Smith v. Brock ( 2003 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 02-50372
Summary Calendar
GAYLENE SMITH, Individually and as next friend of Stacey Marie
Smith,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
DOYLE BROCK, JR., Individually and in his official capacity as a
police officer for the City of Hewitt, Texas; ET AL.,
Defendants,
DOYLE BROCK, JR., Individually and in his official capacity as a
police officer for the City of Hewitt, Texas; TUCK SAUNDERS,
Individually and in his official capacity as a police officer for
the City of Hewitt, Texas; THE CITY OF HEWITT, TEXAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas, Waco Division
(W-01-CV-196)
March 17, 2003
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs Gaylene and Stacey Smith appeal two separate orders
by the district court granting summary judgment to defendants Doyle
Brock, Jr., Tuck Saunders, and the City of Hewitt, Texas.1 The
first order, dated January 25, 2002, granted summary judgment to
the defendant officers on plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 false arrest
claims on grounds of qualified immunity. The second order, dated
March 27, 2002, granted summary judgment to all defendants on
plaintiff Stacey Smith’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging illegal
detention on grounds that plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient
evidence of the police officer’s recklessness in handling evidence
and conducting their investigation to withstand summary judgment.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
employing the same criteria used in that court. Rogers v.
International Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1996).
As to Gaylene Smith’s false arrest claim, the district court
held that the officers enjoyed qualified immunity from suit for her
arrest because she was arrested pursuant to a warrant. Where there
is a warrant for an arrestee, an officer enjoys immunity from suit
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
Defendants argue that because the Smiths’ notice of appeal
references only the March 27 summary judgment order that is all
they are appealing. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c). But the intent of
plaintiffs to appeal both orders is evident, and therefore we will
treat both orders as appealed. In re Hinsley, 201 F.3d 638, 641
(5th Cir. 2000).
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for false arrest so long as a reasonable officer could conclude
that a warrant should issue. Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 444
(5th Cir. 1997). Given the deference afforded the findings of
magistrates, Id. at 444, and that an officer enjoys the benefit of
doubt on the reasonableness of his probable cause assessment when
he submits it to a magistrate, Jennings v. Joshua Independent
School District, 877 F.2d 313, 318 (5th Cir. 1989), we believe the
district court was correct in its finding of qualified immunity.
Similarly, the district court held in its January order that
the defendant officers enjoyed qualified immunity from suit for the
arrest of Stacey Smith because there was at least “arguably”
probable cause for her arrest. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187
F.3d 452, 481 (5th Cir. 1999). While there was no warrant for this
arrest, we agree with the district court’s assessment that a
reasonable officer could have found probable cause here. We have
previously ruled eyewitness statements alone are sufficient grounds
to support a finding of probable cause. Simmons v. McElveen, 846
F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1988).
As for the March order, the district court there held that
plaintiffs failed to introduce sufficient evidence of defendants’
recklessness to support a finding of liability for illegal
detention of Stacey Smith. Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162
(5th Cir. 1992). We agree with the district court that at most
plaintiffs’ evidence supports an inference of negligent, rather
than reckless, investigation. Accordingly, summary judgment was
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appropriate on this claim as well.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED.
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