Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi , 913 F.3d 551 ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434        Page: 1   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 17, 2019
    No. 17-50282
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING
    AND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC; PLANNED
    PARENTHOOD SAN ANTONIO; PLANNED PARENTHOOD CAMERON
    COUNTY; PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC; PLANNED
    PARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER; JANE DOE #1;
    JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #7;
    JANE DOE #9; JANE DOE #10; JANE DOE #11,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees
    v.
    CHARLES SMITH, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner of
    HHSC; SYLVIA HERNANDEZ KAUFFMAN, in her official capacity as
    Acting Inspector General of HHSC,
    Defendants - Appellants
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and HAYNES 1, Circuit Judges.
    EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
    The Texas Health and Human Services Commission’s Office of Inspector
    General (“OIG”) sought to terminate the Medicaid provider agreements of
    Planned Parenthood affiliates throughout the state. The agency based this
    1   Judge Haynes concurs in the judgment only.
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434     Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    decision largely on undercover video footage of graphic discussions with
    Planned Parenthood personnel concerning the prospective sale of liver,
    thymus, and neural tissue from fetuses aborted during the second trimester of
    pregnancy.     The videos justified terminating the affiliates’ provider
    agreements, the agency contended, because they indicated noncompliance with
    accepted medical and ethical standards. Three Planned Parenthood affiliates
    (“Provider Plaintiffs”) and several Medicaid beneficiaries (“Individual
    Plaintiffs”) sought a preliminary injunction against the termination decision.
    The district court held that the Individual Plaintiffs possessed a private right
    of action under the “qualified-provider” provision of the Medicaid Act,
    42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23), and issued a preliminary injunction preventing
    Texas from terminating Medicaid funding to the Planned Parenthood facilities
    statewide. The state agency has appealed.
    We are constrained to affirm the district court’s conclusion that the
    plaintiffs possess a private right of action, as held by this court in Planned
    Parenthood Gulf Coast v. Gee, 
    862 F.3d 445
    (5th Cir. 2017) (hereafter, “Gee”)
    (cert denied, 
    139 S. Ct. 408
    ). But Judge Jones, in a separate concurrence, urges
    rehearing en banc on that issue, which has divided the appellate courts. We
    vacate the preliminary injunction and remand for the district court to limit its
    review to the agency record under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Planned Parenthood Affiliates
    The Provider Plaintiffs operate health centers and provide family
    planning services to about 12,500 Medicaid patients and the general public.
    Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast (“PPGC”) runs seven health centers in the
    Houston area. Planned Parenthood Greater Texas (“PPGT”) and Planned
    2
    Case: 17-50282      Document: 00514800434         Page: 3    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    Parenthood South Texas (“PPST”) 2 operate an additional 23 health centers. As
    affiliates of Planned Parenthood Federation of America (“PPFA”), they must
    adhere to various organizational standards to use the Planned Parenthood
    name and trademark.
    Among the Provider Plaintiffs, only PPGC has sold fetal tissue for use in
    outside research. 3 Melissa Farrell has served as PPGC’s Research Director
    since 2006. In this role, she provides information about PPGC’s services to
    outside researchers, develops budgets and contracts, and facilitates
    Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) submissions.                  Ms. Farrell has been
    involved in several outside studies involving fetal tissue research. In 2006,
    PPGC participated in a first-trimester fetal tissue study. A second study,
    conducted in conjunction with the University of Texas Medical Branch in
    Galveston (“UTMB”), ran from 2010 to 2011 and concerned first-trimester
    placental tissue.
    To facilitate these studies, Ms. Farrell stated that she would modify
    certain clinical procedures and require consent from the abortion patients
    whose procedures yielded fetal tissue. Both studies required that fetal tissue
    be processed and packaged following the abortions.                   The UTMB study
    additionally required PPGC to use a sterile process to collect the placental
    2  PPST is technically an umbrella organization comprising three other named
    plaintiffs: Planned Parenthood Cameron County, Planned Parenthood San Antonio, and
    Planned Parenthood South Texas Surgical Center.
    3PPGC itself does not technically provide abortions. But an affiliated entity—located
    in the same building as PPGC’s headquarters and called Planned Parenthood Center For
    Choice (“PPCFC”)—does provide abortions. PPGC’s own research department handles all of
    PPCFC’s research agreements because PPCFC has no separate research department or
    personnel of its own. The district court pretermitted the question whether PPGC and PPCFC
    were effectively a single organization.
    3
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434     Page: 4   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    tissue after the abortion. Dr. Regan Theiler, a researcher involved in the
    UTMB project, also performed abortions at PPGC’s facility.
    Ms. Farrell communicated with Baylor College of Medicine regarding
    another fetal tissue donation project from 2013 through 2015. They discussed
    IRB approval, next steps, and draft contract terms, but no contract or budget
    was finalized.
    B. Undercover Videos and Ensuing Investigations
    In 2015, the Center for Medical Progress (“CMP”), a pro-life organization,
    released more than eight hours of undercover videos disclosing conversations
    held at the PPGC headquarters. In the CMP videos, two individuals posed as
    representatives from a fetal tissue procurement company. They claimed to be
    interested in purchasing liver, thymus, and neural tissue from fetuses aborted
    during the second trimester of pregnancy. Ms. Farrell features prominently in
    the video, as she discusses the possibility of a research partnership, provides a
    tour of PPGC’s surgical facilities, and displays tissue samples from recently
    aborted fetuses.
    Dr. Tram Nguyen, the director of PPGC’s abortion facility, confirmed many of
    Ms. Farrell’s statements.
    4
    Case: 17-50282      Document: 00514800434         Page: 5    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    The release of these graphic videos prompted federal and state
    investigations into numerous Planned Parenthood affiliates.                   The Harris
    County District Attorney, the Texas Rangers, and the Houston Police
    Department investigated but brought no charges.                   Likewise, the Texas
    Attorney General’s Office, the Texas Department of State Health Services, and
    the Texas Health and Human Services Commission conducted investigations.
    Additionally, the U.S. House of Representatives formed a Select
    Investigative Panel (“Select Panel”) to investigate abortion providers’ medical
    practices involving fetal tissue procurement.                 Representative Marsha
    Blackburn of Tennessee, a Republican, was named Chair of the bipartisan
    Select Panel.     In December 2016, Blackburn emailed the Texas Attorney
    General Ken Paxton evidence the Select Panel had gathered about PPGC and
    asked Texas to investigate possible violations of Tex. Penal Code § 48.02, which
    prohibits the purchase and sale of human organs, and Tex. Penal Code § 37.08,
    which prohibits making a false report to a law enforcement officer.
    C. Termination of Medicaid Provider Agreements
    As participants in the Texas Medicaid program, 4 the Provider Plaintiffs
    and each of their related health centers signed Medicaid provider agreements
    and agreed to comply with all Texas Medicaid policies and applicable state and
    federal regulations. The Provider Plaintiffs received $3.4 million from Texas
    Medicaid funds. 5 Texas Health and Human Services Commission Office of
    Inspector General (“OIG” or “the agency”) oversees compliance with state
    Texas Medicaid only pays for abortions under narrow circumstances—specifically,
    4
    when a woman’s life is in danger or for victims of rape and incest.
    5This amount is a smidgen of the three affiliates’ combined revenues of approximately
    $57 million in 2013.
    5
    Case: 17-50282     Document: 00514800434       Page: 6   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    Medicaid policies and may conduct investigations and terminate Medicaid
    provider agreements for noncompliance.
    OIG may terminate a Medicaid provider agreement when “prima facie
    evidence” establishes that a provider has committed a “program violation” or
    is “affiliated with a person who commits a program violation.” 1 Tex. Admin.
    Code § 371.1703(c), (c)(6)-(8). A “program violation” includes any violation of
    federal law, state law, or the Texas Medicaid program policies. For instance,
    as explained in the Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual, a provider
    violates Texas Medicaid rules if it fails to offer health services in accordance
    with “accepted medical community standards.”           See 1 Tex. Admin. Code
    § 371.1659(2).
