United States v. Dana Miller , 906 F.3d 373 ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-10594   Document: 00514687426        Page: 1   Date Filed: 10/18/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 17-10594                  October 18, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    DANA KAY MILLER,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JONES and ENGELHARDT, Circuit
    Judges.
    KURT D. ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge:
    Dana Kay Miller pled guilty without a plea agreement to bank fraud, in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), and was sentenced above the advisory
    guidelines range to 96 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised
    release. On appeal, Miller argues that the district court clearly erred by
    applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 for abusing a
    position of trust and by applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
    2B1.1(b)(10)(C) for using sophisticated means. We AFFIRM Miller’s sentence.
    Case: 17-10594     Document: 00514687426      Page: 2    Date Filed: 10/18/2018
    No. 17-10594
    FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
    In August 2014, Miller began working as the accounts payable clerk for
    Hawk Steel Industries, Inc. (HSI), a scrap metal processing and recycling
    company owned and operated by Peter and Susan Bausone. Miller was
    primarily responsible for preparing the payroll for the approximately 80 HSI
    employees and preparing the weekly vendor payment checks. Each week, HSI
    disbursed 80–100 checks to pay metal suppliers and other vendors. Miller used
    the company’s accounting software to make bookkeeping entries and to prepare
    and print weekly checks that were to be submitted to HSI’s office manager for
    signature. After the checks were signed, Miller transmitted an electronic copy
    of the authorized checks directly to HSI’s bank, Regions Bank, so that the
    checks would be paid when presented and to ensure that only the checks
    written by HSI were paid.
    Miller began writing fraudulent HSI checks to her boyfriend, Russell
    Sandifer, in October 2014, and continued to write two to three fraudulent
    checks to Sandifer per week, forging the office manager’s signature. 1 Miller
    included the fraudulent checks with legitimate checks she recorded in HSI’s
    accounting system, falsely representing in the company’s accounting records
    that Sandifer sold metal to HSI. She also included the fraudulent checks in the
    list of authorized checks that she transmitted to Regions Bank.
    As part of Miller’s fraudulent scheme, Miller and Sandifer opened a joint
    checking account at Woodforest National Bank (WNB) in October 2014.
    Between October 2014 until February 2016, Miller deposited 228 fraudulent
    HSI checks payable to Sandifer, totaling about $1,536,000, into Miller and
    Sandifer’s WNB account. In February 2016, WNB became suspicious of the
    1 The office manager, Jim Milligan, and co-owner, Susan Bausone, were the only
    authorized signors on the HSI checking account at Regions Bank.
    2
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    frequent deposits made to the WNB after-hours drop box; thus, the bank
    required HSI’s verification of the deposits. Miller composed a letter attempting
    to provide the requested verification, but it was refused by WNB because it
    was not notarized. Consequently, Miller had Sandifer close the WNB account.
    That same month, Miller and Sandifer opened another joint checking and
    savings account at Texas Trust Credit Union (TTCU) and began depositing
    fraudulent HSI checks into that account. Between February and July 2016,
    Miller deposited 72 fraudulent HSI checks into the TTCU account, totaling
    approximately $729,000.
    Concerned that something was amiss with the company’s finances,
    Susan Bausone conducted an audit of HSI’s checks in July 2016. 2 The audit
    revealed checks written to Sandifer between October 2014 and July 2016 that
    appeared to be forged. Because of Miller’s inability to explain the payments to
    Sandifer—identified for the first time as her boyfriend—and due to the lack of
    documentation to support any sales transaction between Sandifer and HSI,
    Miller was terminated from HSI. In total, Miller wrote 300 fraudulent checks,
    stealing $2,239,407.68 from HSI. 3 Miller spent the stolen money on a plethora
    of personal expenditures, including a down payment on a home, a swimming
    pool, numerous cars and motorcycles, an engagement ring, and various
    cosmetic surgeries and procedures.
    Miller pled guilty without a plea agreement to a one-count information,
    charging her with bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2). Based on the
    2 Peter Bausone, co-owner of HSI, testified at Miller’s sentencing hearing that the
    company began experiencing noticeable, incomprehensible financial trouble in December
    2015, resulting in the cessation of annual employee bonuses for the first time in 37 years;
    denial of overtime; and loss of key employees. Despite its inexplicable financial concerns, HSI
    did not grow suspicious of Miller until July 2016 when one of the owners began noticing
    Miller’s extravagant spending.
    3 Regions Bank paid all but two of the fraudulent checks when presented and drew
    funds from HSI’s account. The two checks not paid by Regions Bank totaled $26,665.01.
