U.S. v. Liu ( 1992 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________
No. 90-2976
______________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AN CHYI LIU ,
a/k/a FAT FRANK, and
AI-TI-TING, a/k/a EDDIE,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(April 30, 1992)
Before WILLIAMS and WIENER, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, District
Judge.1
LITTLE, District Judge:
Appellants Liu and Ting were found guilty by a jury of
conspiring to bribe a public official, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(C) and
aiding and abetting the commission of the substantive offense of
bribery of the same public official, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(C).
Liu was convicted of a separate bribery offense, and being an alien
in possession of a firearm on two separate occasions. 18 U.S.C. §
1
District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana,
sitting by designation.
992(g)(5) and § 924(a)(2). Subsequent to sentencing, Liu and Ting
lodged a timely appeal with this court. Appellants raised a number
of issues that they argue justify conviction reversal or sentence
reduction. We decline to grant any relief to either appellant and
affirm their convictions and sentence.
An Chi Liu, born in Burma and now a Taiwan national, lived in
Houston, Texas and operated a modeling studio in that city. During
times material to this matter, Liu, as an alien, was without proper
credentials to remain in this country. Thus, he is classified as
an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States. In late
January, 1988, Houston police arrested Liu claiming that the
modeling studio was a facade to mask the real operation on the
premises--a whorehouse. After the arrest, Liu was approached by
one of the Houston police arresting officers, Jeffrey Shaffer. Liu
was asked to reveal any criminal activity of which he was aware
occurring in the Houston-Asian community. Shaffer wanted Liu to be
an informant. Liu accepted, and for a period of months Liu was
paid to inform the Houston police department, through Shaffer, of
criminal activities. Liu also provided, for pay, information to
the F.B.I.
Liu admitted to Shaffer that he was a member of a notorious
group known as the United Bamboo Gang. Moreover, Liu was the
bodyguard for one of the gang king pins--Fargo Chen a/k/a
Yellowbird. Liu's knowledge of the group's illicit activities was
the subject for sale to the police.
On one occasion, Liu and Shaffer met at an oriental restaurant
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in Houston. Liu told Shaffer that he had purchased an Uzi
automatic weapon, a prohibited act for an alien illegally and
unlawfully in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(5) and 924
(a)(2). Liu admitted that the acquisition was accomplished by use
of false identification. He surrendered the weapon to Shaffer who,
unbeknown to Liu, had it examined by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms. The weapon was then returned to Liu.
Shaffer, through admissions from Liu, knew that Liu was in the
United States illegally and needed a "green card" to authorize his
continued stay and legalize his desired trip to Asia. Shaffer told
Liu that he could arrange a meeting with an individual who could
sell Liu a "green card." Shaffer's seemingly corrupt contact was
actually a straight I.N.S. agent, Tom Cason.
Cason met with Liu, and Liu agreed to buy five green cards.
Liu coordinated a meeting among himself, five potential card
purchasers, Cason, and Shaffer, but the transaction cratered when
one of the would be purchasers was arrested on a smuggling charge
by another governmental entity.
This did not deter Liu from buying, by bribery, a green card
for himself from Cason. During the period between March and
November of 1989, Liu and Shaffer met many times. Liu's interest
in marketing, at a great profit, albeit illegal, green cards, was
unsatisfied.
Asians, living in the United States and desiring to purchase
green cards, were known to Liu, and Liu was interested in
satisfying their needs. Fellow defendant, Ai-Ti-Ting, was also in
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need of a green card. Ting, in this country illegally, had
knowledge of immigration procedures, a knowledge which was
essential to the sale of green cards to illegal aliens. In a
Houston restaurant, Shaffer and Cason met with Liu, Ting, and a man
known as Steve Huang. Huang was steamed with Liu as Liu collected
a "green card" acquisition fee, but did not deliver as promised.
Huang's presence at the meeting was to insure receipt of the
previously paid for document. Ting, the more credible and
knowledgeable of the Ting-Liu duo, assured the group that Ting and
Liu could sell ten green cards without any difficulty whatsoever.
They agreed to acquire a ten-pack for $120,000.00 by paying cash
upon receipt of the cards. The sale was set for sometime in
January, 1990. Shaffer and Cason required that Ting and Liu
prepare proper application documents for all the vendees, including
a photograph of each prospective transferee.
The show and tell event took place in a Houston motel and was
recorded on video tape. Each candidate for green card acquisition
was brought to the room. Forms were completed, and pictures
provided. Ting and Liu supplied translations for those without a
working knowledge of the English language. The film reveals that
the purchasers were informed of the illegal nature of the
transaction and that Shaffer and Cason were officers of the law.
Officer Shaffer received $108,000 from Ting and Liu and, in their
presence, called Cason to produce and deliver the green cards.
Cason received the message and arrived at the Houston motel to make
delivery. No cards were delivered. The purchasers had been duped.