    In October 2015, OIG sent each Provider Plaintiff a Notice of
    Termination, stating that each was “no longer capable of performing medical
    services in a professionally competent, safe, and legal manner.” The Notice
    listed the bases for termination and stated that, unless the Provider Plaintiffs
    responded within 30 days, a Final Notice of Termination would issue.
    Instead of responding to the Notice and pursuing administrative and
    state judicial avenues of relief, the Provider Plaintiffs sued in federal court to
    block    the   termination.    The    Individual     Plaintiffs—Texas     Medicaid
    beneficiaries who have received services from the Provider Plaintiffs—joined
    in this challenge. On the state agency’s motion, the district court stayed the
    proceedings for almost a year pending a Final Notice of Termination. OIG sent
    the Final Notice on December 20, 2016.
    The Final Notice states that the Inspector General had determined that
    the Provider Plaintiffs were “not qualified to provide medical services in a
    professionally competent, safe, legal and ethical manner under the relevant
    provisions of state and federal law pertaining to Medicaid providers.” The
    6
    Case: 17-50282     Document: 00514800434     Page: 7   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    Final Notice bases this conclusion on the CMP videos and evidence provided
    by the Select Panel.      The Final Notice states that the Inspector General
    consulted with the Chief Medical Officer, who reviewed the evidence and
    concluded that PPGC had violated “generally accepted medical standards, and
    thus [was] not qualified to provide medical services.”
    The Final Notice then specifies the “numerous violations of generally
    accepted standards of medical practice” established by the CMP video,
    including “a history of deviating from accepted standards to procure samples
    that meet researcher[s’] needs” and “a history of permitting staff physicians to
    alter procedures to obtain targeted tissue samples needed for their specific
    outside research.” The Final Notice also states that evidence establishes that
    PPGC engaged in misrepresentations regarding fetal tissue procurement. The
    Final Notice concludes that under OIG’s regulations, affiliates of a terminated
    entity are also subject to termination. See 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 371.1703(c)(7).
    D. Court Proceedings
    After reviewing the Final Notice, the plaintiffs filed an amended
    complaint and a new motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court
    conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing, during which it reviewed the CMP
    videos and heard testimony from medical and ethics experts on both sides. The
    plaintiffs offered testimony of the Provider Plaintiffs’ CEOs, Ms. Farrell, and
    PPGC’s Medical Director.      The agency offered testimony of the Inspector
    General, OIG’s Chief Medical Officer, an expert in obstetrics and gynecology,
    and a bioethics expert.
    Much of the evidentiary hearing consisted of review and analysis of clips
    from the CMP videos. The agency focused on evidence that PPGC had violated
    federal regulations relating to fetal tissue research by altering abortion
    procedures for research purposes or allowing the researchers themselves to be
    7
    Case: 17-50282     Document: 00514800434     Page: 8   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    involved in performing abortions to harvest their preferred tissue samples. See
    42 U.S.C. § 289g-1(c)(4) (requiring researchers to certify that they “had no part
    in any decisions as to the timing, method, or procedures used to terminate the
    pregnancy made solely for the purposes of the research”); 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(i)
    (for research involving pregnant         women or fetuses, requiring that
    “[i]ndividuals engaged in the research will have no part in any decisions as to
    the timing, method, or procedures used to terminate a pregnancy”); 42 U.S.C.
    § 289g-1(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring researchers to certify that “no alteration of the
    timing, method, or procedures used to terminate the pregnancy was made
    solely for the purposes of obtaining the tissue”). The plain purposes of the
    regulations are to prevent conflicts of interest between the researcher and
    patients and to eliminate any temptation to place research studies above the
    patients’ medical needs. In addition to federal regulations, state regulations
    authorize sanctions for providers who fail to adhere to “accepted medical
    community standards.” See 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 371.1659(2).
    Various of Ms. Farrell’s statements were offered as evidence that PPGC
    had violated or is willing to violate these standards. For example, at one point
    in the video, Ms. Farrell responds to questions about whether PPGC has
    “physicians who would be able to change the procedure a bit” for research
    purposes, and Ms. Farrell says, “Yep.” She then adds:
    Yes. And it will depend. Obviously the change in the procedure
    will have to be where it’s not going to put the patient at more risk
    . . . prolong the procedure putting her at more risk, and altering
    the procedure where we leave content in the patient, which
    obviously we’re trying to get . . . and that’s something we’ll have to
    discuss, you know, with the docs . . . and see how they can do it.
    Because some of our[] doctors in the past have projects, and they’re
    collecting the specimens so they do it in a way that they get the
    best specimen. So I know it can happen.
    8
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434     Page: 9   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    Later in the video, Ms. Farrell identifies Dr. Theiler, a participant in the
    UTMB study, as someone who would be a good reference. She explains:
    Yeah. So she knows what’s involved in modifying what we need to
    do to get you the specimens that are intact because she’s done it.
    . . . And she was doing those here.
    Dr. Nguyen confirmed that the PPGC abortion facility can obtain intact liver
    and thymus.      The doctor stated, sarcastically, that while federal law
    (prohibiting partial birth abortions) restricts a facility from intentionally
    retrieving an intact fetus, PPGC can make it happen by signing a form that
    they did not so “intend.” Nguyen also stated that obtaining intact specimens
    of liver, thymus, and neural tissue depends upon the amount of cervical
    dilation of the patient and the patient’s pain tolerance. The doctor noted risks
    associated with fetal tissue procurement that PPGC is willing to take because
    “it is for a good cause.” The doctor acknowledged that two particular PPGC
    doctors can alter the abortion procedure to meet a researcher’s request.
    Relying on these statements, others like them, and their expert testimony, OIG
    sought to justify its termination decision.
    The plaintiffs’ live witnesses, on the other hand, denied that PPGC ever
    altered abortion procedures for research purposes. Ms. Farrell herself testified
    that, in the videos, she was actually discussing changes to clinical operations
    and not changes to the abortion procedures themselves.
    Following the hearing, the district court issued a memorandum and
    order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The district
    court held that the Individual Plaintiffs possessed a private right of action to
    challenge OIG’s termination decision. Analyzing OIG’s evidence of PPGC’s
    program violations, the district court credited the plaintiffs’ self-justifying
    explanations. The court found that even in the light most favorable to the
    agency, the videotaped discussions were ambiguous and open to interpretation.
    9
    Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434         Page: 10     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    The district court stated, inaccurately, that the CMP video had not been
    authenticated and suggested that it may have been edited. 6 The district court
    also noted that neither the Inspector General nor the Medical director had
    expert knowledge concerning abortion procedures. And the court discounted
    Ms. Farrell’s videotaped statements because she claimed on the witness stand
    that she really had no personal knowledge of the medical aspects of abortion
    procedures and had never even been in the room when an abortion was
    performed.
    While the court felt free to credit all of the trial testimony from the
    Provider Plaintiffs—none of which had been offered during the state
    administrative      procedures—the        court    bound     the    IG    solely    to   the
    administrative record and expressly refused to consider any support for
    termination “not included in the Final Notice and not part of the Inspector
    General’s termination decision.” Having thus narrowed the evidence, the court
    concluded that OIG “did not have prima facie . . . evidence, or even a scintilla
    of evidence, to conclude the bases of termination set forth in the Final Notice
    merited finding the Plaintiff Providers were not qualified.” The agency timely
    appealed.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy.’” Texans for Free
    Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 
    732 F.3d 535
    , 536 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
    Byrum v. Landreth, 
    566 F.3d 442
    , 445 (5th Cir. 2009)). “To be entitled to a
    6 In fact, the record reflects that OIG had submitted a report from a forensic firm
    concluding that the video was authentic and not deceptively edited. And the plaintiffs did
    not identify any particular omission or addition in the video footage. Moreover, the district
    court also suggested that there was no evidence that any of PPGC’s research was federally
    funded, so the regulations relied on by OIG might be inapplicable. But the record actually
    establishes that the UTMB study was funded by the National Institute of Health.
