United States v. Gibson , 108 F. App'x 975 ( 2004 )


Menu:
  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                September 21, 2004
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-60968
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DON EUGENE GIBSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:03-CR-93-BS-ALL
    --------------------
    Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Don Eugene Gibson appeals his conviction and sentence for
    sexual abuse of a minor on the basis that his confession should
    have been suppressed.    He argues that his confession was
    involuntary because (1) it was elicited after he invoked his
    right to counsel and (2) it was the result of coercion.
    Gibson contends that he was not provided with an attorney
    despite three requests during an interrogation conducted after a
    polygraph examination.    The district court found that Gibson’s
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 03-60968
    -2-
    statements, “Do I need an attorney?” and “Well, this sounds
    serious.    Maybe I need to talk to an attorney” did not constitute
    unequivocal requests for counsel, thus the agent was not required
    to cease his interrogation.    This finding was not error.   Davis
    v. United States, 
    512 U.S. 452
    , 459 (1994); Soffar v. Cockrell,
    
    300 F.3d 588
    , 591-95 (5th Cir. 2002)(en banc); United States v.
    Posada-Rios, 
    158 F.3d 832
    , 867 (5th Cir. 1998).
    Gibson concedes that he was informed of his Miranda** rights
    prior to taking the polygraph examination as well as his rights
    not to take the polygraph examination, not to answer any
    questions, not to answer specific questions, to have a lawyer
    present during the examination, and to stop the examination at
    any time.    He complains that Agent Spiers did not again inform
    him of his rights before beginning the post-test interrogation.
    This argument is without merit.    Agent Spiers was not required to
    again warn Gibson of his rights after having done so that same
    day only an hour or so earlier.    See Wyrick v. Fields, 
    459 U.S. 42
    , 47-48, 49 (1982); see also, 
    Soffar, 300 F.3d at 593
    .
    Gibson complains that his confession was coerced due to the
    use of a small room; the length of time he was in the room; Agent
    Spiers’ failure to inform him that he could leave the room to
    take a break, use the bathroom, or eat lunch; Agent Spiers’
    informing him that he had failed the test; and Agent Spiers’
    promise to make a favorable recommendation if he resolved the
    **
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
    No. 03-60968
    -3-
    matter that day.   The tactics used by Agent Spiers were similar
    to those used in United States v. Bell, 
    367 F.3d 452
    (5th Cir.
    2004).   Under the reasoning of that case, such tactics, standing
    alone, do not amount to coercion sufficient to render Gibson’s
    confession involuntary.    See Bell, 
    367 F.3d 461-62
    .
    The district court did not err in denying Gibson’s motion to
    suppress his confession.
    AFFIRMED.