Farris v. Johnson ( 1998 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 97-10864
____________________
TROY DALE FARRIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL
DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(4:94-CV-142-Y)
April 27, 1998
Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Troy Dale Farris, convicted in Texas state court of capital
murder and sentenced to death, appeals the denial of habeas relief,
claiming that the district court erred in applying a presumption of
correctness to the trial court’s determination that prospective
juror Janice Goodson was excludable for cause, in the light of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in a decision in another case,
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
overruling its earlier decision in Farris’ direct appeal on that
issue; and that his court appointed counsel labored under an actual
conflict of interest due to their professional affiliation with an
attorney who was formerly the lead prosecutor assigned to his case.
We AFFIRM.
I.
Farris was convicted by jury in May 1986 of the offense of
capital murder for the shooting death of Tarrant County Texas
Deputy Sheriff Clark Rosenbalm. (The facts underlying the murder
are not at issue.) Following a separate punishment hearing, the
jury affirmatively answered two special issues that were presented;
and, accordingly, the trial court sentenced Farris to death.
On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
the conviction and sentence. Farris v. State, 819 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 911 (1992), overruled by
Riley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 290, aff’d on rehearing, 889 S.W.2d 297
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1137 (1995).
Farris then filed for state habeas relief. The trial judge
conducted the state habeas proceeding; following an evidentiary
hearing, the court, in August 1993, entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and recommended that habeas relief be denied.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the trial court’s
finding and denied habeas relief in December 1993. Ex parte
- 2 -
Farris, No. 15,938-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 1993) (unpublished
order). Execution was set for 8 March 1994.
On 2 March 1994, Farris sought federal habeas relief and a
stay of execution; a stay was granted on 4 March. And, at the end
of 1994, while Farris’ federal habeas petition was pending, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rendered Riley v. State, 889 S.W.2d
290, aff’d on rehearing, 889 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1137 (1995), which expressly overruled its
prior opinion in Farris’ appeal on the issue of whether
venireperson Goodson was properly excluded for cause.
In early 1997, the magistrate judge recommended granting
habeas relief to Farris with respect to Goodson’s exclusion, while
recommending denying relief on all other issues. But, in June
1997, the district court denied habeas relief as to all claims;
nevertheless, it granted a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
Farris v. Johnson, 967 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1997). Farris moved
to amend the judgment; in July 1997, in the light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lindh v. Murphy, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2059
(1997), the district court amended the denial order by applying the
standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as existed prior to the enactment of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
(The district court later granted Farris an AEDPA certificate of
appealability. But, as the district court ruled, pre-AEDPA law
applies.)
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II.
Farris claims that the district court erred in according a
presumption of correctness to the trial court’s finding that
Goodson was excludable for cause due to her position regarding the
death penalty. For his second, and only other, issue, he maintains
that his court appointed counsel labored under an actual conflict
of interest due to their professional affiliation with the former
lead prosecutor on Farris’ case, who resigned from the district
attorney’s office prior to Farris’ trial and formed a professional
relationship with his trial counsel.
Of course, under pre-AEDPA habeas law, “[i]n considering a
federal habeas corpus petition presented by a prisoner in state
custody, federal courts must generally accord a presumption of
correctness to any state court factual findings.” Mann v. Scott,
41 F.3d 968, 973 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1117
(1995). Of particular application here, as stated in Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985), a state trial judge’s decision to
strike a juror because of his views on capital punishment is a
factual finding entitled to the presumption of correctness found in
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (All references in this opinion to § 2254(d)
are to that section as it existed prior to amendment by AEDPA).
However, “[e]ight exceptions exist to this presumption. One of the
exceptions is if the record does not fairly support the finding.
If the record as a whole does not fairly support the finding, the
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finding is not entitled to the presumption of correctness.” James
v. Whitley, 39 F.3d 607, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1069 (1995); see also Gilley v. Collins, 968 F.2d 465, 469
(5th Cir. 1992) (although findings of fact are entitled to a
presumption of correctness, this court is not bound by those
findings if the state finding is not fairly supported by the
record).