    10
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434      Page: 11   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    preliminary injunction, the applicants must show (1) a substantial likelihood
    that they will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that they will
    suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) their substantial
    injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom they seek to enjoin,
    and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
    interest.”   Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey,
    
    667 F.3d 570
    , 574 (5th Cir. 2012) (brackets and citations omitted). The party
    seeking preliminary injunctive relief must clearly carry the burden of
    persuasion on all four elements.      
    Id. This court
    “review[s] a preliminary
    injunction for abuse of discretion, reviewing findings of fact for clear error and
    conclusions of law de novo.” Texans for Free 
    Enter., 732 F.3d at 537
    . When a
    court applies incorrect legal principles, it abuses its discretion.           See
    Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
    894 F.3d 692
    , 696 (5th Cir. 2018).
    III. DISCUSSION
    The following discussion demonstrates that the district court erred in
    evaluating the evidence de novo, in its peculiarly asymmetrical way, rather
    than under the arbitrary and capricious standard, and in applying Gee’s
    reasoning to its determination of a “qualified” provider in this context. For
    those reasons, the court erred legally and Appellees are unable to show a
    likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. Accordingly, it is unnecessary
    for us to address the other elements of preliminary injunctive relief.
    The    Medicaid       program   exemplifies   cooperative    federalism—a
    partnership between federal and state agencies to provide medical services to
    needy individuals. The federal government shares the costs of funding the
    program with participating states. Atkins v. Rivera, 
    477 U.S. 154
    , 156–57,
    
    106 S. Ct. 456
    , 2458–59 (1986). In exchange for federal funds, the states must
    11
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434      Page: 12   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    “agree[] to spend them in accordance with congressionally imposed conditions.”
    Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S Ct. 1378, 1382 (2015).
    Under the Medicaid Act’s “qualified-provider” provision, “[a] State plan
    for medical assistance must . . . provide that [ ] any individual eligible for
    medical assistance . . . may obtain such assistance from any institution . . .
    qualified to perform the service or services required . . . who undertakes to
    provide him such services.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23). The Supreme Court has
    held that this provision “gives recipients the right to choose among a range of
    qualified providers, without government interference.”       O’Bannon v. Town
    Court Nursing Ctr., 
    447 U.S. 773
    , 785, 
    100 S. Ct. 2467
    , 2475 (1980).
    Relying on this court’s decision in Gee, the district court concluded that
    the “qualified-provider” provision grants the Individual Plaintiffs a right of
    action to challenge OIG’s termination of the Provider Plaintiffs’ Medicaid
    agreements. 
    862 F.3d 445
    (5th Cir. 2017). The district court then issued a
    preliminary injunction against the agency after holding that the plaintiffs met
    the criteria for extraordinary relief.
    On appeal, OIG raises two principal arguments: the plaintiffs lack a
    private right of action because Gee does not control this case; and the district
    court abused its discretion in concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to
    succeed on the merits of their challenge because, inter alia, the court
    erroneously applied de novo review in evaluating OIG’s termination decision
    instead of limiting its review to the agency record under the deferential
    arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
    A. Private Right of Action
    In Gee, a divided panel of this court held that, under some circumstances,
    42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) can afford Medicaid beneficiaries a private right of
    action to challenge a state’s erroneous termination of Medicaid provider
    12
    Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434          Page: 13     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    agreements.        This “free choice of provider” provision mandates that “any
    individual eligible for medical assistance…may obtain such assistance from
    any institution…or person, qualified to perform the service or services
    required….” Gee involved a decision by the Louisiana Department of Health
    and Hospitals (“LDHH”) to terminate the Medicaid provider agreements of two
    PPGC-affiliated clinics operating in 
    Louisiana. 862 F.3d at 450
    –52. Although
    the OIG, as will be seen, attempts to distinguish Gee, we are constrained to
    follow that decision as the law of this circuit.
    In Gee, LDHH advanced three reasons for terminating the provider
    agreements: (1) PPGC’s settlement of several qui tam False Claims Act
    lawsuits,     in    which     PPGC       disclaimed      all   liability;    (2) unspecified
    misrepresentations by PPGC in its letters to LDHH; and (3) a pending
    investigation of PPGC by LDHH and the Louisiana Office of Inspector General.
    See 
    id. at 453.
    As in this case, PPGC and several Medicaid beneficiaries
    bypassed      state    administrative       procedures      and    sued     LDHH       under
    42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that PPGC’s clinics were, in fact, “qualified” and that
    LDHH had failed to identify any valid ground under federal or state law for
    terminating the two clinics. The Gee majority agreed.
    The court held, joining the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, that
    Section 1396a(a)(23) can provide Medicaid beneficiaries with a right of action
    to challenge a state’s termination decision that is unrelated to a provider’s
    qualifications. See 
    id. at 462.
    7 The court relied on the definition of “qualified”
    7 See Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 
    727 F.3d 960
    (9th Cir. 2013); Planned
    Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 
    699 F.3d 962
    (7th Cir. 2012);
    Harris v. Olszewski, 
    442 F.3d 456
    (6th Cir. 2006). After Gee was issued, the Eighth Circuit
    held that Section 1396a(a)(23) does not afford a private right of action. See Planned
    Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Gillespie, 
    867 F.3d 1034
    (8th Cir. 2017). Then the Tenth
    Circuit joined the circuit majority in affirming a private right of action. Planned Parenthood
    of Kansas and Mid-Missouri v. Andersen, 
    882 F.3d 1205
    (10th Cir. 2018).
    13
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434       Page: 14    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    cited by other circuits: “[t]o be ‘qualified’ in the relevant sense is to be capable
    of performing the needed medical services in a professionally competent, safe,
    legal, and ethical manner.” See 
    id. at 462
    (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
    Ind., 699 F.3d at 978
    ). The court then determined that none of LDHH’s asserted
    justifications for terminating the Medicaid provider agreements implicated
    whether the health clinics were “qualified” under this definition. See 
    id. at 470.
           OIG argues that Gee is distinguishable. Specifically, the agency suggests
    that Gee must be narrowly construed to prevent conflict with the Supreme
    Court’s decision in O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 
    447 U.S. 773
    ,
    
    100 S. Ct. 2467
    (1980). In O’Bannon, the Supreme Court held that patients
    lacked a private right of action under Section 1396a(a)(23) to challenge the
    state agency’s termination of a nursing home’s Medicaid provider agreements
    for failure to meet statutory and regulatory standards. The Court asserted
    that the Medicaid Act “clearly does not confer a right on a recipient to enter an
    unqualified home and demand a hearing to certify it, nor does it confer a right
    on a recipient to continue to receive benefits for care in a home that has been
    decertified.”    
    Id. at 785,
    100 S. Ct at 2475.              Consequently, under
    Section 1396a(a)(23), a patient “has no enforceable expectation of continued
    benefits to pay for care in an institution that has been determined to be
    unqualified.” 
    Id. at 786,
    100 S. Ct at 2476.
    Over a cogent dissent by Judge Owen, 
    see 862 F.3d at 475
    (Owen, J.,
    dissenting), the Gee majority distinguished O’Bannon for two reasons. First,
    the majority stated that O’Bannon involved a due process challenge whereas
    the Gee plaintiffs “assert[ed] the violation of a substantive right.” 
    Id. at 460.
    Second, the majority asserted that, in O’Bannon, the state had “decertified”
    the nursing center, whereas in Gee, “there was no decertification decision.” 
    Id. 14 Case:
    17-50282     Document: 00514800434     Page: 15   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    at 461.   “When, as here, a state terminates only a Medicaid provider
    agreement, independent of any action to enforce statutory and regulatory
    standards, O’Bannon is inapposite.” 