    3
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    United States Sentencing Guidelines, as calculated in the presentence report
    (PSR), Miller’s base offense level was seven, subject to a 16-level increase based
    on the amount of loss; a two-level increase under the sophisticated means
    enhancement; and another two-point increase for Miller’s abuse of a position
    of trust. Applying these enhancements, Miller’s adjusted offense level was 27,
    which was reduced by three points for her acceptance of responsibility,
    resulting in a total offense level of 24. Miller’s total offense level of 24 and
    criminal history category of I yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 51 to
    63 months.
    Relevant to this appeal, Miller filed written objections to the abuse of
    trust and sophisticated means enhancements. At sentencing, after considering
    further argument by Miller’s counsel, the district court overruled Miller’s
    objections and adopted the PSR and addenda as its findings of fact. Miller
    received an above-guidelines sentence of 96 months imprisonment. Miller
    timely appealed her sentence. On appeal, Miller argues that the district court
    clearly erred by applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 for
    abusing a position of trust and by applying a two-level enhancement under
    U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) for using sophisticated means. 4
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the
    Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v.
    Hernandez, 
    876 F.3d 161
    , 164 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Trujillo,
    
    502 F.3d 353
    , 356 (5th Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, we review for clear error the
    district court’s factual determinations that Miller abused a position of trust
    and used sophisticated means. See United States v. Ollison, 
    555 F.3d 152
    , 164
    4As conceded at oral argument, Miller does not appeal the 33-month upward variance.
    Thus, this argument is waived. See Cinel v. Connick, 
    15 F.3d 1338
    , 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“An
    appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.”).
    4
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    (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Conner, 
    537 F.3d 480
    , 492 (5th Cir. 2008).
    “Under the clearly erroneous standard, we will uphold a finding so long as it is
    plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United States v. Miller, 
    607 F.3d 144
    , 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Ekanem, 
    555 F.3d 172
    , 175
    (5th Cir. 2009)).
    DISCUSSION
    Miller appeals the district court's application of the abuse of a position
    of trust sentencing enhancement and the sophisticated means sentencing
    enhancement. We address her arguments in turn.
    I. Abuse of a Position of Trust
    Miller first challenges the district court’s imposition of the enhancement
    for abuse of a position of trust, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Miller’s argument
    largely rests on her contention that she did not occupy a position of trust,
    attempting to analogize Ollison; United States v. Vinalay, 694 F. App’x 278
    (5th Cir. 2017); and a case from a different circuit, United States v. Tann, 
    532 F.3d 868
    (D.C. Cir. 2008). Miller argues that, as an accounts payable clerk, she
    held a clerical position with little-to-no discretion, had limited duties, and did
    not have any managerial or professional discretion. Miller further argues that
    stealing from a trusting employer while under minimal supervision does not
    warrant a position of trust enhancement. Miller asserts that any accounts
    payable clerk could have committed the theft and that her position did not help
    her commit or conceal the theft.
    Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level
    increase to the defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant abused a position
    of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly
    facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
    Applying a two-step inquiry, the sentencing court must first “determine
    whether the defendant occupied a position of trust at all.” 
    Ollison, 555 F.3d at 5
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    165. “A position of trust is characterized by (1) professional or managerial
    discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given
    considerable deference), and (2) minimal supervision.” 
    Id. at 166
    (citing
    U.S.S.G. 3B1.3 cmt. n.1). Persons holding a position of trust “ordinarily are
    subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose responsibilities
    are primarily non-discretionary in nature.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1. This
    enhancement “does not apply in the case of an embezzlement or theft by an
    ordinary teller or hotel clerk because such positions are not characterized by
    [these] factors.” 
    Id. We consider
    “the extent to which the position provides the
    freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong” to be a “primary trait” in
    determining whether a person is in a position of trust. United States v. Brown,
    
    7 F.3d 1155
    , 1161 (5th Cir. 1993). 5 If the court finds that the defendant did not
    occupy a position of trust, “the inquiry ends and no enhancement accrues.”
    
    Ollison, 555 F.3d at 165
    .
    If the defendant occupied a position of trust, then the court must
    “ascertain the extent to which the defendant used that position to facilitate or
    conceal the offense.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Reccko, 
    151 F.3d 29
    , 31 (1st
    Cir. 1998)). “In order for the enhancement to apply, the [defendant’s] superior
    position must not only provide the opportunity to defraud, but also
    significantly facilitate its commission or concealment.” 
    Id. at 169
    n.14. To
    determine whether a position of trust “significantly facilitated” the commission
    or concealment of the offense, the court must decide “whether the defendant
    5  In her Rule 28(j) letter, Miller cites the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v.
    Douglas, 
    885 F.3d 124
    (3d Cir. 2018), arguing that our decision in United States v. Brown
    was abrogated by the 1993 amendment (Amendment 492) to Section 3B1.3, which added
    language referring to professional or managerial discretion. We disagree. Whether a position
    provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong remains a primary trait—although
    not dispositive—in distinguishing a person in a position of trust from one who is not. See,
    e.g., 
    Ollison, 555 F.3d at 166
    (citing Brown post-Amendment 492 when characterizing a
    position of trust as including professional or managerial discretion and minimal supervision).