It goes without saying that we review a district court’s
findings of fact for clear error; issues of law, de novo. E.g.,
Mann, 41 F.3d at 973 (citing Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 636
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 990 (1993)). And,
needless to say, “[a] finding of fact made by the district court is
clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court, after reviewing
the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d
626, 630 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1289 (1994).
A.
In asserting that the district court erred in according a
presumption of correctness to the trial court’s findings in
excluding Goodson, Farris contends that, instead, the presumption
should be applied to Riley v. State, which overruled Farris v.
State on the issue of whether Goodson was properly excluded. He
maintains also that Goodson’s exclusion was based on an application
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of an improper legal standard; and that the decision to exclude her
was without support in the record.
On direct appeal, in affirming Farris’ conviction and
sentence, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the
contention that Goodson was excluded improperly because of her
capital punishment views:
[W]e find Goodson established, via her juror
questionnaire form and later upon examination,
that she could not impose the death penalty
under any circumstances. She also stated that
she would not “deliberately” find appellant
“not guilty” because of her opposition to the
death penalty. On the more critical issue of
the three questions at punishment, Art.
37.071(b), however, Goodson vacillated.
Pursuant to questioning by the State, defense
counsel, and the trial judge, Goodson stated,
among other things, she was opposed to capital
punishment under any circumstances, that she
could answer affirmatively the special issues
if the facts warranted, but that it would
violate her conscience to vote yes on the
issues “in the proper case and the proper
evidence”. Goodson understood her
responsibilities as a juror and said she would
not violate her oath, but she also stated she
did not agree with the law and if she were
selected as a juror she would have no choice
but to follow it.
....
On the basis of these facts, we cannot
say the trial judge abused his discretion in
granting the State’s challenge for cause to
venire-person Goodson. When presented with a
prospective juror who has conflicting feelings
regarding the law, the juror’s oath, and
capital punishment, the trial judge is in a
unique position to determine whether those
same feelings would prevent or substantially
impair the venire-person’s performance as a
juror.
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Farris, 819 S.W.2d at 501.
As noted, approximately three years later, however, while
Farris’ federal habeas petition was pending, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, in Riley v. State, revisited Farris. In Riley,
the court, in its original opinion, had held that a prospective
juror in Riley’s capital murder trial was excused improperly, based
solely on her opposition to the death penalty. Riley, 889 S.W.2d
at 296-97. On rehearing, the court held that its opinion was
inconsistent with its holding on this issue in Farris, due to the
fact that the two cases were factually indistinguishable. As a
result, the Riley court overruled Farris on that issue: “Farris
was wrongly decided, Wainwright v. Witt notwithstanding, and [we]
hereby expressly overrule it.” Riley, 889 S.W.2d at 298. The
Riley court concluded that Goodson was not a vacillating
venireperson, as had been concluded in Farris, stating that,
despite her objection to capital punishment, Goodson “insisted she
would not violate her oath to render a true verdict, and
unambiguously and unwaveringly insisted she would answer the
special issues honestly and in accordance with the evidence.”
Riley, 889 S.W.2d at 300. The court held that Goodson had been
improperly excluded due to her conflicting feelings regarding
capital punishment, despite the fact that she stated she could
answer the special issues honestly. Id.
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Because Farris contends that Goodson was improperly excluded,
we excerpt her voire dire at considerable length:
[BY THE STATE] Q. I notice an answer to your
questionnaire ... in response to the following
question, with reference to the death penalty
which of the following statements would best
represent your feelings, circle one, and you
circled No. 3 and with your signature on the
next page or two pages later, I could never
under any circumstances return a verdict which
assessed the death penalty. Is that your
opinion?
[BY GOODSON] A. Yes, that’s the way I feel.
Q. I beg your pardon?
A. That’s the way I feel, yes.
Q. I presume then that you are opposed to
capital punishment?
A. Yes I am.
Q. And I will repeat that question one more
time and this is important for the record in
this case. Could you, under any circumstances
as a juror in a criminal case, vote to return
the death penalty?
A. No.
Next, counsel for Farris explained in detail to Goodson the
procedure for the penalty phase of the trial, including the
submission of the special questions, and the role of the jury at
that phase of the trial.
[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q. The question that I
have of you is whether or not your feeling
about the death penalty is so strong and is so
fixed that you feel that you would not be able
to answer these factual questions fairly and
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truly and honestly without regard for the
consequences. That was a long question.