    Id. OIG focuses
    on the majority’s second reason for distinguishing
    O’Bannon—the absence of a “decertification decision” by LDHH.               OIG
    emphasizes that LDHH had “conceded that [the clinics were] competent to
    provide the relevant medical services” and had not sought to decertify the
    health centers beyond ejecting them from the Medicaid program. 
    Id. at 466.
    Thus, LDHH admitted that its termination of the clinics’ Medicaid provider
    agreements was “independent of any action to enforce statutory or regulatory
    
    standards.” 862 F.3d at 461
    . Texas, however, has not conceded that the
    Provider Plaintiffs are “qualified” in any way. Moreover, unlike LDHH, the
    OIG’s termination action is predicated on specific findings that federal and
    state statutory and regulatory standards have been violated. In other words,
    the plaintiffs in this case are doing precisely what O’Bannon disallowed—
    challenging the merits of a state agency’s decertification decision.
    The Gee majority indeed indicated several times that the plaintiffs were
    not contesting the “the merits of [LDHH’s] decertification 
    decision.” 862 F.3d at 461
    . But we are unpersuaded by the distinction urged by the state. The Gee
    majority states that “it bears repeating that LDHH has conceded that PPGC is
    competent to provide the relevant medical services to any and all non-Medicaid
    
    patients.” 862 F.3d at 466
    (emphasis added). Although the Gee majority
    acknowledged that LDHH’s justifications for termination “might well relate to
    a provider’s qualifications,” the state had “taken no action to revoke PPGC’s
    15
    Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434         Page: 16     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    license and has not called into question any qualification that enables PPGC
    to offer medical care 
    generally.” 862 F.3d at 469
    (emphasis in original). 8
    Here, there is far stronger evidence in support of OIG’s termination
    decision than the justifications offered by LDHH, but there is also no evidence
    that the state of Texas questions the competence of the Provider Plaintiffs or
    that it has taken steps to prevent the Provider Plaintiffs from offering medical
    care to non-Medicaid patients. In the end, the plaintiffs’ claim here is roughly
    the same as it was in Gee: the state agency violated the “qualified provider”
    provision by excluding them from the Medicaid program for reasons allegedly
    unrelated to whether they are “capable of performing the needed medical
    services in a professionally competent, safe, legal, and ethical manner.” OIG’s
    attempt to distinguish Gee regarding an implied individual claim is unavailing.
    This does not mean, of course, that the agency’s O’Bannon-based
    arguments are frivolous. Seven judges on this circuit joined a dissent from the
    denial of rehearing en banc focused on the conflict with O’Bannon. See Planned
    Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 
    876 F.3d 699
    , 700 (5th Cir. 2017)
    (Elrod, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining that Gee “is
    directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s holding in O’Bannon”). But this
    panel lacks authority to contradict the current law of the circuit.
    B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
    Gee controls this appeal as to the plaintiffs’ right of action but the
    plaintiffs, and to an extent the district court, suggest that this case is merely
    Gee redux. That is incorrect. In Gee, the state agency’s purported justifications
    8 See 
    also 862 F.3d at 476
    –77 (Owen, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority
    opinion as holding, “whenever a State terminates a provider’s Medicaid agreement,
    regardless of the grounds for termination, a patient may sue to contest the termination,
    unless the State also precludes the provider from providing services or care to all patients,
    not just Medicaid recipients.”).
    16
    Case: 17-50282     Document: 00514800434       Page: 17    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    for termination were tantamount to contending that a provider can be excluded
    “simply because state law says 
    so,” 862 F.3d at 466
    , or that a state can “simply
    label[ ]   any   exclusionary    rule   as    a   ‘qualification’”   to   circumvent
    Section 1396a(a)(23)’s requirements. 
    Id. at 466
    (quoting Planned Parenthood
    of 
    Ind., 699 F.3d at 980
    ). OIG, however, based its termination decision on,
    inter alia, a record of incriminating admissions by PPGC’s own personnel that
    show, the agency contends, a failure to comply with federal regulations or, at
    the very least, a failure to comply with the ethical standards that Texas
    requires of Medicaid providers.
    It is true that the district court purported to find “not . . . even a scintilla
    of evidence” impugning PPGC’s qualifications. But this occurred only after the
    district court credited the plaintiffs’ witnesses’ self-serving testimony about
    their videotaped statements, while asymmetrically refusing to consider OIG’s
    post-termination evidence. None of the plaintiffs’ evidence, moreover, was ever
    presented to the agency through the standard administrative procedures or
    judicial review required by the Medicaid statutes.
    OIG challenges the district court’s procedures as facially inequitable.
    But the agency’s principal argument on appeal is that the district court abused
    its discretion by reviewing the agency’s decision de novo instead of under the
    deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard required by this court’s decision
    in Abbeville General Hospital v. Ramsey, 
    3 F.3d 797
    (5th Cir. 1993). We agree
    that Abbeville’s analysis applies here: a state agency’s decision terminating a
    Medicaid provider agreement—and the agency’s determination that the
    provider is not “qualified”—should be reviewed like any other administrative
    case—on the record that was made before the agency and under the arbitrary-
    and-capricious standard.
    17
    Case: 17-50282        Document: 00514800434      Page: 18   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    However, before explaining the appropriate standard of review, it is first
    necessary to clarify how Gee’s analysis of the “qualified-provider” requirement
    applies to state agencies like OIG. We then explain why the district court had
    to review the agency’s decision under the more deferential standards.
    1. The meaning of “qualified”
    The Medicaid Act itself does not define what it means for a provider to
    be    “qualified      to     perform     the    service   or     services   required.”
    42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23).        But “Medicaid regulations allow states to set
    reasonable standards relating to the qualifications.” 
    Gee, 862 F.3d at 462
    (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 431.51(c)(2)). And Gee emphasized that “states retain
    broad authority to define provider qualifications and exclude providers on that
    basis.” 
    Id. at 465;
    see also Detgen ex rel. Detgen v. Janek, 
    752 F.3d 627
    , 631
    (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that states possess “broad discretion to implement
    the Medicaid Act”).         Nevertheless, Gee held that a state’s discretion is
    “circumscribed by the meaning of ‘qualified’ in this 
    context.” 862 F.3d at 465
    .
    Rather than offer a comprehensive definition of what it means for a
    provider to be “‘qualified’ in this context,” Gee instead relied on a general
    definition used by several other circuits. See 
    id. at 462.
    This definition of
    “qualified,” which LDHH never challenged, is “capable of performing the
    needed medical services in a professionally competent, safe, legal, and ethical
    manner.” See 
    id. at 462
    (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
    Ind., 699 F.3d at 978
    ).
    Absent further explanation, this broad statement could unduly circumscribe
    an agency’s ability to “define provider qualifications and exclude providers on
    that basis,” 
    Gee, 862 F.3d at 465
    , and it conflicts with other Medicaid statutory
    provisions and with the interpretation of federal funding statutes.
    First, the word “capable” must be construed with reference to the
    limiting terms “competence,” “safety,” “legality,” and “ethics.” Being “capable
    18
    Case: 17-50282     Document: 00514800434      Page: 19    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    of” providing health services is not the same as being “qualified” to do so. Being
    “capable of” denotes merely the ability to perform a function. 9 In contrast,
    being “qualified” means “[h]aving qualities or possessing accomplishments
    which fit one for a certain . . . function” and, often, it means that this fitness is
    “officially recognized.” 10   If being merely “capable” of providing health
    services—say, safely—were the standard for being a “qualified” provider, a
    Medicaid provider could challenge its termination by showing that it could
    have acted safely—even if it seriously or frequently failed to do so. A state
    agency should not have to show that a provider is incapable of operating
    appropriately to hold a provider accountable under the “qualified-provider”
    provision. None of the cases that have relied on the general definition of
    “qualified” have indicated otherwise.
