Manuel v. Sanderson Farms Inc. , 90 F. App'x 714 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 6, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
_____________________ Clerk
No. 03-20663
_____________________
OLIVER MANUEL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SANDERSON FARMS INC., Processing Division
Defendant - Appellee.
---------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
(No. 02-CV-4837)
---------------------
BEFORE HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and WIENER Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff–Appellant Oliver Manuel appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer,
Defendant-Appellee Sanderson Farms, Inc. (“Sanderson Farms”),
dismissing his Texas state law racial discrimination claims. We
affirm, albeit for different reasons.1
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
See S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315
F.3d 533, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2003)(“Summary judgment must be affirmed
if it is sustainable on any legal ground in the record, . . . . and
it may be affirmed on grounds stated or not stated by the district
court.”)(cites omitted).
Manuel filed suit in the County Court of Law No. 2 of Brazos
County, Texas against Sanderson Farms, alleging discriminatory
discharge and hostile work environment claims under the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”).2 Sanderson Farms had
hired Manuel in April 2000 as one of three superintendents at its
poultry processing plant in Bryan, Texas. Each superintendent was
in charge of one of the plant’s three shifts. Manuel, a black
male, was hired as superintendent of the second shift. Brian Otto
and Ed Cammack, both white males, were superintendents of the first
and third shifts, respectively.
The second shift operated from 6:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m., but
Manuel would occasionally leave his shift early. On July 10, 2001,
Manuel’s supervisor, David Jarrett, instructed Manuel that, from
that day on, he would be required to stay until the second shift
had ended. (Although Jarrett did not give similar instructions to
Otto and Cammack, neither does Manuel contest the record evidence
that Otto and Cammack had no history of early departure.) The
following week, Jarrett arrived at the plant around midnight and
discovered that Manuel had left. Jarrett promptly recommended to
Sanderson Farms’ Division Manager, Eric Erickson, that Manuel’s
employment be terminated because of his poor performance and his
failure to follow Jarrett’s directive that he remain at work until
the end of his shift. Erickson agreed with Jarrett’s
2
TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.001, et seq. (Vernon 1996).
2
recommendation and, on July 19, 2001, informed Manuel that his
employment at Sanderson Farms would be terminated.3
On February 20, 2002, more than 200 days after being informed
of his discharge, Manuel filed a charge of discrimination with the
Texas Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”) and with the
EEOC. The Commission issued Manuel a right to sue letter on
September 26, 2002.4 Manuel filed suit in state court within 60
days after receiving the Commission’s letter, as required by Texas
Labor Code Annotated section 21.254.5 His complaint asserted only
state law causes of action.
Sanderson Farms removed the case to federal court on the basis
of diversity, and, following an expedited discovery schedule, moved
for summary judgment on Manuel’s claims. The district court
granted Sanderson Farms’s motion in June 2003. In its stated
reasons, the court said that it found Manuel’s claims time-barred
3
Neither side disputes that the date Manuel was unequivocally
informed that his employment at Sanderson Farms would be
terminated, and not the date of his actual termination, triggers
the 180 day time limit for filing his complaint with the Texas
Commission on Human Rights. See TEXAS LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.202
(Vernon 1996); see also Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville,
933 S.W.2d 490, 492-93 (Tex. 1996)(“[t]he limitations period begins
when the employee is informed of the allegedly discriminatory
employment decision, not when that decision comes to
fruition”)(citing Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,
258 (1980)).
4
The EEOC issued Manuel a right to sue letter on October 7,
2002.
5
TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.254 (Vernon 1996)(“Within 60 days
after the date the right to file a civil action is received, the
complainant may bring a civil action against the respondent.”).
