Crockett v. Wackenhut Correctional Corp. , 79 F. App'x 732 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS               November 6, 2003
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-30329
    Summary Calendar
    DARRYL A. CROCKETT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    WACKENHUT CORRECTIONAL CORP.; O. KENT ANDREWS; MARK ESTES; JOSEPH
    EVANS, JR.; WALTER GARNETT; DANIEL GRANGER; WILLIAM MARTIN; DOE
    LINSEY; DOE MANUAL; RICHARD WACKENHUT; CARLENE VIDRINE; GORDON
    WEBB; DOE SIMMONS; JOHN ONELLION; DOE MORGAN; DOE WHITTINGTON,
    Defendant-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    (02-CV-1446)
    Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Darryl A. Crockett, Louisiana inmate # 97474, appeals the
    dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights action.
    For his retaliation claim, Crockett contends that the district
    court erred in dismissing his complaint because he alleged facts in
    support of a direct-retaliation theory and a chronology of events
    from       which   it   could   reasonably   be   inferred   that   retaliation
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    occurred   because    he    had   written     a    complaint     letter    to   an
    administrator at a different correctional facility.                    Crockett’s
    retaliation claim fails unless he identifies a constitutional
    right, the exercise of which resulted in retaliation. See McDonald
    v. Steward, 
    132 F.3d 225
    , 231 (5th Cir. 1998).
    As Crockett concedes, he did not have a constitutional right
    to complain.     See Gibbs v. King, 
    779 F.2d 1040
    , 1045-46 (5th Cir.
    1986). Crockett maintains, however, that prison officials censored
    his outgoing     mail.     “Prison   officials       may   not   censor    inmate
    correspondence    simply    to    eliminate       unflattering    or    unwelcome
    opinions   or   factually    inaccurate      statements.”         Procunier     v.
    Martinez, 
    416 U.S. 396
    , 413 (1974), overruled in part, Thornburgh
    v. Abbott, 
    490 U.S. 401
    (1989).       Taking as true (as we are required
    to do) Crockett’s allegation that prison officials censored his
    mail, Crockett has alleged a constitutional right and a chronology
    of events from which it can reasonably be inferred that he was
    subject to retaliation through disciplinary proceedings, as well as
    being directly disciplined for writing the letter.               See Bradley v.
    Puckett, 
    157 F.3d 1022
    , 1025 (5th Cir. 1998); Woods v. Smith, 
    60 F.3d 1161
    , 1166 (5th Cir. 1995).
    Crockett also contends that, before dismissing his First
    Amendment claim, the district court should have given him the
    opportunity to amend. To the extent that his claims were dismissed
    as frivolous, the district court was not required to provide
    Crockett an opportunity to amend.           See Graves v. Hampton, 
    1 F.3d 315
    , 318 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds, Arvie v.
    Broussard, 
    42 F.3d 249
    , 251 (5th Cir. 1994).     Moreover, Crockett
    did amend his complaint once; and he had the opportunity to file
    objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and
    did so.
    Finally, Crockett contends that the district court erred in
    dismissing his Eighth Amendment claims for failure to exhaust his
    administrative remedies because it will take over three years to do
    so.   Crockett urges application of the exception found in McCarthy
    v. Madigan, 
    503 U.S. 140
    (1992), as cited in Edwards v. Johnson,
    
    209 F.3d 772
    , 776-77 (5th Cir. 2000), to excuse him from his Prison
    Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) duty to exhaust.   Edwards involved an
    alien awaiting deportation, a situation to which the PLRA does not
    apply; and we have declined to apply McCarthy’s exception to the
    exhaustion requirement for prisoners’ claims under the PLRA.     See
    Clifford v. Gibbs, 
    298 F.3d 328
    , 332 (5th Cir. 2002).
    That part of the judgment dismissing with prejudice Crockett’s
    retaliation claim is VACATED; the remainder of the judgment is
    AFFIRMED; and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.
    VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; and REMANDED