[BY GOODSON] A. You are asking me if I feel
strongly enough about the death penalty that I
would not -- that I would say not guilty, so I
wouldn’t have to say it; is that what you are
saying.
Q. Yes, ma’am. Regardless of what the facts
were presented by the State of Texas.
A. No, I would not do that.
Q. You would make up -- we are taking this
in two stages.
A. I would try to do the best that I thought
the reasonable outcome should be.
Q. Your oath of office as a juror would
require you to render a true verdict, and what
that means, I can tell you, is to render a
verdict based upon the evidence, based upon
the facts, not based on what you want to have
happen. So at the first stage of the trial
you see no difficulty and you could do that?
Difficulty is not the right word. You could
do that?
A. I would not like to.
Q. Okay.
A. But on the other hand, if I were to be
placed in that position --
Q. Uh-huh.
A. -- then I would do the best I could.
Counsel for Farris continued questioning Goodson, once again
explaining in detail the procedures of the penalty phase of the
proceedings, including the submission of the special questions.
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[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q. The law requires that
these questions be based on evidence that
you’ve heard, just as your guilty verdict has
to be based on the evidence and that stands to
reason. A trial should be more than guesswork
or speculation or what I think maybe [might]
have happened.
[BY GOODSON] A. Yes.
Q. All right. Does your feeling about the
death penalty -- and, you know, what the
consequences of yes answers would be and you
know what the consequences of no answers would
be -- Is your feeling about the death penalty
such that you do not feel that you could
fulfill the oath of office that you would have
to take and answer those questions 1, 2 and/or
3, if 3 were to be given to you, that you
could not answer those questions fairly and
truly and honestly just as your oath requires
you?
A. I can only tell you that I would do my
best. That I would not deliberately do
otherwise.
Q. Okay. That’s --
[BY THE COURT] Q. I did not hear. Would not
deliberately do what?
[BY GOODSON] A. I wouldn’t deliberately do
otherwise.
At this point, a dispute between the prosecutor and defense
counsel over whether Goodson had clearly stated her views on
capital punishment resulted in a conference in the judge’s
chambers. Questioning then resumed by counsel for Farris:
[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q. What I was about to
try -- and I don’t know if being up here is
going to help at all. What we have got is we
have jurors who have to make the decisions
about the facts in the case. They have to
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make those decisions based on the evidence and
what the law is trying to do by saying that a
juror must make those decisions based on the
facts, is trying to keep the jurors from
jumping the gun, if you will, from going
around what the facts are just in order to
arrive at a certain outcome. Does that make
sense?
[BY GOODSON] A. Yes.
Q. So the law says this wouldn’t be proper
for the jurors just to say, well, I am a juror
and I get to write in a yes or no up here, but
because I want it to come out a certain way, I
am just going to disregard the facts; I am not
going to pay any attention to the evidence in
the case and in order to arrive at a certain
outcome I will just answer the questions in a
certain way that I know is going to bring
about the outcome. The law says that we must
go through step-by-step; that the jurors must
answer the questions based upon the facts and
then the outcome is set out by the law and
falls on the Judge. I just want to make sure
we don’t have any misunderstanding.
A. You are asking me if I feel strongly
enough about the death penalty that if I think
he is guilty I am going to say, no, he is not
guilty so he doesn’t get the death penalty?
You are asking me if I would do that?
Q. Yes, ma’am. That would be at the first
stage, yes, ma’am.
A. I would not deliberately.
Q. Now at the second stage -- see, your job
is not over at the first stage -- At the first
stage we decide guilty or not guilty, and at
the second stage is when you see these
questions. The Judge [will] give you a set of
written instructions, and these questions
would be in those instruction[s] and the Judge
would tell you, answer questions either yes or
no, depending on the evidence that you’ve
heard. And if you had heard enough evidence
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to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt the
law would require you to answer the questions
yes. If you had not heard sufficient
evidence, the law would require you to answer
the questions no. Your obligation is to
follow the law at both stages of the trial,
and I am sure you can agree with that. Just
as you would not automatically vote not guilty
to keep somebody from getting the death
penalty because that would be contrary to your
oath, as I understood your earlier answer you
wouldn’t automatically vote no to these
questions to keep somebody from getting the
death penalty because that also would be
contrary to your oath. Have I misstated your
answer? If I have --
A. No, that’s sound like [sic] what I said.
Q. No one is asking you to like or dislike
the death penalty. No one is asking you to
put yourself in the role of judge because
that’s not your job. Your job as a juror
would be to answer the questions, the factual
questions, and I take it, regardless of your
feelings one way or another that you could do
that because that’s what your oath requires
you to do?
