Brown v. Shalala ( 1999 )


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  •                                               Filed: May 11, 1999
    Corrected order filed: May 19, 1999
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-2513
    (CA-96-1005-L)
    Angela L. Brown,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    Donna E. Shalala, etc.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    CORRECTED ORDER
    The court amends its opinion filed May 3, 1999, as follows:
    On page 3, 4, and 5 - all references to “EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
    OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.” are corrected to read
    “EEOC.”
    For the Court - By Direction
    /s/ Patricia S. Connor
    Clerk
    Filed:   May 11, 1999
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-2513
    (CA-96-1004-L)
    Angela L. Brown,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    Donna E. Shalala, etc.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    O R D E R
    The court amends its opinion filed May 3, 1999, as follows:
    On page 3, 4, and 5 - all references to “EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
    OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.” are corrected to read
    “EEOC.”
    For the Court - By Direction
    /s/ Patricia S. Connor
    Clerk
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    ANGELA J. BROWN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 98-2513
    DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY,
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Benson E. Legg, District Judge.
    (CA-96-1005-L)
    Argued: April 8, 1999
    Decided: May 3, 1999
    Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Alice Patricia Frohman, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
    Albert David Copperthite, Assistant United States Attorney, Balti-
    more, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lynne A. Battaglia,
    United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Angela Brown filed suit in the United States District Court claim-
    ing that her employer, the National Institutes of Health (the NIH), had
    breached a settlement agreement that resolved earlier discrimination
    claims by releasing confidential personnel records to the Department
    of Labor and to the Postal Inspector. Additionally, Brown claimed
    that the NIH's release of this information was discriminatory and
    retaliatory and thus violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-3 (West
    1994) & 2000e-16 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
    After determining that the settlement agreement required that the
    personnel information be kept confidential only from prospective
    employers, and that neither the Department of Labor nor the Postal
    Inspector were prospective employers, the district court granted sum-
    mary judgment to the NIH. The district court also concluded that
    Brown failed to establish a prima facie case of a Title VII violation.
    Brown appeals these rulings. Finding no error, we affirm.
    Summary judgment is appropriate when a party who will bear the
    burden of proof at trial fails to make a factual showing sufficient to
    establish an element essential to the case. See Celotex Corp. v.
    Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986). We review the district court's
    grant of summary judgment de novo and view the facts in the light
    most favorable to Brown. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986) (noting that the facts and all inferences reason-
    ably drawn therefrom are to be viewed in favor of the non-moving
    party).
    Brown, a black female, was employed at NIH as a GS-6, step 10,
    Secretary-Typist. When she began work at the NIH, she advised the
    personnel department that she had a workers' compensation claim
    pending from her prior employment at the Post Office based upon
    2
    tendinitis in her wrists, which affected her joints and fingers, and car-
    pal tunnel syndrome. As a result of those conditions, she requested
    that she be assigned primary duties other than typing. Nevertheless,
    after her first month of employment, the NIH increased Brown's typ-
    ing duties. Shortly thereafter, Brown's neurologist issued letters
    describing her carpal tunnel syndrome and stating that typing was
    contraindicated for her condition. Brown's supervisor continued to
    require that she type.
    Brown's supervisor also put her on special leave procedures under
    which she was required to sign in and out whenever she left the office
    for more than five minutes. Because allegedly insufficient medical
    documentation had been provided in support of an absence, Brown
    was put on leave without pay and charged with being AWOL. Addi-
    tionally, Brown was suspended for three weeks without pay for fail-
    ing to follow the special leave procedures and for insubordinate
    behavior. Following these disciplinary actions, Brown was injured in
    a car accident, and, although she submitted letters from her doctor
    stating that she could not return to work for an extended period of
    time, her supervisor found them to be insufficient. As a result, Brown
    was terminated for failing to follow the special leave procedures, pro-
    ducing insufficient documentation, and remaining AWOL for two
    months after the car accident.
