Brooks v. Cintas Corp. , 91 F. App'x 917 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         January 12, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-20719
    Summary Calendar
    NICHOLAS D. BROOKS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    CINTAS CORPORATION
    Defendant-Appellee.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-02-CV-2736
    --------------------
    Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Nicholas Brooks appeals from two district court orders.         The
    first stayed and administratively closed his employment
    discrimination case against Cintas Corporation pending
    arbitration, and the second denied his motion to reconsider the
    arbitrator’s award of no damages.
    Cintas hired Brooks in 1995.   On August 19, 1999, in
    connection with a promotion, Brooks signed an employment
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 03-20719
    -2-
    agreement with Cintas that compelled, in the event of an
    employment dispute, a good faith attempt at resolution by
    conference followed by binding arbitration.   Brooks was promoted
    in March, 2001 to Service Sales Representative (SSR).   As an SSR,
    Brooks delivered bathroom supplies and floor mats to Cintas
    customers.   Cintas management discovered in June that Brooks
    charged one of Cintas’s customers for goods and services he did
    not deliver and that he regularly obtained invoice signatures
    from unauthorized customer representatives or even signed
    invoices himself.   Brooks demonstrated that these were common
    practices of Cintas SSRs, who often were sent to customers with
    insufficient supplies, were not given enough time to perform all
    requested services, and worked at hours when authorized
    representatives were often unavailable.
    Several days after Cintas’s discovery of Brooks’s poor
    performance and unauthorized signatures, Brooks complained to
    Cintas management that he was due a commission that had been
    given to a white employee.    Two days later, Cintas fired Brooks.
    Brooks was replaced by an African-American man.
    Brooks filed a race-discrimination complaint with the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission.    The EEOC invited Brooks and
    Cintas to participate in an EEOC-sponsored mediation, but Cintas
    declined.    Brooks filed suit in the district court, alleging that
    Cintas discriminated against him based on race and retaliated
    against him for demanding a commission in violation of Title VII
    No. 03-20719
    -3-
    of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.   The district court stayed the
    case pending arbitration and administratively closed the case.
    At arbitration, several former and current Cintas employees
    testified that Cintas supervisors told racial jokes.   One witness
    testified that Brooks’s supervisor was a racist and made racist
    jokes.
    After a two-day hearing, the arbitrator determined that
    “Brooks was fired because of poor service and improper invoicing
    procedures.   Cintas’s decision to fire him, and not to fire other
    employees, appears to have been a purely business decision,
    devoid of racial undertones or motivation.”   The court denied
    Brooks’s motion to open the administratively closed case.
    We have jurisdiction, as the district court ordered
    arbitration, closed the case, and denied the motion to review the
    arbitration award.   See American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr,
    
    294 F.3d 702
    , 707-08 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that where a
    district court compels arbitration, stays proceedings, and closes
    a case or where it decides the merits and retains jurisdiction
    only to enforce an arbitration award, the order is a final,
    appealable judgment).
    Review of the decision to compel arbitration is de novo.
    Catholic Diocese of Brownsville v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 
    919 F.2d 1054
    , 1056 (5th Cir. 1990).   Review of the decision to
    vacate or confirm an arbitration award is also de novo.     Prestige
    No. 03-20719
    -4-
    Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Svcs., Inc., 
    324 F.3d 391
    , 393 (5th
    Cir. 2003).
    To decide whether to compel arbitration, a district court
    must first determine if the parties agreed to arbitrate the
    dispute in question.    OPE Int’l LP v. Chet Morrison Contractors,
    Inc., 
    258 F.3d 443
    , 445 (5th Cir. 2001).      Next a court must
    examine “whether legal constraints external to the parties’
    agreement foreclose[] the arbitration of those claims.”
    Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
    473 U.S. 614
    , 628 (1985).   Brooks concedes on appeal that he agreed
    to arbitrate the dispute in question.      He argues, though, that
    Cintas’s refusal to confer with him or mediate the dispute
    constituted a waiver of the arbitration provision.      Cintas’s
    alleged refusal would have been a breach of the employment
    agreement, which should have been presented to the arbitrator
    even if it amounted to waiver.    See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
    Mercury Constr. Corp., 
    460 U.S. 1
    , 24-25 (1983) (“any doubts
    concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
    favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
    construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
    waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”).
    Furthermore, Cintas’s breach would not have been a “legal
    constraint[] external to the parties’ agreement,” so it would not
    have barred arbitration.   The district court did not err in
    compelling arbitration.
    No. 03-20719
    -5-
    Brooks argues the arbitrator was biased because he did not
    consider evidence that would have supported Brooks’s claims.
    Review of an arbitration award is “extraordinarily narrow.”
    Gateway Tech.s, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm.s Corp., 
    64 F.3d 993
    , 996
    (5th Cir. 1995).    A court may vacate an award if there is
    evidence of partiality or corruption by the arbitrator.    9 U.S.C.
    § 10(a)(2).   A court may not reverse based solely on legal or
    factual error.1    United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v.
    Misco, Inc., 
    484 U.S. 29
    , 38 (1987).    Arbitrators must give each
    party an adequate opportunity to present evidence and arguments,
    but they need not hear all of the evidence tendered by the
    parties.   Prestige 
    Ford, 324 F.3d at 395
    .   Here the arbitrator
    heard Brooks’s evidence and mentioned it in his recitation of
    facts.   His decision not to credit that evidence is not
    reviewable.   Brooks has not shown partiality or corruption.     The
    district court did not err in denying Brooks’s motion to reopen
    the case to reconsider the arbitration award.
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    The only other grounds on which a district court may vacate
    an arbitrator’s award are the following: the award was procured
    by corruption, fraud, or undue means; the arbitrator was guilty
    of misconduct; the arbitrator exceeded his powers; or the
    arbitrator acted with manifest disregard for the law. See id.;
    Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic, 
    286 F.3d 790
    , 792 (5th
    Cir. 2002).