A. Yes. I wouldn’t want to; I wouldn’t like
to, but I would.
....
Q. Would you follow the law and would you be
able to, in fact, base your decisions upon the
facts of the case rather than personal opinion
or personal feelings recognizing that that’s
not the job of the juror? The job of the
juror is to base their decisions on the facts.
A. I would do the best I could.
At this juncture, the court questioned Goodson.
[BY THE COURT] Q. Mrs. Goodson, when you
filled out this questionnaire, was it your
intention to sign this No. 3 which said, “I
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could never under any circumstances return a
verdict which assessed the death penalty?” Is
that what you said?
[BY GOODSON] A. Yes.
Q. All right. Now, as Counsel has told you,
if the Defendant is found guilty you will then
be asked to answer these three questions yes
or no. If you answer those two or three
questions yes, depending on whether the third
one is used, you will be assessing the death
penalty. Now, which is proper? That you
could not under any circumstances, as you said
here, or can you follow the instructions of
the Court and answer these questions yes in
the proper case? Which is it? Nobody is mad
at you. We just need to know.
A. The problem I have with that question is
that I am not sure that the way it’s worded
says what it means.
Q. What are you referring to?
A. It says under any circumstances.
[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q. Judge, is this the
complete questionnaire? Are you talking about
the whole questionnaire?
[BY GOODSON] A. Yes. It says, would I under
any circumstances return the death penalty.
That’s what that says and I said no. Okay. I
didn’t understand what that was asking me.
What I understood was if, indeed, that he was
found guilty then we were to say, yes, we want
the death penalty and would I do that. That’s
what I understood. I did not understand that
I would be required to come here and answer
questions and decide what I felt was right or
not, and that in saying that I thought he was
guilty then I would be, in fact, saying that I
was for the death penalty.
[BY THE COURT] Q. All right. Now, well, it
still comes back to a situation where the jury
might be asked to assess punishment in this
case. They do not assess punishment as it is
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done in other type cases, but they are asked
to answer those three questions either yes or
no, and I think you have surmised from talking
to Counsel for each side that if you vote yes
to 1, 2 and/or 3 you will have voted to assess
the death penalty. Now could you, in a proper
case, if the facts warranted, do that?
[BY GOODSON] A. I could. I wouldn’t want to.
I wouldn’t want to, but I would.
Q. Would it violate your conscience to vote
yes in the proper case and the proper
evidence?
A. Yes, it would.
Apparently, (and understandably) still unclear as to Goodson’s
views, questioning resumed by counsel for Farris.
[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q. Let me ask you, Mrs.
Goodson, this: Mrs. Goodson, you could follow
the law, is that what I understood your
answers to be; is that correct? That you
don’t like being placed in this position and
you wouldn’t want to do it, but with the full
explanation, and I am not talking about that
very brief question that was asked on the
questionnaire because as you can see by that
question it really didn’t tell you what the
procedure is. It really didn’t tell you what
all you may be faced with.
[BY GOODSON] A. I feel like if I were told
that I had to come to the Court and had to
listen to the facts and if I listened to those
facts and felt like he was guilty then I would
not deliberately say, no, he is not. I would
not want to be in that position. I would hate
very badly to be in that position, but I don’t
feel like I could do otherwise than what the
law says I have to do.
Q. You would follow the law? You wouldn’t
violate your oath of office?
A. I would not, no.
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Q. By the same token, at the second stage
you would not violate your oath and
automatically vote one way or another? Here
again, you would base your answers on the
facts?
A. Yes, I will.
Q. Without arguing with the Court or the
State’s counsel, we feel that Mrs. Goodson is
qualified and exactly fills the requirements
of the law and she should not be excused and
we object to excusing her.
