United States v. Neilson ( 1998 )


Menu:
  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                     No. 97-4671
    JEFFREY SCOTT NEILSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.
    Irene M. Keeley, District Judge.
    (CR-96-17)
    Submitted: February 10, 1998
    Decided: April 20, 1998
    Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Lori M. Hood, COOPER & PRESTON, Parsons, West Virginia, for
    Appellant. William D. Wilmoth, United States Attorney, Zelda E.
    Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia,
    for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Jeffrey Scott Neilson appeals from the fifteen-year sentence
    imposed upon his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a fire-
    arm, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) (1994). Neilson claims, first, that the district
    court erred by considering his prior conviction of third degree arson
    as a "violent felony" for purposes of sentencing him as an armed
    career criminal, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) (1994). Second, Neilson claims
    that the mandatory minimum sentence provided by§ 924(e) violates
    the doctrine of separation of powers. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    The plea agreement provided that, if Neilson had three previous
    convictions for either a violent felony or a serious drug offense, the
    enhancement under § 924(e) would apply, giving him a fifteen-year
    minimum term of imprisonment. Neilson was convicted in West Vir-
    ginia state court in 1987 of third degree arson, defined as the willful,
    malicious burning of personal property with a value of at least five
    hundred dollars, 
    W. Va. Code § 61-3-3
     (1997), and is punishable by
    imprisonment of "not less than one nor more than three years." 
    Id.
    The only issue is whether this conviction constitutes a "violent fel-
    ony" within the meaning of § 924(e).
    Section 924(e) defines a violent felony to include any crime pun-
    ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that "is bur-
    glary, arson, or extortion, . . . or otherwise involves conduct that
    presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(2)(B)(ii). In United States v. Taylor, 
    495 U.S. 575
    (1990), the Supreme Court adopted a categorical approach to examine
    the statutory definition of a crime to determine whether it falls within
    the ambit of § 924(e). For the enhancement to apply, the statutory def-
    inition must substantially correspond to the "generic" crime at issue.
    Id. at 598. Because West Virginia's definition of third degree arson
    substantially corresponds with the generic definition of arson, we find
    that the district court did not err by including Neilson's conviction for
    purposes of applying the enhancement under § 924(e). See United
    States v. Hathaway, 
    949 F.2d 609
    , 610 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
    third degree arson conviction in Vermont met definition of arson for
    2
    purposes of § 924(e): "[T]he proper inquiry . . . is solely a comparison
    of the elements of arson in Vermont to that crime's generic ele-
    ments").
    Neilson also maintains that the mandatory sentence provision
    found in § 924(e) violates the separation of powers doctrine. This
    court, among others, has rejected this claim. See United States v.
    Jackson, 
    863 F.2d 1168
    , 1171 (4th Cir. 1989); see also United States
    v Mendoza, 
    121 F.3d 441
     (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
    Washington, 
    109 F.3d 335
    , 338 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
    ___, 
    66 U.S.L.W. 3257
     (U.S. Oct. 6, 1997) (No. 96-9415).
    Accordingly, we affirm Neilson's sentence. We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
    ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in
    the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3