PER CURIAM:
    Alix Laincy, a male, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    to his former employer, Chatham County (“County”), in his employment
    discrimination action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
    (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a). On appeal, Laincy argues that
    the district court erred in granting the County’s motion for summary judgment on
    Laincy’s claim of sex discrimination in the County’s failure to promote him to an
    appraiser and on his claims of retaliation so far as the County failed to promote
    him and then terminated him. After thorough review, we affirm.
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying
    the same legal standards as the district court.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 
    229 F.3d 1012
    , 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the
    evidence before the court shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
    fact.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted). “A genuine issue of material fact does not exist
    unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable
    jury to return a verdict in its favor.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted). In making this
    determination, we “make all reasonable inferences in favor of the” nonmoving
    party. 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).
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    First, we are unpersuaded by Laincy’s argument that the district court erred
    in granting the County’s motion for summary judgment on Laincy’s sex
    discrimination claim. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against
    an employee based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). “Title VII’s prohibition of
    discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ protects men as well as women.” Oncale v.
    Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
    523 U.S. 75
    , 78 (1998). A plaintiff bears the
    burden of proving, using direct or circumstantial evidence, unlawful employment
    discrimination. Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 
    231 F.3d 821
    , 827 (11th
    Cir. 2000). Under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973),
    there is a three-step process to establish discrimination: first, the plaintiff must
    establish a prima facie case; second, the defendant “must articulate a legitimate,
    nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action”; and third, the
    plaintiff must proffer evidence “sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to
    conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the
    adverse employment decision.” Chapman, 
    229 F.3d at 1024
     (quotation omitted).
    To meet the requirements of the pretext step, a plaintiff must produce
    sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer’s
    legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was “a pretext for discrimination.” Vessels v.
    Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 
    408 F.3d 763
    , 771 (11th Cir. 2005). “Provided that the
    proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee
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    must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by
    simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman, 
    229 F.3d at 1030
    .
    Rather, the plaintiff must show “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
    incoherencies or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons . . .
    that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Vessels, 
    408 F.3d at 771
     (quotation omitted). In the context of a promotion, where a plaintiff
    attempts to show pretext by arguing that he was more qualified than the selected
    individual, he must show, in light of those superior qualifications, that “no
    reasonable person” would have selected the other candidate rather than the
    plaintiff. Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 
    509 F.3d 1344
    , 1349
    (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
    In this case, the district court did not err in granting the County’s motion for
    summary judgment on Laincy’s sex discrimination claim. Assuming arguendo that
    Laincy established a prima facie case, he nonetheless did not rebut the County’s
    proffered reason for promoting two women as appraisers rather than promoting
    Laincy. Specifically, those individuals had taken appraisal classes, and Laincy had
    not. Laincy has not shown that “no reasonable person” could have selected two
    candidates who had already taken the courses over Laincy, who had not done so.
    
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).
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    As for Laincy’s argument that the two women who were promoted were
    afforded unfair opportunities to take appraisal classes, it is without merit. There is
    no evidence in the record that Laincy asked to take the courses, and thus, there is
    no evidence that he was denied the opportunity to do so. Moreover, unlike the
    individuals who took the courses and were promoted, Laincy was still in his initial
    probationary period with the County when he applied and was interviewed for the
    appraiser position.      Under County policy, probationary employees were not
    eligible to be promoted. In short, even if Laincy asked to take the courses and had
    his request denied, the County did nothing improper, since Laincy was not eligible
    to be promoted regardless of whether he had taken appraisal classes. 1
    Nor are we persuaded by Laincy’s retaliation claim.                   Employers are
    prohibited from retaliating against employees who oppose unlawful sex
    discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The McDonnell Douglas framework has
    been used in retaliation cases in which the plaintiff relies on circumstantial
    evidence. Bryant v. Jones, 
    575 F.3d 1281
    , 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2009). To establish
    a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff may show that: (1) he engaged in a
    protected activity; “(2) he suffered an adverse employment action”; and (3) there
    1
    Laincy also claims that one of the employees had not completed her probationary period
    when she was promoted and that she was promoted within two months of being hired, but the
    record refutes this unsupported assertion.
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    was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
    employment action. 
    Id.
    Not every act an employee takes in opposition to discrimination is protected.
    Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 
    536 F.3d 1209
    , 1214 (11th Cir. 2008). The
    employee must show: (1) that he had a subjective good-faith belief “that his
    employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices”; and (2) that his belief,
    even if mistaken, was objectively reasonable in light of the record. 
    Id. at 1213
    (quotation omitted).     In evaluating the objective severity of harassment, we
    consider factors such as: (1) the conduct’s frequency; (2) the conduct’s severity;
    (3) “whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
    offensive utterance”; and (4) “whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the
    employee’s job performance.” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 
    277 F.3d 1269
    ,
    1276 (11th Cir. 2002).
    Likewise, not every discriminatory comment made by a coworker
    constitutes an unlawful employment practice. Butler, 
    536 F.3d at 1214
    . Rather, to
    establish a claim of a hostile work environment, the employee “must show that the
    workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that
    is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
    employment and create an abusive working environment.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).
    Thus, we have held that “[a] racially derogatory remark by a co-worker, without
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    more, does not constitute an unlawful employment practice under the opposition
    clause of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and opposition to such a remark,
    consequently, is not statutorily protected conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). It is
    objectively unreasonable to believe that a coworker’s single use of discriminatory
    language “is enough to permeate the workplace with ‘discriminatory intimidation,
    ridicule, and insult’ and to ‘alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
    create an abusive working environment.’” Id.
    Here, the district court did not err in granting the County’s motion for
    summary judgment on Laincy’s retaliation claims. First, Laincy did not establish a
    prima facie case of retaliation because he did not show that he had engaged in
    protected activity. See Bryant, 
    575 F.3d at 1307-08
    . Even if he subjectively
    believed that he was opposing an unlawful employment practice, his belief that his
    coworker’s allegedly harassing comments constituted an unlawful employment
    practice was not objectively reasonable. See Butler, 
    536 F.3d at 1213
    . The record
    shows that Laincy’s work environment was not permeated with intimidation,
    ridicule, or insult.   See 
    id. at 1214
    .   Rather, Laincy’s coworker made three
    innocuous comments asking him if he was dating anyone. These comments were
    not threatening, humiliating, or offensive, and they did not interfere with Laincy’s
    job performance. See Miller, 
    277 F.3d at 1276
    . Accordingly, we affirm the
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    district court’s grant of summary judgment to the County on Laincy’s sex
    discrimination and retaliation claims.
    AFFIRMED.
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