Jones v. Rivers ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 21-60211     Document: 00516389820         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/11/2022
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    July 11, 2022
    No. 21-60211                   Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                      Clerk
    Derrick L. Jones,
    Petitioner—Appellant,
    versus
    Warden Christopher Rivers,
    Respondent—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:18-cv-858
    Before King, Costa, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Derrick L. Jones appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing
    his petition for writ of habeas corpus with prejudice. We affirm.
    Jones is currently incarcerated in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons
    serving a 120-month term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm and
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 21-60211        Document: 00516389820              Page: 2       Date Filed: 07/11/2022
    No. 21-60211
    ammunition after having served a state sentence related to the same
    underlying incident. Without first proceeding through the Administrative
    Remedy Program, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that
    his federal sentence is being unlawfully executed because the Bureau of
    Prisons has not applied a nunc pro tunc designation to his prison term. The
    district court, acknowledging that an inmate must first exhaust his
    administrative remedies prior to seeking such relief from the court,
    nevertheless reached the merits of his complaint. It concluded that Jones
    could not show an error by the Bureau of Prisons for failing to apply a nunc
    pro tunc designation because the record as submitted by Jones demonstrated
    that the sentencing court intended his “federal sentence run consecutive to
    the state term.”
    On appeal, Jones does not challenge the district court’s merits
    conclusion, but instead argues: (1) the district court erred by dismissing his
    petition with prejudice because he had failed to exhaust his administrative
    remedies; and (2) the district court denied him procedural due process
    because he was not given sufficient opportunity to oppose the magistrate
    judge’s Report and Recommendations.1 We address these arguments in turn.
    First, while true that the ordinary course for a district court is to
    dismiss a case without prejudice when a habeas petitioner fails to first exhaust
    his administrative remedies, it is not required. Woodford v. Ngo, 
    548 U.S. 81
    ,
    101 (2006) (“[E]ven if dismissals under § 1997e(c)(2) typically occur when
    the opportunity to pursue administrative remedies has passed, § 1997e(c)(2)
    1
    Jones also contends the district court inappropriately denied his motion for
    summary judgment, appointment of counsel, and motion for evidentiary hearing. Because
    he does not explain why or how the district court erred in denying these motions, we do not
    address the contentions further. See Mapes v. Bishop, 
    541 F.3d 582
    , 584 (5th Cir. 2008)
    (“Although pro se briefs are afforded liberal construction, even pro se litigants must brief
    arguments in order to preserve them.” (citation omitted)).
    2
    Case: 21-60211      Document: 00516389820            Page: 3    Date Filed: 07/11/2022
    No. 21-60211
    still serves a useful function by making it clear that the PLRA exhaustion
    requirement is not jurisdictional, and thus allowing a district court to dismiss
    plainly meritless claims without first addressing what may be a much more
    complex question, namely, whether the prisoner did in fact properly exhaust
    available administrative remedies.”). Thus, the district court was permitted
    to reach the merits.
    Second, Jones has failed to show a denial of due process in his late
    receipt of the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendations. When a
    petitioner does not receive a copy of a magistrate judge’s report, and thus
    fails to file objections, we ask whether the petitioner was prejudiced. See
    Ferguson v. La. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Bd. of Parole, 218 F. App’x 355,
    356 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing McGill v. Goff, 
    17 F.3d 729
    , 731 (5th Cir. 1994),
    overruled on other grounds, Kansa Reinsurance Corp. v. Cong. Mort. Co., 
    20 F.3d 1362
    , 1373–74 (5th Cir. 1994)). Here, upon discovery that Jones had not
    received the Report and Recommendations, he was mailed another copy, he
    received that copy and filed his objections, and the district court considered
    and rejected those objections. Therefore, Jones has not shown how he was
    prejudiced by the initial late delivery or initial order of the district court that
    found he did not raise objections.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
    3