    Similarly, courts may not interpret Gee to hold that a Medicaid provider
    must be considered “qualified” until the state has totally barred that provider
    from serving the public. A literal understanding of “capable of performing the
    needed medical services” could lead to that interpretation, as could several of
    the Gee majority’s statements in dicta. See, e.g., 
    id. at 465
    (“While as a general
    rule a state may terminate a provider’s Medicaid agreements for reasons
    bearing on that provider’s general qualification to provide medical services, we
    are not aware of any case that holds a state may do so while continuing to
    license a provider’s authorization to offer those same services to non-Medicaid
    patients.”). But any such requirement would hamstring state agencies like
    9   See The Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2018),          available   at
    http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27354?redirectedFrom=capable#eid.
    10  See The Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2017), available at
    http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/155867?rskey=k2PgDU&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid.
    19
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434      Page: 20    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    OIG that have no authority to decertify health care providers generally. The
    Provider Plaintiffs’ Texas medical licenses are regulated by the Texas Medical
    Board, which is a separate agency operating under separate statutory
    authority. See Tex. Occ. Code §§ 151.003(2), 152.001(a). And to the extent the
    Provider Plaintiffs or their affiliated health clinics are abortion providers, they
    are separately licensed by the Texas Department of State Health Services. See
    25 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.1(a). Moreover, if Louisiana’s failure to revoke the
    health clinics’ licenses were dispositive, the Gee majority would not have
    needed to review LDHH’s justifications for termination at all. In sum, a state’s
    decision to revoke a health care provider’s license may be sufficient, but it is
    not necessary in order for a state to exclude a provider from the Medicaid
    program.
    Second, requiring a state to decertify a provider entirely before
    jettisoning it from the Medicaid program would also conflict with the Medicaid
    Act’s provision of numerous grounds on which the Secretary of the Department
    of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) or a state can or must exclude a
    Medicaid provider from the program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(p)(1) – (3), 1320a-
    7. Indeed, the general exclusionary provision in Section 1396a(p)(1) authorizes
    a state to disqualify a provider for many reasons unrelated to violations that
    would require the provider to cease operating entirely.         Suspension from
    another state health care program, for example, is one of many statutory bases
    upon which the Medicaid Act allows a state to exclude a provider. See 
    id. § 1320a-7.
    The applicable regulations amplify that “a State may exclude an
    individual or entity . . . for any reason for which the Secretary could exclude
    that individual or entity from participation in Federal health care programs”
    and “[n]othing contained in this part should be construed to limit a State’s own
    authority to exclude an individual or entity from Medicaid for any reason or
    20
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434      Page: 21   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    period authorized by State law.” 42 C.F.R. § 1002.3(a)-(b). Gee also recognized
    that “[s]tates undoubtedly must be able to terminate provider agreements in
    cases of criminal activity, fraud and abuse, and other instances of
    
    malfeasance.” 862 F.3d at 469
    . The Medicaid Act’s comprehensive regulatory
    framework nowhere suggests that a provider may only be disqualified once it
    is deemed unfit to provide care for the general public.
    Third, because the Medicaid program transfers funds to states on
    conditions, a “clear statement” of any mandatory condition is required by
    Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
    451 U.S. 1
    , 17 (1981), and OIG’s
    interpretation and implementation of the regulations is valid unless “plainly
    prohibited” by the statute. Detgen ex rel. Detgen v. 
    Janek, 752 F.3d at 631
    . As
    noted above, states have definitional latitude, and there is no federal definition
    of “qualified provider.”
    In light of this analysis, Gee’s holding that a state may not exclude a
    Medicaid provider for “reasons unrelated to that provider’s 
    qualifications.” 862 F.3d at 462
    (emphasis in original), is best read to mean that a state
    agency’s justifications for terminating a provider must actually implicate
    whether the provider operates in a “safe, legal, and ethical manner” under
    state and federal law. A state cannot exclude a provider “for no reason at all.”
    
    Id. at 468.
        Nor can a state “simply label[] any exclusionary rule a
    ‘qualification’” and then contend a provider is unqualified on that basis. 
    Id. at 469
    (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
    Ind., 699 F.3d at 978
    ). Thus, the Seventh
    and Ninth Circuits found violations of the “qualified-provider” requirement
    where states excluded providers merely because they provided abortions. As
    Gee explained, “a state may not exclude a provider simply based on the scope
    of the services it 
    provides.” 862 F.3d at 469
    .
    21
    Case: 17-50282   Document: 00514800434      Page: 22   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    To comply with Gee, a state agency undertaking to decide that a
    Medicaid provider is not “qualified” should identify regulations concerning the
    “safe, legal, and ethical manner” of furnishing healthcare services and point to
    evidence of the provider’s violations.      As reflected in the Gee majority’s
    analysis, this should be an easy standard for the state to meet in most cases.
    See 
    id. at 468
    (“[W]e reiterate for emphasis the unique circumstances of the
    instant case.”).
    2. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
    With the governing legal standard in mind, we turn to the proper
    standard of judicial review.     OIG contends that the district court erred
    procedurally by applying de novo review and allowing the plaintiffs to offer
    evidence outside the administrative record, because this court held in Abbeville
    that the “substantive adequacy and reasonableness” of a state agency’s
    findings in administering the Medicaid Act should be reviewed by courts “using
    the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
    review.” 3 F.3d at 803
    –04. Although
    the district court did not specify the standard of judicial review, the court
    clearly did not defer to OIG’s findings. Instead, the court distinguished the
    state’s findings at every opportunity. And by considering and crediting the
    plaintiffs’ post-termination evidence, while expressly discrediting the state’s
    witnesses, the court did not limit its review to the agency record.         This
    procedure violates Abbeville’s requirements.
    In Abbeville, this court held that the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious
    standard applies to a state agency’s rate-setting action under the Medicaid
    Act’s Boren Amendment.        
    Abbeville, 3 F.3d at 802
    .     Federal courts are
    accustomed to applying the “deferential” standard to the actions of federal
    agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home
    Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
    551 U.S. 644
    , 658, 
    127 S. Ct. 2518
    , 2529 (2007);
    22
    Case: 17-50282        Document: 00514800434           Page: 23     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under this deferential standard, an agency’s finding may
    only be overturned if it fails to satisfy “minimum standards of rationality.”
    La. Envt’l Action Network v. U.S. E.P.A., 
    382 F.3d 575
    , 582 (5th Cir. 2004).
    Courts accordingly may consider only “whether the agency action ‘bears a
    rational relationship to the statutory purposes’ and [whether] there [is]
    ‘substantial evidence in the record to support it.” 
    Id. at 582
    (quoting Tex. Oil
    & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. E.P.A., 
    161 F.3d 923
    , 934 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mercy
    Hosp. of Laredo v. Heckler, 
    777 F.2d 1028
    , 1031 (5th Cir.1985))). Arbitrary and
    capricious review is conducted on the basis of the agency record alone.
    Luminant Generation Co. v. U.S. EPA, 
    675 F.3d 917
    , 925 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (internal citation omitted).
    Abbeville’s application of this deferential standard to a state agency was
    not novel; indeed, the court referred to the applicability of this standard as an
    “indisputable proposition” supported by a “litany of cases.” See 
    Abbeville, 3 F.3d at 802
    & n.6 (citing cases); see also Miss. Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Heckler,
    
    701 F.2d 511
    , 517 (5th Cir. 1983) (reviewing state agency’s Medicaid
    reimbursement plan under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard). Abbeville
    clarified that whether a state had complied with the Medicaid Act’s procedural
    requirements was subject to de novo review. 
    Id. at 802.
    11 However, once a
    state agency complies with any required Medicaid procedures, “a presumption
    of regularity and [a] deferential standard attaches” to the agency’s decision.
    
    Id. at 804.
