McKenzie v. US Dept Vet Affairs , 83 F. App'x 642 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    December 16, 2003
    In the
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    United States Court of Appeals                                        Clerk
    for the Fifth Circuit
    _______________
    No. 03-30653
    Summary Calendar
    _______________
    JANIE MCKENZIE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    ANTHONY PRINCIPI,
    SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    m 02-CV-1601
    _________________________
    Before SMITH, DEMOSS, and STEWART,
    Circuit Judges.                                          Plaintiff Janie McKenzie appeals the dis-
    missal of her claim after she failed timely to
    PER CURIAM:*                                            respond to a dispositive motion by defendant.
    *                                                        *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-             (...continued)
    termined that this opinion should not be published      and is not precedent except under the limited cir-
    (continued...)    cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Finding no error, we affirm.                               of the VA, dismissing with prejudice on June
    9.
    I.
    McKenzie sued on May 24, 2002, charging                                       II.
    that the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (“the                 McKenzie argues that the court abused its
    VA”) had unlawfully engaged in racial discrim-             discretion in refusing to grant her motion for
    ination against her, in violation of title VII.            relief, because counsel’s failure to reply timely
    During the pre-trial period, the court set June            was “excusable neglect.” Appellate review of
    9, 2003, as a cutoff date for pre-trial motions            a denial of a rule 60(b) motion is narrower in
    to be heard. In scheduling pre-trial deadlines,            scope than is review of the order of dismissal.
    the court was mindful that McKenzie’s counsel              To merit reversal, a denial must be so unwar-
    had duties as a legislator during the spring and           ranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
    summer. In its discretion, the court charitably            New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Martech USA,
    adjusted the pre-trial schedule to reduce con-             Inc., 
    993 F.2d 1195
    , 1200 (5th Cir. 1993) (cit-
    flict with counsel’s other duties.                         ing Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 
    965 F.2d 38
     (5th
    On May 12, the VA filed a motion to dis-               Cir. 1992)); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635
    miss or alternatively for summary judgment.                F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)
    The motion package was duly delivered to
    McKenzie’s lawyer on May 13, informing him                    Any post-deadline extension to reply to a
    that the motion would be heard on May 28.                  dispositive motion must be “upon motion
    McKenzie failed to respond until May 22, too               made” and is permissible only where the failure
    late to be heard under the applicable rules. 1             to meet deadline ‘was the result of “excusable
    The court granted the motion to dismiss as                 neglect.” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497
    unopposed.                                                 U.S. 871, 896 (1990). In determining whether
    a late filing was excusable neglect, the court
    On June 5, 2003, pursuant to FED. R. CIV.               should take into account the possible prejudice
    P. 60(b), McKenzie filed a “Motion for Relief              to the later filer, the length of delay and the
    from Judgment or Order and Reinstatement of                impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for
    Action” (“motion for relief”). As the basis for            delay, including especially if it was within the
    the request for leniency, McKenzie’s attorney              reasonable control of the movant, and whether
    pointed to his duties as a state representative,           the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer Inv.
    where he was then serving in a regular session             Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,
    convened on March 31 and set to extend                     
    507 U.S. 380
    , 395 (1993).
    through June 23. He argued that his work had
    kept him out of his office and had caused the                 Moreover, “the greater the negligence in-
    late response. The court refused to grant Mc-              volved, or the more willful the conduct, the
    Kenzie’s motion and entered judgment in favor              less ‘excusable’ it is.” Crutcher v. Aetna Life
    Ins. Co., 
    746 F.2d 1076
    , 1083 (5th Cir. 1984).
    Greater leniency should be exercised in finding
    1
    Under Local Rule 7.5E, “Each party opposing           excusable neglect where failure to grant a
    a motion shall file . . . a memorandum of the              motion for relief would result in a default
    reasons advanced in opposition . . . no later than         judgment. In Blois v. Friday, 
    612 F.2d 938
    ,
    the eighth calender day prior to the noticed hearing       940 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), we stated:
    date.”
    2
    [The] Rule 60(b) Motion must be equita-            counsel were aware of the requirements of the
    bly and liberally applied to achieve substan-        pre-trial period and of counsel’s busy sched-
    tial justice. Doubt should be resolved in the        ule.
    favor of a judicial decision on the merits of
    a case, and a technical error or a slight               Accordingly, it was no abuse of discretion
    mistake by plaintiff’s attorney should not           to deny the motion for relief.
    deprive plaintiff of an opportunity to pres-
    ent the true merits of his claims. The coun-           AFFIRMED.
    tervailing factors are the defendants’ and
    society’s interests in the finality of judg-
    ments and the avoidance of prejudice. The
    plaintiff should not be punished for his
    attorney’s mistake absent a clear record of
    delay, willful contempt or contumacious
    conduct.
    (Citations omitted.) See also Hassenflu v.
    Pyke, 
    491 F.2d 1094
    , 1095 (5th Cir. 1974)
    (per curiam).
    Nonetheless, McKenzie has failed to show
    that her neglect was “excusable.” This court
    has regularly found “excusable neglect” in
    responding to a dispositive motion only in cir-
    cumstances where, through inadvertence, the
    party or its attorney did not receive notice. See
    e.g., Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, 
    151 F.3d 465
    , 470 (5th Cir. 1998); Seven Elves, 635
    F.2d at 399; Blois, 
    612 F.2d at 940
    . Mean-
    while, we have “expressly held that conflicts in
    scheduling do not provide sufficient cause to
    warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(1).” Pryor v.
    United States Postal Serv., 
    769 F.2d 281
    , 287
    (5th Cir. 1985).
    McKenzie offers no reason to excuse her
    late filing other than counsel’s schedule as a
    legislator. It is no more than a conflict in
    scheduling, and one that the district court gen-
    erously accommodated during the pre-trial
    period. There were no surprises or unusual
    intervening circumstances that caused the
    lateness of McKenzie’s reply––she and her
    3