United States v. Pablo Stallings , 80 F. App'x 537 ( 2003 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-1642
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * District of Nebraska.
    Pablo Stallings,                        *
    *    [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: November 7, 2003
    Filed: November 10, 2003
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, McMILLIAN, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    A jury found Stallings guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute
    50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846, and
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . The presentence report (PSR) determined that Stallings’s Guidelines
    imprisonment range was 360 months to life, but because Stallings had two prior
    felony drug convictions, section 841(b)(1)(A) mandated a life sentence. Stallings
    objected, as relevant, to the PSR attributing any amount of cocaine base to him,
    enhancing his sentence by 4 levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for being a leader of
    the conspiracy, and using his prior convictions to enhance his sentence. The district
    court1 sentenced him to life imprisonment.
    On appeal, this court affirmed Stallings’s conviction, but reversed and
    remanded his sentence because a 1993 California felony conviction for possessing
    cocaine base--one of the convictions used to enhance his sentence to life
    imprisonment--had never been properly entered against Stallings. See United States
    v. Stallings, 
    301 F.3d 919
     (8th Cir. 2002). At resentencing, Stallings renewed his
    objections from the first sentencing, and argued during allocution that a 1987 Nevada
    sentence was too old to be considered, and that he should receive a 10-year sentence.
    The district court overruled these objections, and sentenced him to 360 months
    imprisonment and 10 years supervised release. In this appeal, Stallings’s counsel has
    moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    arguing that the district court erred by (1) overruling Stallings’s objection to the
    weight of cocaine base attributed to him, (2) overruling his objection to the 4-level
    role enhancement, and (3) not sentencing him to 10 years. In a pro se supplemental
    brief, Stallings argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. Stallings also has moved
    for appointment of new counsel.
    We need not consider the drug-quantity and role-enhancement issues raised
    by counsel, because these issues were not raised in Stallings’s first direct criminal
    appeal. See United States v. Kress, 
    58 F.3d 370
    , 373 (8th Cir. 1995) (where party
    could have raised issue in prior appeal but did not, court later hearing same case need
    not consider matter). We also do not consider Stallings’s pro se argument that he was
    denied effective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Martin, 
    59 F.3d 767
    , 771
    (8th Cir. 1995) (except where result would be plain miscarriage of justice, ineffective-
    assistance claims should be raised in 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     proceeding). To the extent
    1
    The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of
    Nebraska.
    -2-
    Stallings’s argument that his prison sentence should be only 10 years is an argument
    that the district court should have departed from the applicable sentencing range, the
    district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, see United States v. Montanye, 
    996 F.2d 190
    , 192 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (standard of review for issues not raised in
    district court is plain error), and having carefully reviewed the record independently
    for any nonfrivolous issues, see Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
     (1988), we find none.
    Accordingly, we affirm, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and deny
    Stallings’s motion for counsel.
    ______________________________
    -3-