    6
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    occupied a superior position, relative to all people in a position to commit the
    offense, as a result of her job.” United States v. Kay, 
    513 F.3d 432
    , 459 (5th Cir.
    2007) (citation omitted).
    Given our deferential review, Miller has not demonstrated clear error.
    The district court’s findings that Miller occupied a position of trust and that
    she used that position to significantly facilitate the commission and the
    concealment of her fraudulent scheme are plausible in light of the record as a
    whole. Each week, Miller used the company’s accounting software to prepare
    and print approximately 80–100 checks to pay HSI’s vendors. As HSI’s
    accounts payable clerk, Miller had the discretion to create new vendor entries
    in her employer’s bookkeeping system, which she utilized to add her boyfriend
    as a payee, and to issue checks to pay those vendors. 6 Further, Miller exercised
    professional discretion when she presented a list of HSI checks directly to
    Regions Bank for electronic verification and authorization of payment. Miller
    included the fraudulent checks with the legitimate checks, deceiving Regions
    Bank into believing the fraudulent checks were legitimate so that it would
    make payment on the fraudulent checks when presented.
    Moreover, as conceded by Miller’s counsel at oral argument, Miller was
    not a closely supervised employee. Miller’s disbursement of funds and
    maintenance of accounting logs was essentially unsupervised, as demonstrated
    by the number of times Miller forged checks for payment (300 checks), the
    amount she stole from HSI ($2,239,407.68), as well as the length of time she
    maintained the fraudulent scheme undetected (21 months).
    6 There is no mention in the record that any of the other approximately 80 employees
    enjoyed similar access or authority. Cf. 
    Ollison, 555 F.3d at 166
    (“Absent proof of other
    aggravating circumstances, we do not think that the § 3B1.3 enhancement should apply to a
    secretary who made unauthorized charges on a corporate credit card that was issued to 1,200
    other employees.”).
    7
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    Miller’s deferential position afforded her the autonomy to add and pay
    vendors, and her fraudulent conduct proved difficult to detect because of this
    freedom and limited supervision. See 
    Brown, 7 F.3d at 1161
    ; see also 
    Ollison, 555 F.3d at 170
    (Garza, J., dissenting). Miller’s discretionary judgment, her
    largely unsupervised access to the company’s accounting records, and her
    exploitation of her knowledge of HSI’s internal accounting procedures, renders
    her case distinguishable from the cases she attempts to analogize, and more
    comparable to cases where we have upheld the abuse of trust enhancement.
    See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 
    203 F.3d 884
    , 893–94 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding
    that a part-time teller occupied a position of trust because of special knowledge
    of operating and security procedures, which the teller used to facilitate a
    robbery); United States v. Roberts, 75 F. App’x 266, 267–68 (5th Cir. 2003)
    (unpublished) 7 (holding that an accounts receivable data entry clerk occupied
    a position of trust because her position provided her with “special access to the
    company’s data base, with the power to receive, deposit and record substantial
    sums of money, and with the authority to relay the updated account
    information to the company’s headquarters”).
    As to the second prong of the inquiry, Miller exploited the knowledge of
    HSI’s internal accounting procedures and access to its accounting records—
    necessary for her position as the accounts payable clerk—to facilitate and
    conceal her bank fraud. See United States v. Powers, 
    168 F.3d 741
    , 752 (5th
    Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Pruett, 
    681 F.3d 232
    , 248 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (“We have found the second element of § 3B1.3 to be satisfied where the
    defendant’s position made the criminal conduct easier to perform or where it
    facilitated his crime.”). This access and knowledge provided Miller with the
    7Although an unpublished opinion issued after January 1, 1996, is not controlling
    precedent, it may be considered as persuasive authority. See Ballard v. Burton 
    444 F.3d 391
    ,
    401 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4).
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    means to issue fraudulent checks made payable to her boyfriend, Sandifer.
    Miller’s position of trust similarly assisted in her concealment of the fraud:
    Miller abused her ability to add Sandifer as a vendor-payee, delayed detection
    by falsely representing in the company’s accounting records that Sandifer 8 sold
    metal to HSI, and disguised the fraudulent checks as legitimate in the list she
    provided to HSI’s bank. The exploitation of this type of unsupervised,
    specialized knowledge in the commission of the offense supports the abuse of
    position of trust enhancement. See 
    Smith, 203 F.3d at 893
    (holding that a part-
    time bank teller occupied a position of trust because of special knowledge of
    operating and security procedures, which the teller used to facilitate a
    robbery); United States v. Ehrlich, 
    902 F.2d 327
    , 330–31 (5th Cir. 1990)
    (holding that a loan clerk occupied a position of trust because of specialized
    knowledge and access of the computer system, as well as the authority to
    balance large, important accounts, which facilitated her embezzlements,
    warranting an abuse of position of trust enhancement); United States v.