[BY THE COURT] Each answer I get from her
still goes back to guilt or innocence. I
don’t think we have got over that point and I
would appreciate you working on that area.
....
[BY GOODSON] A. I don’t know what I can say
or maybe I am not understanding what you are
asking me, but I don’t feel like I can put it
any plainer or see it any differently than I
already have.
In yet another attempt to clarify Goodson’s views, the
prosecution once again explained the bifurcated procedure.
[BY THE STATE] Q. And did you or did you not
circle this question, I could never under any
circumstances return a verdict which assessed
the death penalty, and you had four choices
and you chose that one?
A. Yes, I did.
....
Q. On this page you had the possibility of
answering four different questions, and I
refer to page 5 of this questionnaire, that
you have told and that you have signed and in
response to the following question with
reference to the death penalty, which of the
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following statements would best represent your
feelings, circle one. No. 1, I believe the
death penalty is appropriate in some cases.
You didn’t circle that one, did you?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. No. 2, although I do not believe that the
death penalty should ever be involved so long
as the law provides for it I could assess if I
believed the facts warranted it, and you
didn’t circle that one, did you?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. No. 3, I could never under any
circumstances return a verdict which assessed
the death penalty, but you did circle that
one, didn’t you?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. No. 4, none of the above; you didn’t
circle that one, did you?
A. No, sir, I didn’t.
Q. Seated right there where you are, I asked
you a while ago are you opposed to capital
punishment?
A. Yes, I am.
....
Q. Did you or did you not answer my question
a while ago that you were opposed to capital
punishment?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Is that your final answer?
A. I feel like I have no choice. I mean, I
am told that I have to come -- yes, I am told
I have to come to this jury and I have to
listen to the facts and if I listen to these
facts then I have to personally say if I
believe he is guilty or not. That’s my
responsibility. I have no choice, you know, I
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really don’t want to do it and I don’t believe
in it and don’t want to do it, but if the
State of Texas tells me that I have to do it,
I have no choice.
Q. Nobody is telling you you have to do
anything. That’s the reason we have this
legal system we have. Nobody is about to ...
tell you to do anything.
A. If I am chosen, if I have to come to this
jury then I don’t have a choice.
Q. You certainly do have a choice. You get
a vote.
A. I can say the man is guilty. Well, I
believe there is other ways of dealing with
that person being guilty than the death
penalty.
Q. All right. Let me ask you this: In the
State of Texas the law provides that in some
cases for a jury to return a verdict of death
that’s our law, and there is a lot of law that
I don’t agree with. And if you don’t agree
with this law, that’s all we are asking you.
If you will just tell us, you can go home.
A. Pardon me for saying so, but I have said
so for several times that I don’t agree with
it.
After hearing argument from counsel for Farris as to why
Goodson should not be stricken, the court, pursuant to the
following finding, excused Goodson:
The Court having observed the demeanor of the
juror and her answers to various questions,
finds her views on capital punishment would
prevent or substantially impair the
performance of her duties as a juror in
accordance with her instructions and oath and
she is, therefore, discharged and excused from
the case.
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(Emphasis added.)
As noted, “in a proceeding under [pre-AEDPA] 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), the trial court’s factual determination that a potential
juror is disqualified is entitled to a presumption of correctness,
absent one of the specifically enumerated exceptions contained [in
that section].” Ellis v. Lynaugh, 873 F.2d 830, 833 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970 (1989).2 Such a deferential standard of
2
Pre-AEDPA 2254(d) provided:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal
court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a determination
after a hearing on the merits of a factual
issue, made by a State court of competent
jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the
applicant for the writ and the State or an
officer or agent thereof were parties,
evidenced by a written finding, written
opinion, or other reliable and adequate
written indicia, shall presumed to be correct,
unless the applicant shall establish or it
shall otherwise appear, or the respondent
shall admit—
(1) that the merits of the
factual dispute were not resolved in
the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding
procedure employed by the State
court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts
were not adequately developed at the
State court hearing;
(4) that the State court
lacked jurisdiction of the subject
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review, obviously, is especially appropriate for a finding of juror
bias because it “is based upon determinations of demeanor and
credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”
Witt, 469 U.S. at 428; see also O’Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365,
392 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984)
(Higginbotham, J., concurring specially) (discussing the
justification for the presumption of correctness afforded the trial
court’s finding of juror bias).