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Liu, Ting and the others were arrested. The sting was complete.
As an aside, the authorities obtained a general warrant to inspect
Liu's residence in search of the Uzi that Liu illegally possessed.
The gun was located and confiscated.
THE LIU APPEAL
Liu raises two issues on appeal. We shall deal with each
separately.
EVIDENTIARY RULING DENYING TESTIMONY
AS TO LIU'S STATED REASONS FOR BEING FEARFUL
One of the defenses asserted by defendant Liu is that he
played along with Shaffer and Cason not out of a desire to make
money by distributing illegally acquired green cards, but out of
fear of suffering injury or death at the hands of Shaffer. Without
a knowledgeable person, such as Liu, Shaffer and Cason could not
make money. Merely having green cards did not produce any cash.
There had to be a purchaser, and that purchaser needed to be an
Asian knowledgeable about illegal immigrants needing valid green
cards. Thus, according to this argument, if Liu didn't perform,
Shaffer would physically abuse and possibly kill Liu.
Liu now argues that the district court's refusal to admit
certain testimony on this issue constitutes reversible error.
Liu's cousin, Tung Shu, appeared as a witness at Liu's trial. Shu
testified that Liu told him that he was fearful for his life and
that he was in a life threatening situation. Shu was prohibited
from relating to the jury what Liu said to Shu about the cause of
Liu's fear. The evidence of what was said by Liu was offered, not
for the truth of the statements, but to show Liu's state of mind--
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i.e., the state of being fearful and what caused that fear. The
ruling to exclude that evidence was subject to Liu's objection and
offer of proof.
Liu link's his quest for reversible error to Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(3), an exception to the rule against admission of
hearsay testimony.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witnesses:
(3) Then existing mental, emotional or physical
condition. A statement of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,
pain, and bodily health), but not including
the statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates
to the execution, revocation, identification,
or terms of the declarant's will.
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(3)
We review evidentiary rulings by applying an abuse of
discretion standard. If abuse is found, then the error is reviewed
under the harmless error doctrine. United States v. Capote-Capote,
946 F.2d 1100, 1105 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Moody, 903
F.2d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jimenez Lopez, 873
F.2d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1989).
At trial Shu testified that during the four meetings that Liu
had with Shu over a period of time, Liu "was scared" and that he
had a fear of getting killed. The district court did not allow the
witnesses to say that Liu was fearful because a governmental agent
would do bad things to him, nor was he allowed to testify as to
generalized conversations with Liu at indefinite times about Liu's
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fear about injury to be received from a corrupt government agent.
There was no abuse of discretion in the ruling by the district
judge. Evidence of Liu's fear was admitted. Properly excluded
were the alleged reasons for that fear. We find guidance in the
apt analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), given by this
court in 1980.
That rule (referring to 803(3)) by its own terms excepts
from the ban on hearsay such statements as might have
been made by Cohen of his then existing state of mind or
emotion, but expressly excludes from the operation of the
rule a statement of belief to prove the fact believed.
... But the state-of-mind exception does not permit the
witness to relate any of the declarant's statements as to
why he held the particular state of mind, or what he
might have believed that would have induced the state of
mind. If the reservation in the text of the rule is to
have any effect, it must be understood to narrowly limit
those admissible statements to declarations of condition-
-`I'm scared'--and not belief--`I'm scared because Galkin
threatened me.'
United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1980) reh'g
denied 636 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted). Evidence
was admitted as to Liu's state of mind but not hearsay evidence as
to the exact nature of the cause of that condition. There was no
error in the evidentiary ruling.
JURY INSTRUCTION ON DURESS
Liu's submitted jury instruction on the issue of duress or
justification (counsel for Liu uses both interchangeably) was
rejected by the court. The tendered but denied instruction
provided:
One of the issues that the government must prove is that
the defendant was not forced to commit the offenses
charged in the indictment. The defendant was forced if:
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(1) He reasonably believed that participating in the
offense was necessary to avoid specific and immediate
threat of serious harm to himself or to another; and (2)
He reasonably believed that participating in the offense
was the only way to avoid this harm.
The fact the defendant may have been wrong in what he
believed does not matter so long as there was a
reasonable basis for what he believed and he acted
reasonably under the circumstances as they existed at
that time.
It is not up to the defendant to prove that he was forced
to commit the offense as charged in the indictment. It
is up to the government to prove that he was not.
Failure to deliver an instruction constitutes reversible error
when three conditions exist:
1) The instruction is substantially correct;
2) It is not substantially covered in the charge
actually given the jury; and
3) It concerns an important point in the trial so that
the failure to give it seriously impairs the
defendant's ability to present a given defense
effectively.