    Nelson, 487 F. App’x 152, 154 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (affirming the
    enhancement where the defendant’s position as a liaison between her employer
    and marketing vendors, “combined with her specialized knowledge of [her
    employer’s] invoice-process for marketing services, [ ] provided her with the
    means and discretion to submit and receive payment for fraudulent invoices”).
    Additionally, the extent of the fraudulent scheme—in the amount of loss
    and the length of time—evinces that Miller’s position as HSI’s accounts
    payable clerk facilitated Miller’s commission and concealment of bank fraud.
    Because of Miller’s concealment efforts, the owners of HSI struggled with the
    company’s inexplicable financial troubles for several months, which resulted
    8HSI did not learn the identity of Sandifer until July 18, 2016: Miller first revealed
    that Sandifer was her boyfriend when HSI questioned her about the unauthorized checks.
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    in employees being laid off, withholding of annual bonuses, and the
    termination of overtime.
    For   these    reasons,    the   district   court’s    sophisticated   factual
    determination that Miller abused a position of trust is plausible in light of the
    record, and thus is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the district court did not
    err in applying the § 3B1.3 abuse of trust sentencing enhancement.
    II. Use of Sophisticated Means
    As to Miller’s second argument challenging the sophisticated means
    enhancement, the Guidelines provide for a two-level increase if “the offense
    otherwise involved sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally
    engaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G.
    § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The term “sophisticated means” is defined as “especially
    complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or
    concealment of an offense.” 
    Id. at cmt.
    n. 9(B). “Conduct such as hiding assets
    or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells,
    or offshore financial accounts [ ] ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.” 
    Id. We have
    “affirmed the application of the sophisticated means enhancement in
    cases involving some method that made it more difficult for the offense to be
    detected, even if that method was not by itself particularly sophisticated.”
    United States v. Valdez, 
    726 F.3d 684
    , 695 (5th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).
    “We will not find a district court’s ruling [that a defendant used sophisticated
    means to impede discovery of the offense] to be clearly erroneous unless we are
    left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
    United States v. Clements, 
    73 F.3d 1330
    , 1340 (5th Cir. 1996).
    While some aspects of Miller’s scheme were not sophisticated, viewing
    the scheme in its entirety, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to
    conclude that Miller’s overall conduct warranted the sophisticated means
    enhancement. Miller employed multiple methods that made it more difficult to
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    detect her bank fraud. See 
    Valdez, 726 F.3d at 695
    . Specifically, Miller
    misrepresented her boyfriend as HSI’s vendor and created false bookkeeping
    entries to pay her boyfriend for fictitious metal sales, forging the office
    manager’s signature on the checks she issued. Miller further attempted to
    disguise her scheme by including the fraudulent checks in the list of authorized
    checks she submitted to Regions Bank, making them appear legitimate and
    delaying detection.
    Moreover, by issuing the fraudulent checks to Sandifer—a name
    unknown to HSI—Miller obscured the link between herself and the fraudulent
    payments. See 
    Clements, 73 F.3d at 1340
    . Miller further attempted to avoid
    linking herself to the fraudulent checks by continuously depositing the checks
    into WNB’s after-hour drop box. Once WNB became suspicious, Miller
    composed a letter attempting to provide the bank with the requested
    verification. When WNB refused the letter because it was not notarized, Miller
    closed the account and opened a new account at another bank.
    Miller’s conduct is something more than an “open and transparent direct
    deposit and movement of funds,” 
    Valdez, 726 F.3d at 695
    , and closer to the
    conduct of defendants in cases where similar enhancements were upheld. See,
    e.g., 
    Clements, 73 F.3d at 1340
    (upholding the enhancement where the
    defendant repeatedly converted payments he received into multiple cashier's
    checks, which were either cashed or deposited into his wife's separate bank
    account, because his actions “obscure[d] the link between the money and . . .
    himself,” and “undeniably made it more difficult for the IRS to detect his [tax]
    evasion”); United States v. Malfitano, 690 F. App’x 218, 219 (5th Cir. 2017)
    (affirming enhancement where, although the defendant provided his true
    identity, “he attempted to avoid detection and to conceal the fraudulent nature
    of the transactions at issue, and he attempted to legitimize the proceeds
    distributed to him through his company”); United States v. Faulkner, 
    598 F. 11
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    App’x 301 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) enhancement where the
    defendant “created fictitious room revenue credits using the [hotel’s] house
    account and issued these refunds to her personal accounts”).
    Based on the foregoing reasons, the district court’s application of the
    sophisticated means enhancement was not clearly erroneous.
    CONCLUSION
    AFFIRMED.
    12