Neal v. Federal Bureau of Prisons , 76 F. App'x 543 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    September 12, 2003
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    _________________________                        Clerk
    No. 03-30419
    SUMMARY CALENDAR
    _________________________
    DENARD DARNELL NEAL
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; KATHLEEN HAWK-SAWYER; RONALD G
    THOMPSON; CARL CASTERLINE; JANE HASCHEMEYER; WHITE, Mr., Mailroom
    Supervisor; ERICKSON, Mr., Assistant Mailroom Supervisor; HALTIWANGER, Mr.;
    CASTILLO, Ms.; PHELPS, Mr.; SMITH, Mr.; HARRELL WATTS; SHERREL BOZEMAN;
    LESTER PHILLIPS, In His Individual and Official Capacity; TRANSOU, Lieutenant, In His
    Individual and Official Capacity; BOBBY TYLER
    Defendants - Appellees
    DENARD DARNELL NEAL
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    KATHLEEN HAWK SAWYER; CARL CASTERLINE; SHERRELL BOZEMAN; RONALD G
    THOMPSON; HARRELL WATTS; WHITE, Mr.; ERICKSON, Mr.; PHELIPS, Mr.;
    HALTIWANGER, Mr.; SMITH, Mr.; CASTILLO, Ms.; JANE HASCHEMEYER
    Defendants - Appellees
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    (02-CV-1908)
    (02-CV-1942)
    ______________________________________________________________________________
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    Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
    REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:1
    In this appeal we review the district court's decision to deny Plaintiff-Appellant, Denard
    Darnell Neal’s (hereinafter “Neal”), motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
    injunction in his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the following reasons,
    we affirm the district court’s decision.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Neal has filed several civil actions seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief against
    the Federal Bureau of Prisons (hereinafter “BOP”) and employees of both the BOP and the
    United States Penitentiary at Pollock, Louisiana. Neal alleges numerous violations of his
    constitutional rights by prison officials, including 1) forcible interviews; 2) charging inmates for
    typewriter ribbons and underwear; 3) tampering with legal mail; and 4) a corrupt administrative
    remedy system. Neal’s initial request was for a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to
    transfer him to another prison.
    Neal also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order against eight Defendants. This
    request resulted from an alleged attack on Neal by prison officials when Neal refused to allow
    officers to put another inmate in Neal’s cell. In his motion for a temporary restraining order, Neal
    claimed 1) violations of the Eight Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment; 2)
    violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991; 3) an equal protection violation; 4)
    1
    Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
    published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
    47.5.4.
    -2-
    deliberate indifference to medical needs; 5) retaliation; and 6) denial of access to the
    administrative remedy process.
    Neal seeks a court order 1) directing Defendants to cease assaulting Neal; 2) restricting
    Defendants from having contact with Neal pending an investigation; 3) directing Defendants to
    identify all prison staff involved in the alleged assault; 4) placing Neal in protective custody; 5)
    ordering Defendants to preserve the videotape of the alleged assault; and 6) providing Neal access
    to administrative remedies.
    The district court denied Neal’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
    injunction. The court ruled that Neal had not alleged any specific facts showing a substantial
    threat of irreparable injury if his requested injunction was not granted. The district court also
    ruled that Neal had failed to prove a substantial likelihood that his cause would succeed on the
    merits.
    II.
    APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    Due to the way in which Neal framed his motion for a temporary restraining order, this
    court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction. Mosley v. Cozby, 
    813 F.2d 659
    , 660 (5th Cir.
    1987) (the court must examine its jurisdiction on its own motion if necessary). Denial of a motion
    for a temporary restraining order is not appealable. In re Lieb, 
    915 F.2d 180
    , 183 (5th Cir. 1990).
    However, denial of a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable, if the injunction is related
    to the substantive issues of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); Siebert v. Great Northern
    Development Co., 
    494 F.2d 510
    , 511 (5th Cir. 1974); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 
    932 F.2d 1103
    , 1107
    (5th Cir. 1991). Neal designated his motion as a motion for a temporary restraining order, but the
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    relief he requests is only available by a preliminary injunction because the relief sought would
    extend beyond the ten-day limit of a temporary restraining order. Because the injunctive relief
    requested by Neal is related to the substantive issues of the litigation, liberally construed, Neal’s
    request constitutes a motion for preliminary injunction. Thus, this court has jurisdiction to hear
    the appeal.
    III.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the district court’s decision denying Neal’s motion for preliminary injunction
    for abuse of discretion. White v. Carlucci, 
    862 F.2d 1209
    , 1211 (5th Cir. 1989). The decision to
    deny a preliminary injunction will be reversed by this court “only under extraordinary
    circumstances.” 
    Id. IV. PRELIMINARY
    INJUNCTION
    To receive a preliminary injunction, Neal must prove 1) a substantial likelihood of success
    on the merits of his case; 2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the order will result in
    irreparable injury; 3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction will cause
    Defendants; and 4) the injunction will not have an adverse affect on the public interest. Women’s
    Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 
    248 F.3d 411
    , 418-420 (5th Cir. 2001); 
    Lakedreams, 932 F.2d at 1107
    . Neal
    must prove all four elements and failure to prove any one of them will result in denial of the
    motion. Enterprise Intern, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 
    762 F.2d 464
    ,
    472 (5th Cir. 1985).
    Neal has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a
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    preliminary injunction because Neal has not established a substantial threat of irreparable injury.
    Neal alleges no facts beyond the conclusory allegations of a conspiracy against him that suggest
    the prison staff will assault him in the future. Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-220 (5th Cir.
    1983). In regards to the surveillance tape which Neal purports is evidence of the alleged assault,
    Neal can seek its production through the regular discovery process. U.S. v. Pretel, 
    939 F.2d 233
    ,
    239-240 (5th Cir. 1991) (defendant could have sought preservation of audiotapes by discovery
    process). Any preliminary injunction issued by the court would merely be an order for Defendants
    to do their duty.
    V.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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