D'Alessandro v. Morton ( 1998 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    MICHAEL RICHARD D'ALESSANDRO,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    WILLIS E. MORTON; ATTORNEY
    No. 97-7182
    GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW
    JERSEY; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
    STATE OF MARYLAND,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    MICHAEL RICHARD D'ALESSANDRO,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    WILLIS E. MORTON; ATTORNEY
    No. 97-7850
    GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW
    JERSEY; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
    STATE OF MARYLAND,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge.
    (CA-97-2316-S)
    Submitted: April 14, 1998
    Decided: June 30, 1998
    Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and NIEMEYER,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    No. 97-7182, dismissed; No. 97-7850, vacated and remanded by
    unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Michael Richard D'Alessandro, Appellant Pro Se.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Michael R. D'Alessandro appeals from the district court order
    denying relief on his petition filed under 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2254
     (West
    1994 & Supp. 1998), and from the district court's denial of
    D'Alessandro's motion to appoint counsel. We grant leave to proceed
    in forma pauperis in both appeals. In No. 97-7182, we deny a certifi-
    cate of appealability and dismiss the appeal of the district court's
    denial of D'Alessandro's motion to appoint counsel. We grant a cer-
    tificate of appealability in No. 97-7850 and vacate and remand for
    further proceedings regarding whether D'Alessandro has exhausted
    his available state remedies.
    I.
    D'Alessandro was convicted in Maryland state court of storehouse
    breaking and stealing. At the time of his conviction in Maryland,
    D'Alessandro was already serving a fifty-nine year sentence in New
    Jersey state prison. The Maryland state court sentenced D'Alessandro
    to ten years' incarceration, to begin immediately following service of
    his New Jersey sentence.
    2
    D'Alessandro appealed his conviction to the Court of Special
    Appeals of Maryland, contending among other claims that he had
    been denied his right to a speedy trial and that he had been unlawfully
    extradited to Maryland to stand trial there. D'Alessandro's conviction
    was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, and the
    Court of Appeals of Maryland denied his petition for a writ of certio-
    rari.
    D'Alessandro filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Cir-
    cuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, raising an ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim. Although Maryland law provides that
    petitioners have the right to attend any hearing on a motion for post-
    conviction relief, D'Alessandro was unable to attend the hearing on
    his post-conviction motion because he was incarcerated in New Jer-
    sey. Because D'Alessandro was not present at the hearing and had not
    waived his right to be present, the Circuit Court dismissed
    D'Alessandro's petition without prejudice.
    II.
    D'Alessandro filed the instant petition under 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2254
    ,
    contending that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, that he was
    unlawfully extradited to Maryland to stand trial, and that he received
    ineffective assistance of counsel. D'Alessandro also filed a motion to
    appoint counsel. The district court denied D'Alessandro's motion to
    appoint counsel.*
    The district court dismissed D'Alessandro's petition for failure to
    exhaust state remedies. The district court held that because
    D'Alessandro's post-conviction motion was dismissed without preju-
    dice and he could bring another post-conviction motion in Maryland
    court, D'Alessandro's ineffective assistance of counsel claim had not
    _________________________________________________________________
    *D'Alessandro immediately appealed from this order. D'Alessandro's
    appeal from the denial of his motion to appoint counsel is interlocutory.
    See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     (1994). However, because the district court finally
    decided the petition on the merits, the order denying the motion to
    appoint counsel is now reviewable and D'Alessandro's two appeals have
    been consolidated for review. See In re J.T.R. Corp., 
    958 F.2d 602
    , 604
    n.1 (4th Cir. 1992).
    3
    been exhausted. Accordingly, under Rose v. Lundy , 
    455 U.S. 509
    (1982), the district court dismissed the entire petition.
    On appeal, D'Alessandro contends that the district court erred by
    finding that he failed to exhaust his state court remedies (No. 97-
    7850), and by denying his motion to appoint counsel (No. 97-7182).
    Because D'Alessandro's inability to attend the Maryland post-
    conviction hearing was not due to his deliberate free choice, nor did
    he voluntarily forego the opportunity to challenge his conviction
    while in Maryland, we vacate and remand in No. 97-7850 for further
    proceedings regarding whether the exhaustion requirement should be
    deemed satisfied under the procedure announced in Farmer v. Circuit
    Court, 
    31 F.3d 219
    , 222-24 (4th Cir. 1994). See Whittlesey v. Circuit
    Court, 
    897 F.2d 143
    , 145-46 (4th Cir. 1990).
    A review of the record shows that D'Alessandro is fully able to
    present his case, and that the issues are not so complex that appoint-
    ment of counsel is warranted. See Murray v. Giarratano, 
    492 U.S. 1
    ,
    7-8 (1989); Whisenant v. Yuam, 
    739 F.2d 160
    , 163 (4th Cir. 1984).
    Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    D'Alessandro's motion to appoint counsel, and we deny a certificate
    of appealability and dismiss the appeal of that order. (No. 97-7182).
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately set out in the materials before the court and argu-
    ment would not aid the decisional process.
    No. 97-7182, DISMISSED;
    No. 97-7850, VACATED AND REMANDED
    4