matter or over the person of the
applicant in the State court
proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an
indigent and the State court, in
deprivation of his constitutional
right, failed to appoint counsel to
represent him in the State court
proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not
receive a full, fair, and adequate
hearing in the State court
proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was
otherwise denied due process of law
in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the
record of the State court proceeding
in which the determination of such
factual issue was made ... is
produced as provided for
hereinafter, and the Federal court
on a consideration of such part of
the record as a whole concludes that
such factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record....
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1.
But, as noted, Farris contends that this pre-AEDPA § 2254(d)
presumption must be applied, instead, to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals’ ruling in Riley that Goodson “unambiguously and
unwaveringly insisted that she would answer the special issues
honestly and in accordance with the evidence”; and that, therefore,
she was not a vacillating juror, and thus, was not properly
excludable for cause. We disagree.
Initially, we note that § 2254(d) provides that the
presumption of correctness applies to a proceeding in which the
Applicant (Farris) and the State or its agent were parties.
Nevertheless, Farris contends that “[t]here is nothing ... that
stands for the proposition that § 2254(d)’s reference to the
participation of the Applicant and the State is an absolute
prerequisite to [§ 2254(d)’s] application.” But, the following
language from § 2254(d) is just the opposite: “After a hearing on
the merits of a factual issue, made by a state court of competent
jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ
and the State ... were parties”. (Emphasis added.) Farris was not
a party to Riley, which was rendered nearly three years after
Farris.
Moreover, although it is true that the § 2254(d) presumption
may apply to state trial or appellate courts, see Sumner v. Mata,
449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981), that presumption is reserved for factual
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determinations. Riley, in overruling Farris, did not make a
finding of fact regarding Goodson’s exclusion. Rather, the court
recharacterized Goodson as a non-vacillating venireperson, and then
ruled that she was improperly excluded on the basis of her
conflicting feelings regarding capital punishment. Riley, 889
S.W.2d at 300. Along this line, we fail to understand how, while
deciding Riley, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals can, for §
2254(d) purposes, make a factual finding applicable to Farris.
Again, as discussed, the finding of juror bias is based upon
the determination by the trial judge, who, alone among the judges
involved at various stages, personally observes the demeanor and
credibility of the prospective juror during voir dire. See Witt,
469 U.S. at 428. Obviously, the Riley court did not observe
venireperson Goodson during voir dire, and, as a result, could not
judge her demeanor and credibility. In short, the ruling in Riley,
with respect to Farris, is a ruling on a question of law; it is not
a factual determination to which the presumption of correctness
afforded by § 2254(d) attaches.
2.
Second, Farris contends that the state trial court is not
entitled to the presumption of correctness, because it applied an
erroneous legal standard in excluding Goodson. The law is well
settled regarding when a prospective juror may be excluded for
cause because of her views on the death penalty.
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“[O]pposition to capital punishment, in itself, is not
sufficient cause for a judge to exclude a member of the jury pool.”
Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 399 (1997) (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176
(1986)). Instead, the “standard is whether the juror’s views
would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath’”. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424; see also Mann, 41 F.3d at 980.
In order, using the appropriate standard, to exclude a
prospective juror for cause, it is not necessary “that a juror’s
bias be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity’”. Witt, 469 U.S. at
424. As the Court noted, “determination of juror bias cannot be
reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the
manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized
experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough
questions to reach the point where their bias has been made
‘unmistakably clear’”. Id. at 424-25.
“Even if the record is silent as to the standard employed by
a state trial judge ... he is presumed to have applied the correct
standard.” Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 493 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986). But, here, we are not faced with a
situation where the trial judge failed to state the standard used
to exclude Goodson; rather, as quoted supra, the trial judge, in
excluding her, stated the standard from Witt.
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3.
Lastly, Farris contends there is no support in the record for
the trial court’s determination that Goodson would be substantially
impaired in her ability to perform her duties as a juror. The
trial judge observed Goodson’s demeanor and heard her answers
during voir dire. Goodson underwent extensive questioning from not
only the prosecution and defense, but also the judge, regarding her
views on capital punishment and her ability to properly function as
a juror.
