Yount v. Lyons ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 98-60783
Summary Calendar
____________________
WILLIAM MCKINLEY YOUNT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES LYONS, ETC; ET AL,
Defendants,
JACKSON STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:97-CV-408)
_________________________________________________________________
September 27, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM and STEWART, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-appellant William McKinley Yount appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on his Title VII race
discrimination claim in favor of defendant-appellee Jackson State
University. We affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit,
plaintiff-appellant William McKinley Yount was an instructor in
defendant-appellee Jackson State University’s (JSU or the
University) Department of History. Yount’s employment at the
University began in March 1991, when the University hired him as
a part-time lecturer effective March 1, 1991 through May 10, 1991
and as an instructor effective June 17, 1991 through August 5,
1991. In June 1991, the University hired Yount as an instructor
for the 1991-92 academic year, at the end of which Yount received
a letter from Herman B. Smith, Jr., Interim President of the
University, informing him that his employment with the University
had terminated. The University rehired Yount as an instructor,
however, for the 1992-93 academic year. In May 1993, Yount
received a letter from defendant James Lyons, President of the
University, stating that his one-year employment contract would
terminate on May 17, 1993 and that he could discuss future
employment with Dr. Walter Hurns, Chair of the Department of
History. Dr. Hurns recommended to the University’s Board of
Trustees (the Board) that Yount be rehired for the 1993-94
academic year, and the Board approved the recommendation. In
1994, 1995, and 1996, Yount received letters similar to Lyons’s
May 1993 letter, and in 1994 and 1995, Yount was rehired for the
coming academic year upon Dr. Hurns’s recommendation. In 1996,
however, Dr. Hurns decided not to recommend Yount for employment
for the 1996-97 academic year and assigned Barron Banks, a part-
2
time instructor, to take over some of Yount’s classes. After
assuming these new duties, Banks became a full-time instructor.
On June 10, 1997, Yount filed two actions in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
One suit named Lyons and the University as defendants, and the
other named the attorney general of the state of Mississippi as a
defendant. Both actions asserted claims for race, national
origin, religion, and sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (“Title VII”), based on the fact that Yount, a white
male, had been replaced as an instructor for the 1996-97 academic
year by Banks, an African-American male. Later, a magistrate
judge consolidated the two actions, and the district court
entered an agreed order dismissing Lyons and the attorney general
of Mississippi as defendants and all claims of discrimination
based on national origin, religion, and sex. Thus, Yount’s only
remaining claim was that the University discriminated against him
based on his race. On August 31, 1998, the University filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
Yount appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standards as the district court. See
United States v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 1998).
After consulting applicable law in order to ascertain the
material factual issues, we consider the evidence bearing on
those issues, viewing the facts and the inferences to be drawn
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therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Doe
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 214-15 (5th Cir.
1998). Summary judgment is properly granted if “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c).
III. DISCUSSION
Yount alleges that the University discriminated against him
on the basis of his race by failing to rehire him as an
instructor for the 1996-97 academic year and by assigning Banks
to take over some of his teaching duties, later promoting Banks
from part- to full-time instructor. Under the framework set
forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), a Title VII plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at
801-02. A plaintiff may prove a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing (1) that he is a member of a protected
class, (2) that he sought and was qualified for an available
employment position, (3) that he was rejected for that position,
and (4) that the employer continued to seek applicants with the
plaintiff’s qualifications. See id. at 801. Once established,
the prima facie case raises an inference of unlawful
discrimination. See Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The burden then shifts to the defendant
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employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802. If the defendant comes forward with a reason which,
if believed, would support a finding that the challenged action
was nondiscriminatory, the inference of discrimination raised by
the plaintiff’s prima facie case drops from the case. See
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10 (1981). The focus then shifts to
the ultimate question of whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993).
We now apply these principles to the case before us. The
parties agree that Yount established a prima facie case of race
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-02. To
meet its burden of offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision, the University explained that
Yount was not rehired because students were dissatisfied with his
performance as a teacher. Specifically, Dr. Velvelyn Foster,
Professor of History and Director of Faculty Development, and Dr.
Dollye M.E. Robinson, Dean of the School of Liberal Arts, stated
in affidavits that a number of students complained that Yount did
not permit them to ask questions or participate in discussions
and that he refused to answer their questions, adequately explain
his grading procedures, and assist students seeking help. Dr.