    11In Abbeville, itself, the state agency “admit[ted] . . . that it conducted no studies and
    made no efforts to” make the required findings. 
    Id. at 806.
    For this reason, the court reversed
    the agency’s reimbursement plan for procedural noncompliance without applying arbitrary
    and capricious review. 
    Id. at 810.
    23
    Case: 17-50282      Document: 00514800434        Page: 24    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    The plaintiffs argue that Abbeville is inapposite because the instant case
    does not actually involve the appeal of an agency decision; rather, it is “a
    statutory claim under the Medicaid Act giving rise to a right of action in federal
    court under §[ ]1983.”      The plaintiffs contend that there is “no case law
    imposing arbitrary-and-capricious review on such a claim.” The plaintiffs are
    mistaken. Abbeville itself involved a Section 1983 action seeking to enforce
    statutory rights. See 
    Abbeville, 3 F.3d at 801
    (“The Hospitals filed a § 1983
    action against the Secretary of LDHH and other agency officials, claiming their
    actions deprived them of rights secured under the Boren Amendment.”). 12
    Other courts have likewise concluded that the review of state Medicaid
    decisions as applied to individual plaintiffs in Section 1983 cases is governed
    by the arbitrary and capricious standard. See Smith v. Rasmussen, 
    249 F.3d 755
    , 760 (8th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Day, 
    434 F. Supp. 2d 1035
    , 1041 (D. Kan.
    2006).
    Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, moreover, this case plainly involves
    judicial review of an agency action. Here, OIG, the state agency empowered to
    investigate violations of the Medicaid program and terminate providers for
    noncompliance, decided to exclude the Provider Plaintiffs after finding
    evidence that they had violated various medical and ethical standards. The
    plaintiffs have sought judicial review of that termination decision.                The
    plaintiffs’ challenge is functionally equivalent to any other appeal of an agency
    decision. To hold that the plaintiffs’ challenge could receive review in federal
    court without the deference due in a case brought by the Provider Plaintiffs
    directly would be to elevate patients’ rights beyond the complex federal-state
    cooperative and enforcement structure of the Medicaid statute itself. Put
    12 Similarly, Miss. Hosp. Ass’n. does not cite Section 1983 but must also have been
    brought to enforce federal law under that provision.
    24
    Case: 17-50282      Document: 00514800434       Page: 25    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    otherwise, had the Secretary of HHS excluded the Provider Plaintiffs, there is
    no question that its decision would be subject to arbitrary and capricious
    review. 13   And put otherwise again, the result the Individual Plaintiffs
    obtained goes far beyond their personal claims to be treated by the Provider
    Plaintiffs, as it prevents the state from denying millions in state funds to those
    entities; this result cannot be proportional to the litigation of an individual
    claim, but must arise from wholesale review of agency action toward the
    Providers.
    The plaintiffs next contend that Gee precludes the application of
    arbitrary-and-capricious review in this context because Gee reviewed LDHH’s
    termination decision de novo. Had Gee addressed this question and applied de
    novo review, we might be bound to do likewise. But Gee never addressed nor
    was it required to or even asked to address the applicable standard of review.
    LDHH’s grounds for terminating the health clinics amounted to no more than
    unsupported suspicions of misconduct. Unlike in this case, LDHH had done
    no factfinding and conceded that the providers were “qualified.”                 Thus,
    although Gee did not address Abbeville, it is consistent with the prior decision’s
    requirements: as in Abbeville, the lack of findings rendered the LDHH decision
    subject to de novo review. This stands in stark contrast to the present case in
    which OIG made findings.
    Further, not one of the circuits that have recognized a private right of
    action under Section 1396a(a)(23) has intimated that an arbitrary-and-
    capricious standard would be inappropriate.             In Planned Parenthood of
    Indiana and Betlach, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits had no need to address
    13 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Nursing Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
    Servs., 606 F. App’x 164, 167 (5th Cir. 2015) (reviewing whether Secretary’s decision
    imposing sanctions on Medicaid provider was arbitrary and capricious).
    25
    Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434          Page: 26     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    this question because they dealt only with state laws, not agency decisions,
    that blocked Medicaid funding for abortion providers. 
    See 699 F.3d at 967
    ;
    727 F.3d at 962.        Likewise, the underlying issue in the Sixth Circuit’s
    Olszewski decision was whether HHS reasonably construed the Medicaid Act’s
    phrase “medical devices” to include “incontinence 
    products.” 442 F.3d at 465
    . 14
    The state agency’s determination was not properly at issue. Additionally, the
    Tenth Circuit’s decision in Andersen largely parrots Gee in its rejection of a
    state agency’s termination decision and likewise does not discuss the standard
    of 
    review. 882 F.3d at 1236
    .
    The plaintiffs next argue that the deferential standard is inappropriate
    because the Individual Plaintiffs, as Medicaid beneficiaries, have no
    administrative remedy and thus cannot develop the administrative record. 15
    The plaintiffs also point out that Gee held that the plaintiffs “are not subject to
    . . . any administrative exhaustion requirement.” 
    Gee, 862 F.3d at 455
    . That
    is true. But the absence of an exhaustion requirement does not mean there
    can be no consequences for the provider’s decision to ignore the prescribed
    administrative process. The absence of an exhaustion requirement does not
    entitle plaintiffs to de novo review of OIG’s factual findings and conclusions.
    Indeed, it is a feature—not a bug—of the arbitrary-and-capricious
    standard that it incentivizes providers to use the state administrative appeal
    process required by the Medicaid Act itself.               See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(4);
    The court applied Chevron deference to HHS’s construction of the act and found it
    14
    reasonable. 
    Id. at 470.
    15The Individual Plaintiffs, of course, serve here as the Providers’ litigation proxies,
    and the Providers had ample opportunity to develop the administrative record. If this
    deficiency ultimately operates to the detriment of the Individual Plaintiffs, O’Bannon
    recognized that Medicaid beneficiaries might well have a cause of action against their
    Providers for becoming 
    decertified. 447 U.S. at 787
    , 100 S. Ct. at 2476.
    26
    Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434          Page: 27     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    42 C.F.R. § 1002.213 (“Before imposing an exclusion under § 1002.210, the
    State agency must give the individual or entity the opportunity to submit
    documents and written argument against the exclusion.”). It is highly doubtful
    that Congress intended a loophole whereby providers could use patients as
    litigation proxies to avoid the state’s remedial procedures and develop
    separate, potentially conflicting judicial standards of compliance. Requiring
    arbitrary and capricious review that is limited to the administrative record
    encourages Medicaid providers to pursue a state’s administrative-hearing
    procedures in order to develop the administrative record in their favor. 16
    In an effort to apply rather than distinguish Abbeville, the plaintiffs
    alternatively contend that the district court did no more than the federal court
    in that case and simply disregarded OIG findings that were not “bona fide” or
    “supported     by    some     minimum        quantum       of   evidence.”        
    Abbeville, 3 F.3d at 804
    , 805.      As explained above, however, Abbeville was reviewing
    LDHH’s procedural compliance with Medicaid standards, not its substantive
    compliance.
    In any event, there is no question that the OIG here made factual
    findings after viewing the videos and related evidence. On the basis of the
    administrative record—not the post hoc justifications offered by plaintiffs’
    witnesses in the district court—the OIG determined that video discussions
    “centered on clinic processes and tissue packaging rather than the abortion
    procedure itself; the video featured repeated discussion about the position of
    16In this way, requiring the deferential standard of review could ameliorate what
    some members of this court saw as negative consequences of the Gee decision. See 
    Gee, 876 F.3d at 702
    (Elrod, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Disqualified
    providers can now circumvent state law because the panel majority opinion deems it
    unnecessary to have a final administrative determination so long as there are patients to join
    a lawsuit filed in federal court.”).
    27
    Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434          Page: 28     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    the fetus in the uterus, the risk to the patient, and the patient’s pain tolerance.”