As reflected in the earlier-quoted voir dire, Goodson stated
that she was opposed to capital punishment and that under no
circumstances could she vote to return the death penalty. Also,
she stated that she would do her best to answer the special issues
honestly, and that, despite what the evidence revealed, it would
violate her conscience to assess the death penalty in a case where,
based on the evidence, it was warranted. The trial judge, at the
conclusion of the lengthy questioning and conflicting or
inconsistent answers, applied the Witt standard and ruled that
Goodson’s “views on capital punishment would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror in
accordance with her oath and instructions.”
We agree with the district court that “[t]he testimony of Ms.
Goodson presents the textbook case for when a reviewing Court,
pursuant to a § 2254 review, should defer to the judgment of the
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trial judge regarding the credibility and demeanor of a potential
juror.” Farris, 967 F. Supp. at 208. This case vividly
demonstrates that, although “mere emotional opposition to capital
punishment alone is insufficient cause for juror exclusion, it is
equally clear that emotional opposition may rise to the level where
it interferes with a potential juror’s ability to sit as a
dispassionate and objective arbiter of justice.” Mann, 41 F.3d at
981.
In sum, Farris has failed to overcome the presumption of
correctness afforded by § 2254(d) to the trial judge’s decision to
exclude Goodson. Again, the “credibility determinations
[concerning such a decision] are more appropriately resolved under
the watchful eye of the trial judge than by an appellate court
staring at a cold record, which is precisley why they are accorded
a presumption of correctness under 2254(d).” Id. at 982.
B.
The other issue raised by Farris is that his court appointed
counsel, Jack Strickland and Bill Lane, labored under an actual
conflict of interest that adversley affected their performance, due
to the fact that Larry Moore, the original lead prosecutor assigned
to Farris’ case, resigned from the Tarrant County District
Attorney’s Office prior to trial, and became professionally
associated with Strickland and Lane during their representation of
Farris. He asserts that his counsel could not continue to
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represent him and, at the same time, pursue allegations that Moore
was aware of improprieties in the investigation of Farris’ case.
Along this line, Farris asserts that the district court erred
in concluding that he had waived any right to a conflict of
interest; that it improperly held that the conflict did not have an
adverse effect on counsel’s performance; and that it applied an
erroneous legal standard in evaluating the conflict claim. (As
discussed below, because we agree that Farris waived this conflict-
claim, we do not reach the other two subissues.)
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes, of course, the
right to conflict-free-counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271
(1981). However, “like the right to counsel of any kind, the right
to conflict-free counsel can be waived.” United States v. Greig,
967 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, we first address
the validity of the waiver executed by Farris; obviously, “the
finding of a waiver obviates a determination of whether there was
an actual conflict.” United States v. Plewniak, 947 F.2d 1284,
1287 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1120 (1992).
Farris contends that his waiver was invalid because the
affadavit he executed in order to accomplish the waiver contained
factual inaccuracies; that it was based on counsel’s opinion that
the allegations against Moore were meritless; and that the trial
court failed to inquire into the effectiveness of his waiver.
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The law in our circuit is well established regarding the
requirements for a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
conflict-free counsel: “(1) that the defendant be aware that a
possible conflict of interest exists; (2) that the defendant
realize the consequences to his defense that continuing with
conflicted counsel would have; and (3) that the defendant be aware
of his right to obtain other counsel.” Crank v. Collins, 19 F.3d
172, 176 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1214 (1994) (citing
United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Farris executed his affidavit on 18 February 1986, waiving any
potential conflict of interest arising from his court appointed
counsel’s professional relationship with Moore. In the affidavit,
Farris states: that his counsel informed him of that relationship,
which consisted of an office sharing arrangement; that there
existed the potential for a conflict of interest; that counsel had
agreed not to discuss Farris’ case with Moore; that he (Farris) had
been made aware of the allegation implicating Moore in
improprieties regarding the destruction of evidence; and that his
counsel informed Farris that, in their opinion, the allegation was
meritless. The affidavit stated also that Farris was aware of his
options: (1) to relieve Strickland and Lane of their
representation, have new counsel appointed, and pursue the claims
against Moore; (2) to direct Strickland and Moore to pursue the
allegations against Moore, which would result in counsel seeking
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permission from the court to withdraw; and (3) to agree with
Strickland and Moore that the allegations against Moore were
meritless and should not be pursued, in which event they would
remain as his counsel and he would agree that there was no conflict
between Strickland, Lane, and Farris. In the affidavit, Farris
stated, that, after carefully reviewing these options, he had
decided to choose the third: forego pursuing the allegations
against Moore, and continue to be represented by Strickland and
Lane.