3
under federal law, and, alternatively, that he had failed to
establish genuine issues of material fact with regards to the
merits of both his hostile work environment and discriminatory
discharge claims. Manuel timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment.6
B. Time Bar
The district court held Manuel’s claims to be time-barred
under 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5(e), because Manuel did not file suit
within 30 days following receipt of his right to sue letter from
the Commission. 7 Section 2000e-5(e) provides, in pertinent part,
that an aggrieved party who has filed a charge of discrimination
with a state or local agency, such as the Commission, has until the
earlier of 300 days after the date of the alleged unlawful
employment practice, or 30 days after the date on which he receives
notice that the state agency has terminated its proceedings in
which to file an EEOC charge.8 As Manuel correctly points out,
the district court erred in applying section 2000e-5(e), both
because that provision controls the time for filing an EEOC charge
6
See Conserv Ltd. Liability Corp. v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 350 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2003)(cites omitted).
7
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5(e)(Supp. 2003).
8
See id.
4
and not the time for filing suit, and because the TCHRA, rather
than federal law, controls whether his claims were timely filed.
Sanderson Farms concedes that the district court erred in
applying § 2000e-5(e) but argues that Manuel’s claims are time-
barred nevertheless under the applicable limitations provision,
section 21.202 of the TCHRA. That section requires a complainant
to file a charge of discrimination with the Commission within 180
days following the date on which the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, and directs the Commission to dismiss a late-
filed complaint as untimely.9 The Texas Supreme Court has held
that “[t]his time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional.”10
Sanderson Farms argues that, because Manuel waited until February
20, 2002 – well over 180 days after the date on which he was
informed of his termination – to file his complaint with the
Commission, his claims are time-barred under section 21.202.
9
See TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.202 (Vernon 1996). Section 21.202
provides:
(a) A complaint under this subchapter must be filed not later
than the 180th day after the date the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.
(b) The commission shall dismiss an untimely complaint.
Id.
10
Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490,
492 (Tex. 1996); see also Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept. v. Dearing,
– S.W.3d —, 2004 WL 35543, at *4 (Tex. App. - Austin 2004, no pet.
h.)(“[a] complaint with the Commission must be filed no later than
180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred”);
Cooper-Day v. RME Petroleum Co., 121 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tex. App. -
Fort Worth 2003, pet. filed)(“[f]ailure to timely file an
administrative complaint [under Section 21.202] deprives Texas
trial courts of subject matter jurisdiction”).
5
Manuel responds, relying on a state intermediate appellate
court case, Gorges Foodservice, Inc. v. Huerta,11 that his receipt
of the Commission’s right to sue letter creates a presumption that
his complaint was filed timely. His reliance is misplaced: Gorges
held only that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, a
jury could infer from the plaintiff’s receipt of the Commission’s
right to sue letter that his complaint was timely;12 it did not hold
that issuance of a right to sue letter creates a “presumption” of
timeliness. Additionally, at least one Texas appellate court that
addressed this precise point held that issuance of a right to sue
letter from the Commission cannot confer subject matter
jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s complaint when the plaintiff has
failed to file his charge with the Commission within 180 days after
the alleged adverse employment action, as required by section
21.202.13 Because it is undisputed that Manuel did not file his
charge with the Commission until more than 180 days had elapsed
11
964 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1997, pet.
withdrawn).
12
See id. at 664 (“[w]e hold . . . that the jury could have
rationally inferred that Huerta’s complaint was timely filed from
the Commission’s action in sending him a ‘notice of right to file
civil action’ letter rather than dismissing his complaint pursuant
to 21.202 of the Labor Code”).
13
Guevara v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 82 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. App.
-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied); see also Subaru of America, Inc.
v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex.
2002)(“[c]ourts will not imply additional authority to
[administrative] agencies, nor may agencies create for themselves
any excess powers”).
6
following the alleged act of employment discrimination, his claims
are time-barred under the TCHRA. As such, the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his action.14
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Because we hold that Manuel’s claims were time-barred, and affirm
the dismissal of his action with prejudice on that ground, we do
not reach the merits of his case.
AFFIRMED.
14
See Jones v. Grinnell Corp., 235 F.3d 972, 974 (5th Cir.
2001)(“[i]f a complainant fails to exhaust his state administrative
remedies, the Texas Human Rights Act jurisdictionally bars this
court from hearing the case regardless of equitable and policy
concerns”)(cites omitted).
7