    The OIG further concluded, based on the videos, that the Provider Plaintiffs at
    a minimum violated federal standards regarding fetal tissue research and
    standards of medical ethics by allowing doctors to alter abortion procedures to
    retrieve tissue for research purposes or allowing the researchers themselves to
    perform the procedures. The plaintiffs’ briefing with regard to the substance
    of the discussions contained in the videos (as opposed to their trial witnesses’
    post hoc justifications) is curiously silent.
    The plaintiffs finally insinuate that arbitrary and capricious review
    should not apply because OIG has insufficient expertise to determine the
    qualifications of abortion providers. On this point, the district court was also
    dismissive, suggesting that the Inspector General and OIG’s Chief Medical
    Officer were insufficiently informed regarding how to perform abortions. We
    reject this argument. OIG is the agency that the state of Texas has empowered
    to investigate and penalize Medicaid program violations. The agency is in the
    business of saying when providers are qualified and when they are not. That
    the Chief Medical Officer is a surgeon—and not himself an abortion provider—
    does not mean that he deserves no deference when deciding whether a provider
    has failed to meet the medical and ethical standards the state requires. 17 It is
    even odder to claim that federal judges, who have no experience in the
    17Here, it seems necessary to consider the appropriate deference owed to OIG outside
    the abortion context. It is certainly inappropriate “to bend the rules when any effort to limit
    abortion, or even to speak in opposition to abortion, is at issue.” Whole Woman’s Health v.
    Hellerstedt, 
    136 S. Ct. 2292
    , 2321 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Stenberg v.
    Carhart, 
    530 U.S. 914
    , 954, 
    120 S. Ct. 2597
    , 2621 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). To bend the
    rules here would be particularly imprudent. Had OIG terminated the Medicaid provider
    agreements of any other type of health care provider, the incongruity of allowing that
    provider to use patient litigation proxies to avoid administrative review and receive de novo
    review in federal court would be obvious and unacceptable.
    28
    Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434         Page: 29     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    regulations and ethics applicable to Medicaid or medical practice, much less in
    regard to harvesting fetal organs for research, should claim superior expertise.
    In sum, the district court erred by giving no deference to OIG’s factual
    findings and by accepting evidence beyond the agency record. The arbitrary
    and capricious standard applies to review of the record alone.            18
    CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, we must affirm that the Individual Plaintiffs possess
    a private right of action.       However, because the district court apparently
    conducted de novo review of the OIG’s decision, and its procedure was
    incompatible with the proper standard, the basis for its preliminary injunction
    cannot be sustained. Whether plaintiffs might establish a likelihood of success
    on the merits depends on application of the arbitrary and capricious standard
    to the administrative record alone.
    We VACATE the preliminary injunction and REMAND for the district
    court to limit its review to the agency record under an arbitrary-and-capricious
    standard.
    18  A separate issue raised by Planned Parenthood is whether OIG could terminate
    Medicaid funding for all of the Provider Plaintiffs where only one, PPGC, has engaged in or
    contemplated fetal tissue research. State regulations authorizing action against “affiliates”
    of a provider are at issue. This issue becomes relevant and must be reconsidered by the
    district court if, on remand, it upholds the OIG’s termination decision against PPGC.
    29
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434       Page: 30   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    The panel agrees that the Gee decision is binding law for our circuit at
    present, but I urge reconsideration en banc.           Gee is inconsistent with
    O'Bannon, and it makes no practical sense to hold that a Medicare provider
    charged with misfeasance by state regulating authorities may simply bypass
    state procedures, which are required by the Medicaid statute, and use patients
    as stalking horses for federal court review of its status. That the arbitrary and
    capricious standard of review governs such review in federal court is a second-
    best solution to the legal necessity of aligning our precedent with the Supreme
    Court’s holding. Finally, despite being litigated with the trappings of the
    abortion debate, this is fundamentally a statutory construction case, not an
    abortion case. Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc., 
    139 S. Ct. 408
    ,
    409 (2018) (dissenting from denial of certioriari).
    Prudential     and   practical    objections    may    be   made    to   this
    recommendation. From a prudential standpoint, the Supreme Court denied
    certiorari in Gee in the past month, and this court rejected en banc
    reconsideration of the decision in 2017. Therefore, it would follow, the states
    of this circuit should be bound by judicial inertia to a plainly incorrect statutory
    interpretation. Pragmatically, there is no harm, no foul, because the nature of
    arbitrary and capricious review ought ordinarily shield the decisions of state
    authorities who claim evidentiary and legal support when attempting to
    sanction or terminate provider status. In my view, none of these rationales
    suffices.
    Start with this evenly divided court's denial of en banc reconsideration.
    See Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast v. Gee, 
    876 F.3d 699
    (5th Cir. 2017)
    (Elrod, J., dissenting). At the time of that denial, the Gee decision claimed
    support from three other circuits, but the Eighth Circuit had rejected the
    30
    Case: 17-50282      Document: 00514800434     Page: 31     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    creation     of   a   patient’s   implied    private   right    of   action    under
    Section 1396a(a)(23). Compare Planned Parenthood of Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach,
    
    727 F.3d 960
    (9th Cir. 2013); Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of
    Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 
    699 F.3d 962
    (7th Cir. 2012); Harris v. Olszewski,
    
    442 F.3d 456
    (6th Cir. 2006) (all finding a private right of action), with Does v.
    Gillespie, 
    867 F.3d 1034
    (8th Cir. 2017) (rejecting a private right of action).
    Importantly, however, this court’s even split indicated our recognition that the
    statutory interpretation issue posed in Gee is seriously debatable. A refusal to
    vote a case en banc under such circumstances is a victory of sorts for the panel
    decision, but it reflects no endorsement by the majority of active judges.
    Reconsidering the en banc decision, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s
    recent action, would secure a clear majority decision on this surely recurring
    issue.
    In December 2018, the Supreme Court declined certiorari in Gee and the
    Tenth Circuit’s Andersen decision, both of which implied a patient’s private
    right of action to challenge Medicaid providers’ regulatory terminations. See
    Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Andersen, 
    882 F.3d 1205
    (2018). A conflict
    exists with the Eighth Circuit’s contrary holding, yet the Supreme Court left
    in place the circuit conflict. It is a fair bet that the Court’s avoidance indicates
    considerable uncertainty about the statutory issue. To restore the uniformity
    of federal law, the conflict must eventually be addressed. Until that happens,
    three different courses of action are afforded to Medicaid providers in different
    states. In states where no circuit court decision has approved private plaintiffs’
    ability to challenge the providers’ sanctions, the providers must repair to
    Medicaid-required state administrative and judicial procedures. In the Tenth
    Circuit, providers may use private plaintiffs’ federal court suits, level of federal
    review undetermined, as an alternative to undergoing state-crafted
    31
    Case: 17-50282     Document: 00514800434      Page: 32    Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    procedures. And in this circuit, providers have alternative recourse to private
    plaintiffs’ suits under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Tens of
    thousands of provider entities are subject to the Medicaid program’s detailed
    scheme of integrated federal and state regulation.
    That Planned Parenthood providers achieved recognition of implied
    private plaintiffs’ actions should not detract from the program-wide
    uncertainty spawned by this circuit conflict. Equally to the point, the lower
    courts remain obliged to undertake careful statutory review while the issue is
    undecided, especially if the statute, properly construed, offers providers no
    alternative federal court remedy. The Court’s denial of certiorari, in other
    words, strengthens the propriety of this court’s reconsidering Gee en banc.