United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir. 1986). We
have not been cited to, nor has our research unearthed, any Fifth
Circuit case that defines a proper jury instruction on the issue of
duress or justification. Although the Pattern Jury Instructions
(Criminal Cases) prepared by the District Judges Association of the
Fifth Circuit, 1990 Edition, published by West Publishing Company,
is an excellent tool for the trial court, it does not contain a
recommended instruction for the specific defense of duress,
justification or coercion. The essential elements of such a
defense, however, have been described in Fifth Circuit opinions.
The prerequisites for entitlement to an instruction on duress were
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recently set forth in U.S. v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir.
1990).
Before a defendant charged with such an offense is
entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of
justification, however, he must show: (1) that defendant
was under an unlawful and `present, imminent, and
impending (threat) of such a nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
injury.'; (2) that defendant had not `recklessly or
negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was
probable that he would be (forced to choose the criminal
conduct)'; (3) that defendant had no `reasonable legal
alternative to violating the law; a chance both to refuse
to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened
harm'; and (4) `that a direct causal relationship may be
reasonably anticipated between the (criminal) action
taken and the avoidance of (threatened) harm.'
Id. at 1304-5 quoting United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117
(5th Cir. 1986). The genesis of those four essential
characteristics of duress or coercion in this circuit is United
States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982). Other
circuits describe the defense in a nearly identical manner. See,
e.g., United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Lee, 694 F.2d 649, 654 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied 460 U.S. 1086, 103 S. Ct. 1779, (1983); United States v.
Campbell, 675 F.2d 815, 820-821 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 459 U.S.
850, 103 S. Ct. 112, 74 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1982).
With that background we are not surprised to find that Pattern
Jury Instructions for use in criminal cases in the Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adopt virtually identical instructions
on coercion, intimidation, and duress. For example, the Eleventh
Circuit adopts language that contains all of the elements required
by this circuit's jurisprudence:
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It is the theory of the defense in this case that
although the Defendant may have committed the acts
charged in the indictment, he did not do so voluntarily,
but only because of force or coercion in the form of
intimidation and threats of bodily harm to himself (or
his family).
As you have already been instructed willfulness is
an essential element of the crime charged in the
indictment, and acts done involuntarily because of
coercion are not done willfully.
In order to excuse an act that would otherwise be
criminal, however, the intimidation or coercion must be
present and immediate, and must be of such a nature that
it induces a reasonable and well-founded fear of death or
serious bodily injury to one's self or someone else; and
there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape from
coercion without participating in the crime.
If the evidence in the case leaves you with a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant acted willfully as
charged, then it is your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty.
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Cases (U.S. 11th Cir., West
Publishing Co. 1985).
The charge submitted by Liu and Ting on the affirmative
defense of duress does not comport with the requirements created by
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. It is clear that the jury should be
informed that the defense is available if the defendant proves that
he, or a member of his family, was under a present, imminent, or
impending threat of death or serious bodily injury; that he had not
recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it
was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal
conduct; that he had no reasonable opportunity to escape from the
situation and avoid the threatened harm; and that a direct causal
relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal act
taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm. The submitted
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instruction is deficient because it contains no reference to the
defendant's burden to show proof that he did not negligently or
recklessly place himself in a situation in which it was possible
that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct. Moreover,
there is no specific reference in the instruction to the
requirement that the defendant prove that he did not have a
reasonable legal alternative to violating the law, i.e., a chance
both to refuse to do the criminal act, and to avoid the threatened
harm. In the submitted instruction the sentence, "He reasonably
believed that participating in the offense was the only way to
avoid this harm", is opaque and lacks the direction for analysis
that a jury is entitled to receive. Having concluded that the
submitted instruction is not a correct statement of the law, we are
not required to adjudicate the legal consequence of failing to give
the instruction.
We do note in passing, however, that a thorough review of the
record leads the court to conclude that there is no evidence upon
which a reasonable juror could find that Liu was laboring under a
present, imminent and impending threat of such a nature as to
indicate a well grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
injury. The testimony of fellow defendant Ting that Liu was
concerned that his Quisling status would be disclosed to his fellow
Asians by Shaffer, and that such action would mean serious
retribution by the Asians, lacks any merit as being a present,
imminent, impending threat of death or injury. Ting's further
testimony that Liu was afraid that Agent Shaffer would wipe him out
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if Liu failed to cooperate, reveals nothing definite as to when the
damaging event would take place.
Of even greater significance is the fact that the record does
not reveal that Liu was without a reasonable legal alternative to
violating the law, or that he had no chance to refuse to do the
criminal act, or to avoid the threatened harm. Liu purchased a
green card for himself. He used that card to travel between Asia
and the United States. He returned to Houston from Taiwan and
actively sought to market green cards to illegal aliens. Liu had
a number of reasonable alternatives to the continued illegality.
He could have surrendered to federal officials in any city in the
United States. He could have communicated with federal officials
in any city in the United States. He could have remained abroad.
