Boone v. Galveston Independent School District , 126 F. App'x 660 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 17, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-40721
_____________________
SONIA BOONE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
GALVESTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:03-CV-102
_________________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sonia Boone appeals the district court’s grant of Galveston
Independent School District’s (“GISD”) Motion for Summary Judgment
on her compensation discrimination claim. She also appeals the
district court’s assessment of sanctions.
Boone filed a lawsuit in which she alleged unlawful racial
discrimination in GISD’s compensation of her relative to its
compensation of Sergio Ramirez. The district court granted GISD’s
Motion for Summary Judgment after finding that, although Boone had
made a prima facie case of compensation discrimination, she could
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
not show evidence that GISD’s proffered, non-discriminatory reason
for the unequal treatment, namely, Boone’s lack of the required
certificate for the particular position, was a pretext for
discrimination. The district court dismissed Boone’s claim with
prejudice and assessed sanctions against her attorney, Anthony P.
Griffin, and his law firm, Anthony P. Griffin, Inc., because it
concluded that “[e]ven a minimal investigation into the facts of
this case would have revealed the abject frivolity of all of
[Boone]’s claims.” The district court imposed sanctions in the
amount of $17,776.25, the cost to GISD of defending the case.
Boone relies on Williams v. Galveston Ind. Sch. Dist., 256
F.Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2003), aff’d, 78 Fed. Appx. 946 (5th Cir.
2003), to argue that the district court improperly focused on the
relative qualifications of Ramirez and Boone, instead of on their
relative responsibilities, which were equivalent. This argument is
meritless. The Williams court ruled that the plaintiffs had not
established a prima facie case of wage discrimination because their
job responsibilities were not substantially similar to those of the
directors who were not members of the protected class. Here,
however, the district court found that Boone had established a
prima facie case of wage discrimination. The difference between
Ramirez’s and Boone’s qualifications served as a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the disparate treatment, which Boone
cannot rebut. Therefore, the district court was correct in
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granting GISD’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The next question in this appeal is whether the district court
abused its discretion in assessing Rule 11 sanctions against
Boone’s attorney, Anthony P. Griffin, and his law firm. Boone
argues that the sanctions were inappropriate because her claim was
not baseless. As we have already determined that Boone’s claim was
clearly without merit, and because we agree with the district
court’s conclusion that a reasonable investigation would have
revealed to Griffin the “abject frivolity” of his arguments on the
merits, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions.**
Therefore, the district court’s granting of GISD’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against
Anthony P. Griffin and Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. are
AFFIRMED.
**
Boone also argues that the district court erred in failing to
provide time for Boone to file a Motion to Continue Summary
Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) when it granted GISD’s
summary judgment motion just one day after GISD filed its response
to Boone’s discovery objections. We note, however, that Boone
could have moved for a continuance at any time in the summary
judgment process, but she failed to do so. Furthermore, Boone does
not demonstrate that the additional discovery would have created a
genuine issue of material fact. See Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76
F.3d 651, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1996).
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