Rafael Del Rio v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                             ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    THOMAS W. VANES                                     GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Merrillville, Indiana                               Attorney General of Indiana
    GARY R. ROM
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    FILED
    Feb 28 2012, 9:12 am
    IN THE                                               CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA                                         tax court
    RAFAEL DEL RIO,                                     )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                         )
    )
    vs.                                  )       No. 45A05-1106-CR-285
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                   )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                          )
    APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, Judge
    Cause No. 45G01-0807-FA-26
    February 28, 2012
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    CRONE, Judge
    Case Summary
    Rafael Del Rio’s brother was shot and killed outside a bar. Del Rio witnessed the
    shooting. Del Rio pursued the assailant and shot him multiple times, killing him. A jury
    convicted Del Rio of class A felony voluntary manslaughter. Del Rio’s sole contention on
    appeal is that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense.
    Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    On July 27, 2008, Del Rio went looking for his brother, Marco. He located Marco
    walking outside a bar. As Marco was approaching Del Rio’s car, a man “came out of
    nowhere,” pulled a revolver from his waist, and began firing shots at Marco. Tr. at 238.
    After Marco went “down,” the shooter ran away. State’s Ex. 48 at 1. Del Rio reached for his
    semiautomatic handgun and started to chase the shooter. Del Rio shot at his brother’s
    assailant, Hector Lopez-Ramirez, and Lopez-Ramirez shot back. Del Rio pursued Lopez-
    Ramirez and shot at him numerous times as Lopez-Ramirez retreated. Del Rio fired one shot
    when Lopez-Ramirez was seventy-six feet away from where Marco went down, and then
    fired at least another ten shots when Lopez-Ramirez had retreated another one hundred feet
    away. Nine of the shots fired by Del Rio hit Lopez-Ramirez in the back of his body,
    including his upper back, left hip, right hip, buttock, and right thigh. Forensic evidence
    indicated that four of the shots were fired at Lopez-Ramirez at close range, and in close
    succession, after Lopez-Ramirez’s body was no longer moving significantly. Both Lopez-
    2
    Ramirez and Marco died of their wounds.1 Lopez-Ramirez’s revolver was found a few feet
    from his body. Del Rio’s weapon was never recovered.
    On July 29, 2008, the State charged Del Rio with class A felony voluntary
    manslaughter. A jury trial was held on April 11, 2011. During trial, Del Rio claimed that he
    acted in self-defense. The jury found Del Rio guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced
    Del Rio to twenty-two years in prison. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    Del Rio’s sole contention on appeal is that the State failed to present sufficient
    evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. “We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense using the same standard as for any claim of
    insufficient evidence.” Carroll v. State, 
    744 N.E.2d 432
    , 433 (Ind. 2001). That is to say, we
    will affirm the conviction unless, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences
    favorable to the judgment, no reasonable factfinder could have found that the State disproved
    self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
     We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
    the credibility of the witnesses. 
    Id.
    “A person is justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect the
    person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of
    unlawful force.” 
    Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2
    (a). A person is justified in using deadly force, and
    does not have a duty to retreat, “if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary
    1
    Although Del Rio initially told police that he had “blacked out” and had no idea what had become of
    his brother’s shooter, he eventually admitted that he chased and repeatedly shot Lopez-Ramirez. Tr. at 238.
    3
    to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a
    forcible felony.” 
    Id.
     To prevail on a claim of self-defense in a homicide prosecution, the
    defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not
    provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of
    death or great bodily harm. Wilson v. State, 
    770 N.E.2d 799
    , 800 (Ind. 2002). When a claim
    of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State must disprove at least
    one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
     If a defendant is convicted despite his
    claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense
    was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
    Although Lopez-Ramirez was the initial aggressor and fired shots at Marco and Del
    Rio, the record shows that Del Rio pursued Lopez-Ramirez and continued shooting at him
    even after Lopez-Ramirez had ceased firing and was attempting to flee. Indeed, forensic
    evidence indicates that Del Rio shot Lopez-Ramirez numerous times in the back of his body,
    and would support the conclusion that several of those shots were fired after Lopez-Ramirez
    was incapacitated and no longer moving. Lopez-Ramirez’s revolver was found several feet
    from his body and no longer in his reach. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the jury to infer
    that Del Rio could not have been laboring under a reasonable fear of death or great bodily
    harm but was instead a willing participant in the violence at that time.       See 
    id.
     (citing
    Hollowell v. State, 
    707 N.E.2d 1014
    , 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding sufficient evidence
    to rebut self-defense claim when defendant stabbed and continued to pursue initial aggressor
    with a knife after initial aggressor retreated). The evidence was sufficient to support a
    4
    reasonable inference that Del Rio was retaliating for the attack on his brother and did not
    have a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm when he continued to pursue Lopez-
    Ramirez even after Lopez-Ramirez had stopped firing shots and was running away. We
    conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Del Rio’s self-defense claim.2
    Therefore, we affirm Del Rio’s voluntary manslaughter conviction.
    Affirmed.
    MAY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
    2
    We note that, in addition to instructing the jury regarding self-defense, the trial court instructed the
    jury regarding a citizen’s right to use reasonable force to make an arrest if a felony has been committed in his
    presence. See Indiana Code Section 35-33-1-4. Del Rio points to our citizen’s arrest statute in conjunction
    with Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2 to support his argument that he was justified in pursuing and killing
    Lopez-Ramirez after the attack on his brother. Section 35-41-3-2 provides:
    (a) A person is justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect
    the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use
    of unlawful force. However a person:
    (1) is justified in using deadly force, and
    (2) does not have a duty to retreat;
    if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to
    the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony. No person in this state
    shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third
    person by reasonable means necessary.
    
    Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2
    (a). However, what was reasonable under the circumstances was a question for the jury
    and, as noted above, the jury did not agree that deadly force was reasonable self-defense on Del-Rio’s part. It
    is not our prerogative to second-guess the jury.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 45A05-1106-CR-285

Filed Date: 2/28/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021