He could have sought protection in another city. We must remember
that the initial meeting between Shaffer and Liu occurred in
January of 1988. The arrest, as a result of presentation of cash
for more green cards, was made in January of 1990. For obvious
reasons, the record is a fertile field to find many reasonable
legal alternatives to violating the law over a two year period.
Liu is not entitled to an instruction on duress.
THE TING APPEAL
JURY INSTRUCTION ON DURESS
Ai-Ti-Ting raises the same complaint voiced by Liu over the
trial court's failure to submit the duress instruction to the jury.
For the reasons previously given, we find the instruction is
incorrect as a matter of law and therefore need not have been
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given.
We take this opportunity to observe that even if the
instruction were correct, Ting was not entitled to a duress
instruction. Ting had ample opportunity to absent himself from the
criminal surroundings. Ting met with agent Shaffer in November of
1989 at Steven Huang's urgings. Others than Shaffer were the prime
movers in getting Ting involved; for it was Ting who knew the
immigration procedures, knew foreigners in need of green cards, and
had a good community reputation. He traveled the crooked path not
because he was forced to do so, but because he elected to do so.
Ting had police connections of his own. He could have reported the
crooked cop but chose not to do so. Instead, Ting called no less
than forty of his friends in hopes of finding customers for the
illicitly obtained green cards. Ting even accepted a reduced fee
charge for a green card for himself.
ENTRAPMENT
Ting's second argument is that he was the victim of the
government's entrapment and that he was never predisposed to
traffic in green cards.
Recently this court summarized the law of entrapment.
Entrapment is an affirmative defense that requires
a defendant to show he was induced to commit a criminal
act by a government agent and that he was not predisposed
to commit the act without the inducement. See Mathews v.
United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S. Ct. 883, 886, 99
L. Ed. 2d 54 (1988). `Entrapment, as a doctrine, asks ...
what was the defendant's mind before he did the charged
acts.' United States v. Kang, 934 F.2d 621, 624 (5th
Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203,
213 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) emphasis in original)).
`The critical determination is whether the criminal
intent or design originated with the defendant or with
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the government agents.' Id. (citing United States v.
Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1079 (5th Cir. 1985)). To rely
upon the entrapment defense, the defendant must as a
threshold matter `present evidence that government
conduct created a substantial risk that an offense would
be committed by a person other than one ready to commit
it.' Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 872 F.2d
612, 620 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 880 F.2d 413 (1989)).
This requires the defendant to establish (1) that he
lacked predisposition to commit the crime and (2) that
government involvement and inducement amount to more than
just an opportunity to commit the crime. Id. `If the
defendant succeeds in meeting his burden, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the offense.' Id.
U.S. v. Pruneda-Gonzalez, 953 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir. 1992).
The defendant failed to present evidence that he lacked a
predisposition to commit the crime. The evidence reveals that Ting
had a job that afforded him a position of respect and one that
allowed him to make acquaintances with orientals of substance. He
was in a position to provide important services to Taiwan nationals
in this country. The dark side of Ting's Texas life was that he
did not posses the one thing necessary to perpetuate his
comfortable status--a green card. He attempted to marry a partner
with credentials to give him the protected status, but without
success. With a green card, Ting could cement his presence in this
country and also could travel to Taiwan. Thus, Ting was ripe for
the enlistment by Liu (not a government agent) to participate in
the green card scam. As a matter of law, Ting was not entrapped.
The trial judge did not err in so ruling.
STATUS AS A MANAGER OR SUPERVISOR
Ting argues on appeal, as he did prior to his sentencing, that
he was not a manager or supervisor of any co-conspirators. He
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takes umbrage with the trial court awarding him a three level
upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The finding of
the trial court resulted in a sentence more severe than that which
Ting might have received had he not been a manager or supervisor.
We review the trial court's determination that Ting was a
manager or supervisor under a clearly erroneous standard. United
States v. Barreto, 871 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1990). While admitting that we are
not controlled or governed by the Commentary to the Sentencing
Guidelines, we observe that that source suggests that the court
consider the following factors when making its decision:
Factors the court should consider include the
exercise of decision making authority, the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense, the
recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger
share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense, the
nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree
of control and authority exercised over others.
Commentary, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).
Although Ting contends that he did no more than translate, the
facts paint a picture of a manager, not a minion. The success of
the caper was bottomed on customers willing to engage in an illicit
transaction. Ting had the credentials, the contacts, and the
reputation to find accomplices. Ting produced seven customers,
administered the application process, provided a sense of safety
and solace to his fellow conspirators, and stood to gain a green
card for himself at little cost. The facts set forth in the PSI
have not been assailed as unreliable, only the court's conclusion
drawn from those facts. We are not convinced that the findings by
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the district court are clearly erroneous. The sentence need not be
vacated.
For the foregoing reasons, the convictions are AFFIRMED.
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