    The pragmatic argument for denying en banc relief would seem to
    include two parts.    This court’s adoption of the deferential arbitrary and
    capricious standard means that state authorities will ordinarily be able to
    defend their program termination decisions successfully in federal court,
    reducing   the    friction   between   federal   courts     and   state   Medicaid
    administrators.    Thus, it would be argued, the cost of reconsidering Gee,
    especially if Gee was correctly decided, is higher than the cost of federal
    litigation pending a definitive Supreme Court decision. But there is a second
    wrinkle here in that whether to apply an arbitrary and capricious standard is
    a res nova decision by this panel made necessary by Gee.               The parties
    strenuously disputed the standard of review. As long as a circuit split persists,
    other courts weighing in on the standard of review may disagree with this
    panel’s decision. Following the Gee case thus entails ongoing legal uncertainty.
    Another     pragmatic     consideration,   however,     favors      en   banc
    reconsideration: the complexity and cost to state agencies that administer and
    regulate Medicaid.     The program is already one of the most expensive
    32
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434       Page: 33   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    components of state budgets. Regulating providers comprises comprehensive
    federal and state medical, and ethical dictates as well as parameters for
    facilities that provide patient care.      Authorizing lawsuits by patients to
    challenge their providers’ terminations burdens state agencies with redundant
    and intrusive oversight while the high cost of federal litigation displaces more
    efficient uses of state resources. As Justice Thomas also noted in his dissent
    from denial of cert., “the looming potential for complex litigation inevitably will
    dissuade state officials from making decisions that they believe to be in the
    public 
    interest.” 139 S. Ct. at 409
    . State courts, moreover, are well suited to
    handle these cases based on their more intimate familiarity with the agencies,
    the regulation of the practice of medicine, and state administrative law—as
    was contemplated in the Medicaid statutes’ prescription of coordinate state
    responsibilities for the program. If Gee is incorrect, these practical costs will be
    avoided.
    Having explained why there should be no impediment to our rehearing
    this case en banc in order to reconsider Gee, I repeat briefly the arguments that
    others have fulsomely developed. Gee is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
    decision in O’Bannon and in tension with numerous other provisions of the
    Medicaid statute.
    Judge Owen, dissenting in Gee, argued that O’Bannon precluded the
    individual plaintiffs’ assertion of a private right of action to challenge LDHH’s
    termination decision. 
    See 862 F.3d at 475
    (Owen, J., dissenting). The majority
    opinion asserted that in O’Bannon, “the patient-plaintiffs’ injuries were alleged
    to stem from a deprivation of due process rights,” and “[i]n contrast, the
    Individual [Gee] Plaintiffs here assert the violation of a substantive right.” 
    Id. at 460(citations
    omitted). Judge Owen pointed out the fundamental logical
    flaw with this reasoning: the majority “fail[s] to appreciate that there is no
    33
    Case: 17-50282     Document: 00514800434     Page: 34   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    right to due process unless there is a substantive right that may be vindicated
    if adequate process is 
    accorded.” 862 F.3d at 475
    . The majority completely
    missed the dissent’s primary point that O’Bannon rejected the notion that
    Section 1396a(a)(23) creates any substantive liberty or property right. 
    Id. at 476.
           Judge Owen criticized the majority’s broad assertion that only a total
    termination of a Medicaid provider from all medical services would render the
    provider “unqualified” for purposes of Section 1396a(a)(23). She cited, inter
    alia, Section 1396a(p)(1), a provision that authorizes a state to “exclude
    any…entity [from Medicaid] for any reason for which the Secretary could
    exclude the…entity from participation in [several federal programs listed].”
    And she referenced multiple other reasons justifying state termination
    decisions under the Medicaid statute itself. 
    Id. at 477.
           Judge Owen also rebutted the majority’s claim that in O’Bannon, the
    state had “totally” decertified the nursing center, whereas in Gee, “there was
    no decertification decision.” 
    Id. at 472.
    The majority concluded, “[w]hen, as
    here, a state terminates only a Medicaid provider agreement, independent of
    any action to enforce statutory and regulatory standards, O’Bannon is
    inapposite.” 
    Id. The majority’s
    error was a “shaky” basis for distinguishing
    the Supreme Court precedent, according to Judge Owen, because the Court
    never specified that the nursing home had been totally decertified by the 
    state. 862 F.3d at 483
    .
    Six other judges on this circuit found Judge Owen’s dissent sufficiently
    persuasive to join a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. See Planned
    Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 
    876 F.3d 699
    , 700 (5th Cir. 2017)
    (Elrod, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining that Gee “is
    directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s holding in O’Bannon”). And Judge
    34
    Case: 17-50282       Document: 00514800434        Page: 35     Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    Elrod’s dissent added that “the panel majority opinion’s reasoning is not only
    at odds with O’Bannon but also with the entirety of the statutory framework
    in 42 U.S.C. Section 
    1396a.” 876 F.3d at 701
    .
    There are other reasons for rejecting Gee. The Eighth Circuit held in
    even more detail, albeit in a split decision, that Section 1396a(a)(23) confers no
    private right of action on patients concerning the termination of a Medicaid
    provider’s state agreement, because to do so would place that provision in
    conflict with related Medicaid provisions. See Does v. Gillespie, 
    867 F.3d 1034
    ,
    1041–1043 (8th Cir. 2017) (referring to the lack of an individual entitlement
    conferred by the provision itself and 82 related provisions governing State
    duties to the federal program; the availability of other means to enforce the
    State’s obligations under the Medicaid Act and the resulting likelihood of
    conflict between the implied individual remedy and a provider’s administrative
    and state judicial remedies; and the “aggregate” or “substantial compliance”
    nature of the federal government’s oversight duties). All of these structural
    indications, Judge Colloton explained, conflict with the requirement set out in
    Gonzaga v. Doe, that a plaintiff relying on federal law to underpin a
    Section 1983 case must show that “Congress clearly intended to create an
    enforceable federal right.” 
    Does, 867 F.3d at 1039
    (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
    
    536 U.S. 273
    , 283, 
    122 S. Ct. 2268
    (2002)). 1
    In   Andersen,     Judge     Bacharach       dissented     on   the    basis   that
    Section 1396a(a)(23) does not “unambiguously” provide an implied private
    right of action, contrary to Gonzaga, because any “right” conferred on patients
    in that provision conflicts with the state’s broad rights under Medicaid “to
    1  Judge Shepherd, concurring in the Eighth Circuit decision, echoed Judge Owen’s
    sentiments about O’Bannon as an independent ground for rejecting plaintiffs’ implied private
    right of action.
    35
    Case: 17-50282    Document: 00514800434        Page: 36   Date Filed: 01/17/2019
    No. 17-50282
    exclude an individual or entity from Medicaid for any reason or period
    authorized by State law.”          42 C.F.R. § 1002.3(b), interpreting 42 U.S.C.
    § 1396a(p)(1).     Andersen, 
    882 F.3d 1205
    , 1243–45 (10th Cir. 2018).
    Judge Bacharach would accordingly distinguish between situations where a
    state attempted to prohibit all Medicaid funding to abortion providers
    (contrary to law) and situations like that in Andersen, and in this case, where
    neutral regulations were violated by the providers.
    Finally, Justice Thomas and two colleagues noted the “significant
    implications” of the question “whether Medicaid recipients have a private right
    of action to challenge a State’s determination of ‘qualified’ Medicaid providers”
    under Section 1396a(a)(23) and Section 1983.            
    Gee, 139 S. Ct. at 408
    .
    Justice Thomas noted the threats to state administration of Medicaid
    programs, not only from the financial burdens of litigation and deterrence of
    sound management decisions, but also because private patients’ suits “give
    Medicaid providers ‘an end run around the administrative exhaustion
    requirements in [the] state’s statutory scheme.’” 
    Id. at 409,
    (quoting 876 F.3d
    at 702 
    (Elrod, J., dissenting)).
    Given the still-unsettled state of the law and the absence of precedential
    or pragmatic disincentives to rehearing en banc, these persuasive arguments
    deserve the attention of our full court. I respectfully request rehearing en banc
    to reconsider whether Section 1396a(a)(23) creates a private right of action on
    behalf of Medicaid patients to challenge the termination of their providers’
    contracts by the States.
    36