Foster and Dr. Robinson averred that they reported the student
complaints to Dr. Hurns. Dr. Hurns stated in his affidavit that
he “made the decision not to recommend Mr. Yount for employment
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for the 1996/97 academic year because of the complaints made
against him by his students during the summer of 1996; and Mr.
Yount’s inability to manage his class and work effectively with
his students to create a conducive learning environment.” Dr.
Hurns asserted unequivocally that his decision not to recommend
Yount for re-employment was not based on race. Dr. Hurns also
stated that
[t]he practice in the Department of History at JSU is to use
part-time teachers to teach courses left vacant by a full-
time faculty [member] when there are not enough full-time
faculty to teach those courses. Consistent with this
practice, Mr. Banks was assigned one of the courses
previously taught by Mr. Yount. Because Mr. Banks was
already teaching three courses, this additional course gave
him a full-time course load. Thus, Mr. Banks moved from
part-time instructor to full-time instructor.
These explanations, if believed, would support a finding that the
University’s failure to rehire Yount and its reassignment of his
duties to Banks was legitimate and nondiscriminatory; the
University thus has satisfied its burden of production. The
University need not persuade us that it was actually motivated by
these reasons; it is sufficient that it has raised a genuine
issue of fact regarding whether it unlawfully discriminated
against Yount. See Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98
F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
We now turn to the question of whether the University
intentionally discriminated against Yount on the basis of race.
Yount may satisfy his summary judgment burden by coming forward
either with direct evidence of discriminatory intent or with
circumstantial evidence that the University’s rationale was
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pretextual. See LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444,
449 (5th Cir. 1996). We have articulated the test as follows:
[A] jury issue will be presented and a plaintiff can avoid
summary judgment . . . if the evidence taken as a whole
(1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the
employer’s stated reasons was what actually motivated the
employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [race]
was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff
complains. The employer, of course, will be entitled to
summary judgment if the evidence taken as a whole would not
allow a jury to infer that the actual reason for the
discharge was discriminatory.
Williams, 98 F.3d at 181 (first alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 995
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), an age discrimination case, and
applying Rhodes in the race discrimination context).
Yount points to a number of incidents that he claims raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the University’s
proffered explanation for its failure to rehire him was, in fact,
a pretext for race discrimination. First, he asserts that the
summary judgment evidence shows that he received high faculty
performance evaluations from Dr. Hurns throughout his employment
at the University. Second, he claims that the University hired
Wanda Jackson, an African-American female, for the position of
assistant professor at a salary significantly higher than his
own, despite her “comparatively meager credentials.” Third, he
states that Dr. Hurns once advised him that “the University would
no longer be using a textbook because it was ‘inappropriate for
the ethnic racial orientation of the institution.’” Fourth, he
maintains that Banks “organized and presided over a meeting in
7
which a major theme was that ‘white people are always and
historically repressive to blacks.’”
Yount has failed to raise a fact issue as to whether race
was a determinative factor in the University’s failure to rehire
him. See Williams, 98 F.3d at 181. While Yount’s high
performance evaluations may cast some doubt on the University’s
assertion that it did not rehire him because he was a poor
teacher, they do not mandate an inference that this decision was
based on race. Nor does the fact that the University paid an
African-American assistant professor a higher salary than Yount,
a white instructor, indicate that the University refused to hire
Yount because he is white. Rather, the evidence regarding
Jackson’s salary shows only that the University paid assistant
professors more than it did instructors. Finally, Dr. Hurns’s
textbook comment and Banks’s alleged participation in a meeting
“in which a major theme was that ‘white people are always and
historically repressive to blacks’” do not create an inference
that the University’s employment decision was based on Yount’s
race. Dr. Hurns’s rather cryptic remark does not imply any
racial bias in employment. Nor is there any evidence that
Banks’s activities had any bearing on the University’s decision
not to rehire Yount. Yount’s summary judgment evidence
establishes nothing more than that he subjectively believed that
he was the victim of racial discrimination in employment. “It is
more than well-settled that an employee’s subjective belief that
he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of
8
discrimination, without more, is not enough to survive a summary
judgment motion, in the face of proof showing an adequate non-
discriminatory reason.” Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n,
79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
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