Moreover, Farris had consulted with Art Brender, an attorney
appointed by the trial judge, about his affadavit and the decision
not to pursue the allegations regarding Moore. Farris’ affidavit
concluded with his stating that he had made his decision “freely,
voluntarily, and intelligently”.
Along this line, in a proceeding prior to his state trial,
Farris testified that he had executed the affidavit, and understood
the consequences. He testified also about his one hour meeting with
Brender, and that they had discussed the ramifications of the
waiver-affidavit.
A state court finding that a defendant validly waived his
right to conflict-free-counsel is entitled to the § 2254(d)
presumption of correctness. Crank, 19 F.3d at 176. Again, the
presumption applies, unless one of the eight earlier-quoted
exceptions exist.
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The state habeas court (as noted, the same judge presided at
Farris’ trial and at the habeas proceeding) reviewed Farris’
waiver-affidavit and concluded that he had “waived his right to
complain that ... Moore’s business relationship with [] defense
counsel posed a conflict of interest.” The state habeas court
concluded further that the waiver was “knowing and voluntary”, that
the affidavit demonstrated that Farris realized the consequences of
Strickland and Lane continuing their representation, and that
Farris was aware of his right to obtain other counsel.
“This Court has held on many occasions that a state court
‘paper hearing’ is sufficient to allow a federal court to invoke
the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness to the state court’s
findings when the state habeas judge also presided over the
petitioner’s trial.” Baldree v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 659, 663 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1489 (1997) (citing Perillo v.
Johnson, 79 F.3d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1996); Vuong v. Scott, 62 F.3d
673, 683-84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995)). The
state trial judge observed Farris as he testified about his waiver-
affidavit, and, indeed, appointed counsel so that Farris could,
with the advice of independent counsel, decide whether to waive any
conflict of interest. That same judge examined the waiver-
affidavit during the state habeas proceeding.
As noted, in this regard, Farris maintains that his affidavit
contained a factual inaccuracy, which invalidates any waiver of a
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potential conflict of interest. The affidavit states that Farris
was told that one Sheriff’s Deputy had accused Moore of being
involved in the destruction of evidence. Farris contends that it
was actually two deputies, and that this difference is significant
because “corroborated testimony always carries more weight than the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness”. However, Farris
failed to produce affidavits, or any supporting documents,
regarding the testimony of either deputy.
Along this line, at the state habeas proceeding, the trial
court, in its findings of fact regarding the allegation that Moore
was involved in the destruction of evidence, stated that Moore had
heard that two deputies had alleged that they had told him (Moore)
about the destruction of evidence. The trial court also noted that
Farris’ affidavit claimed that one deputy made allegations against
Moore. Thus, the state habeas court, in concluding that Farris
validly waived any potential conflict of interest, appears to have
considered the fact that there was a factual inconsistency in the
affidavit. (In the state habeas proceeding, Farris did not
specifically raise the subissue that a factual inaccuracy
invalidated his waiver; but, as noted, the state court, in the
findings of fact, seems to note the inconsistency, yet still
concluded that the waiver was valid. Farris did raise the subissue
in his federal habeas proceeding.)
Again, Farris did not produce the affidavits or any supporting
documents of either one of the deputies. He has failed to
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demonstrate how the purported factual inaccuracy, if any, in his
affidavit, invalidated his waiver.
In sum, in executing the waiver, Farris was aware that a
potential for conflict existed, was aware of the consequences of
continuing to be represented by Strickland and Lane, and was aware
of his right to obtain other counsel. He has failed again to
overcome the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of habeas relief is
AFFIRMED.
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