    During the course of her employment at the NIH, Brown had filed
    several EEO complaints, alleging discriminatory treatment on the
    basis of race and disability. Additionally, Brown had filed an EEO
    complaint alleging that her supervisor had retaliated against her for
    filing the previous EEO complaints. All of the EEO complaints were
    settled pursuant to an agreement between the NIH and Brown dated
    March 31, 1992.
    The settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that Brown would
    submit an SF-52 form, Request for Personnel Action, that would indi-
    cate resignation, and that the suspensions and AWOL references
    would be expunged from her personnel folder and changed to leave
    without pay notations. Additionally, the NIH agreed:
    [T]o provide Ms. Brown with a written letter of reference.
    This letter of reference provided by the Agency is designed
    3
    to preclude the necessity of Ms. Brown's prospective
    employers contacting the [NIH] directly. No future refer-
    ences will be provided by the [NIH] for Ms. Brown. Infor-
    mation contained in any of Ms. Brown's files at the NIH
    will remain confidential.
    (J.A. at 21 (¶ 6).)
    Three months later, in July 1992, Brown filed another disability
    claim. In response to the claim, the Department of Labor requested
    Brown's leave records. The NIH answered the request and submitted
    Brown's leave records showing the original AWOL and suspension
    notations, as well as additional markings noting that the suspensions
    had been changed to leave without pay pursuant to a settlement agree-
    ment. The Department of Labor eventually denied Brown's claim for
    benefits because she had been dismissed for cause. Later, Brown dis-
    covered that similar information had been revealed by the NIH to a
    Postal Inspector in the course of his work gathering information
    regarding Brown's initial workers' compensation claim filed while
    she was working for the Post Office.
    As a result of the release of the information contained in her per-
    sonnel file, Brown filed a complaint at the EEOC alleging
    that the NIH had breached the settlement agreement. The EEOC
    found that no breach of the settlement agreement had
    occurred because the confidentiality provisions in the agreement
    applied only to prospective employers.
    Thereafter, Brown filed a complaint in district court claiming that
    the NIH breached the settlement agreement by failing to keep
    Brown's records confidential as required in paragraph six of the
    agreement. In addition, Brown alleged that the breach of the agree-
    ment constituted a pattern of continuing discrimination on the basis
    of race and retaliation in violation of Title VII. In response to the
    complaint, the NIH filed a "Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
    Motion for Summary Judgment." (J.A. at 22.) The district court con-
    strued all allegations contained in the complaint as true and deter-
    mined that Brown did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on her
    4
    claim of breach of the settlement agreement. Furthermore, the district
    court ruled that Brown could not make out a prima facie case under
    Title VII, because the NIH's actions did not constitute adverse
    employment action.
    In its review of the NIH's motion for summary judgment, the dis-
    trict court viewed paragraph six of the settlement agreement as a
    whole and concluded that the paragraph should not be interpreted as
    Brown urged, providing a blanket confidentiality requirement applica-
    ble to all parties seeking Brown's leave information. Rather, the dis-
    trict court determined, as the EEOC had, that
    the paragraph was intended to apply only to prospective employers.
    Because the Department of Labor and Postal Inspector were seeking
    information regarding Brown's leave time in order to assess workers'
    compensation claims and not for any reason related to prospective
    employment, the district court ruled that no breach of paragraph six
    of the settlement agreement had occurred.
    Brown filed a timely notice of appeal. Before us, Brown asserts
    that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the NIH
    because the plain language of paragraph six of the agreement requires
    that Brown's personnel records remain confidential. Further, Brown
    argues that the NIH violated paragraph two of the agreement, in
    which it agreed to expunge the negative attendance references from
    Brown's personnel records. Additionally, Brown claims that the dis-
    trict court erred in reaching the conclusion that Brown had suffered
    no adverse employment action.
    We have reviewed the record, briefs, and pertinent case law in this
    matter, and we have had the benefit of oral argument. Our careful
    review persuades us that the rulings of the district court were correct.
    Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning set forth in the district
    court's opinion. See Brown v. Shalala, C. No. L-96-1005 (D. Md.
    Aug. 6, 1998).
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98-2513

Filed Date: 5/19/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021