Pruitt v. Asphalt Zipper ( 2022 )

Case: 21-50717 Document: 00516400571 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/20/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 20, 2022
No. 21-50717 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Estate of Chuck Pruitt,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Asphalt Zipper, Incorporated,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:18-CV-324
Before Clement, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Chuck Pruitt was severely injured when a piece of construction
equipment designed and manufactured by Asphalt Zipper fell on his leg. So,
he sued Asphalt Zipper. Prior to trial, Asphalt Zipper designated the Falls
County Road and Bridge Department as a responsible third party pursuant to
Texas’ proportionate responsibility statute. Mr. Pruitt did not timely object
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 21-50717
to Asphalt Zipper’s designation of the Falls County Department as an RTP,
but after the first day of trial, he objected to its submission to the jury. After
hearing arguments from both parties at the charge conference, the district
court granted Mr. Pruitt’s motion and excluded the Falls County Road and
Bridge Department from the jury instructions.
The jury returned a verdict for Mr. Pruitt. The district court entered
judgment on the verdict and denied Asphalt Zipper’s post-trial motions for
judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Asphalt Zipper timely
appealed. We AFFIRM.
I.
In this personal injury suit, a component water supply system
manufactured by Asphalt Zipper fell on Chuck Pruitt’s leg, causing him
significant injuries. At the time of his injury, Mr. Pruitt was employed by,
and on the job for, the Falls County Road and Bridge Department (Falls
County Department)—a division of Falls County, Texas.
Shortly after the accident, Mr. Pruitt sued Asphalt Zipper in federal
district court, alleging design defect, marketing defect, and negligence
claims. More than sixty days prior to trial, Asphalt Zipper filed a motion for
leave to designate the Falls County Department as a responsible third party
(RTP). Mr. Pruitt did not oppose the motion or object to it within fifteen
days based on an agreement with Asphalt Zipper that, in the event he decided
to later challenge the RTP designation by way of a motion for summary
judgment, Asphalt Zipper would not raise the scheduling order deadline as a
procedural defense.
Prior to trial, Mr. Pruitt filed a motion for leave to strike Asphalt
Zipper’s designation of the Falls County Department as an RTP. Mr. Pruitt
moved to strike on the ground that Asphalt Zipper “wholly failed to provide
sufficient evidence [that] Falls County [Department] in any way caused or
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contributed to the cause of the subject incident.” The court did not rule on
the motion but instead carried the issue over to trial and allowed Asphalt
Zipper to present evidence in support of the designation.
The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial. Following the first day
of trial, Mr. Pruitt filed an objection to the submission of the Falls County
Department as an RTP. In it, Mr. Pruitt made four arguments against
Asphalt Zipper’s RTP designation. First, he argued that the Falls County
Department was not a proper RTP because it is not a designable entity under
the applicable statute. Second, he argued that Asphalt Zipper designated the
Falls County Department too late.
His third and fourth arguments are related. In general, he maintained
that even to the extent that the Falls County Department is a designable
entity, it could not be submitted as an RTP because Asphalt Zipper did not
show that it breached any legal duty owed to Mr. Pruitt. Thus, Mr. Pruitt
argued that there is no legal theory under which the Falls County Department
could be held responsible for any of Mr. Pruitt’s injuries.
At the charge conference, the district court addressed Mr. Pruitt’s
objections and heard argument from both sides. The district court was
concerned principally with determining whether Asphalt Zipper had made a
proper RTP designation and whether there was evidence supporting its
submission to the jury.
Asphalt Zipper at first seemed to agree with Mr. Pruitt that the Falls
County Department was the incorrect entity to designate. It then
backtracked, however, claiming that either the Falls County Department or
Falls County would be a proper RTP designation. Asphalt Zipper concluded
by re-urging its position that the Falls County Department is a designable
entity, explaining that it sent subpoenas to the Falls County Department,
which received them, responded with signatures, and never objected.
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After permitting Mr. Pruitt to re-urge the arguments in support of his
objections, the district court determined that it would not submit the Falls
County Department as an RTP in the jury charge. It did not explicitly state
the basis for its decision. But it appears that the district court was left with
the impression that Asphalt Zipper wasn’t even sure who the correct entity
was.
The claims that the district court submitted in the jury charge were
Mr. Pruitt’s claims for design defect, marketing defect, and negligence in
warning/instructing. The jury returned a $4,054,500 verdict for Mr. Pruitt,
finding that there were defects in both the equipment’s design and
warnings/instructions when it left Asphalt Zipper’s possession. The district
court entered final judgment on the verdict and denied Asphalt Zipper’s
motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Asphalt Zipper
timely appealed the district court’s order entering judgment on the verdict,
as well as the district court’s order denying its motions for judgment as a
matter of law and for a new trial.
II.
A.
“We ‘review challenges to jury instructions for abuse of discretion
and afford the trial court great latitude in the framing and structure of jury
instructions.’” Matter of 3 Star Props., L.L.C., 6 F.4th 595, 609 (5th Cir.
2021) (quoting Young v. Bd. of Supervisors, 927 F.3d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 2019)).
“[T]he party challenging the instruction must demonstrate that the charge
as a whole creates substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has
been properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. at 610.
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B.
“[T]his court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district
court.” Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., 650 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 2011).
“[W]hen a case is tried by a jury, a Rule 50[] motion is a challenge to the legal
sufficiency of the evidence.” Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir.
2008) (citing Int’l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir. 2005)).
“In resolving such challenges, we draw all reasonable inferences and resolve
all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Id.“Our review of jury verdicts ‘is especially deferential.’” Orozco v.
Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Baisden v. I’m Ready
Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2012)). “[J]udgment as a matter
of law should not be granted unless the facts and inferences point ‘so strongly
and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that reasonable jurors could not
reach a contrary conclusion.’” Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247
F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Omnitech Int’l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11
F.3d 1316, 1322 (5th Cir. 1994)). “[T]he court may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are jury functions.”
Brennan’s Inc. v. Dickie Brennan & Co. Inc., 376 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir. 2004).
C.
“A new trial may be granted if the trial court finds that ‘the verdict is
against the weight of evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial
was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed[.]’” Seidman v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1140 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Smith v. Transworld Drilling
Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985)). The court should not grant a motion
for a new trial “unless the verdict is against the great weight, not merely the
preponderance, of the evidence.” Id. (emphasis added).
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We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.
Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 2003). “Where a jury verdict is
at issue, ‘there is no . . . abuse of discretion unless there is a complete absence
of evidence to support the verdict.’” Benson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 889 F.3d
233, 234 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Sam’s Style Shop v. Cosmos
Broad. Corp., 694 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1982)).
III.
The primary question on appeal is whether the district court
reversibly erred by not submitting the Falls County Department as an RTP
in its jury instructions. The parties frame that question as comprising four
main sub-issues. First, whether the Falls County Department is a designable
entity. Second, whether Asphalt Zipper timely designated the Falls County
Department as an RTP. Third, whether Mr. Pruitt waived any objections to
the Falls County Department’s RTP designation by failing to timely object.
And fourth, whether Asphalt Zipper presented sufficient evidence to support
the Falls County Department’s submission in the jury charge. We need not
resolve the first three issues because Asphalt Zipper did not present sufficient
evidence to support the submission of the Falls County Department as an
RTP. Thus, the district court did not reversibly err by excluding it.
The secondary question on appeal is whether the district court
reversibly erred by denying Asphalt Zipper’s post-trial motions for judgment
as a matter of law and for a new trial. We conclude that it did not.
A.
Texas’ proportionate responsibility statute applies to most tort cases
brought under Texas law and obligates the trier of fact to assign a percentage
of responsibility to each claimant, defendant, settling person, and RTP with
respect to each cause of action alleged. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. §§ 33.002(a), 33.003(a)(1)–(4). In general, and as relevant
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here, the trier of fact must submit a properly designated RTP to the jury
unless there is insufficient evidence supporting the designated party’s
responsibility in causing or contributing to cause the injuries alleged. See id.§§ 33.003(b), 33.004(f)–(l); In re Transit Mix Concrete & Materials Co., No.
12-13-00364-CV, 2014 WL 1922724, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 14, 2014,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A trial court may not submit a question to the jury
regarding the conduct of ‘any person’ without sufficient evidence to support
the submission.” (citation omitted)).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the
Falls County Department from the jury charge because there was insufficient
evidence concerning the Falls County Department’s alleged responsibility in
causing or contributing to cause Mr. Pruitt’s injuries.
Section 33.003(a) specifies how third-party responsibility arises: “by
negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous
product, by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal
standard, or by any combination of these.” See also In re Transit, 2014 WL
1922724, at *3–4; De Leon v. Flavor & Fragrance Specialties, Inc., No. 6:12-
CV-327, 2014 WL 12601029, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2014). It was
therefore incumbent upon Asphalt Zipper to present sufficient evidence
establishing that the Falls County Department committed a “negligent act or
omission,” was responsible for a “defective or unreasonably dangerous
product,” or engaged in conduct that “violate[d] an applicable legal
standard.” This, Asphalt Zipper did not do.
Asphalt Zipper points to five general categories of evidence that it
claims supported the submission of the Falls County Department:
(1) Evidence the [accused equipment] was in Falls County
Department’s possession and control, and that the
Department took control of [equipment] that was not
defectively manufactured;
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(2) Evidence that the [accused equipment] was in an
obviously damaged condition with non-vertical legs at the
time of the accident while under Falls County
Department’s possession and control and stored on its
premises;
(3) Evidence that the Falls County Department should have
repaired the damaged [equipment], and repairing it would
have avoided the accident that injured Pruitt;
(4) Evidence of force being applied to [the accused
equipment’s] leg mounting brackets which elongated
holes in brackets and caused legs to not be vertical and
system to be unstable; and
(5) Evidence that this application of force on the [accused
equipment] constituted misuse by Falls County
Department.
For each of these categories, Asphalt Zipper cites witness testimony
generally purporting to show that the accused equipment left Asphalt
Zipper’s possession in undamaged condition; was at all times within the Falls
County Department’s possession and control; could have been improperly
stored; and showed obvious signs of damage, which could have been caused
by an external force improperly applied or by someone dragging it with the
jack legs attached. 1
But Mr. Pruitt cites other—and arguably more compelling—evidence
showing that the equipment had not been altered in any way since its
delivery; was at all times operated in a manner consistent with its intended
use; was never dragged on the ground; and exhibited signs of damage
consistent only with a design defect or use according to Asphalt Zipper’s
instructions. Moreover, he cites witness testimony establishing that the Falls
1
For more information on the equipment’s design, see subsection III(B), infra.
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County Department was never warned of the potential harm that could result
from damage to the equipment’s jack legs.
Asphalt Zipper’s evidence, at best, breaks even with Mr. Pruitt’s
evidence, which is insufficient to establish reversible error. In re Transit,
2014 WL 1922724, at *3 (“A party has produced sufficient evidence to
support submission of a question to the jury when it provides more than a
scintilla of evidence. . . . [E]vidence of circumstances equally consistent with
two facts does not rise above a scintilla of proof of either fact, and is thus no
evidence of either.” (internal citations omitted)). And at worst, it amounts
to mere speculation or conjecture. In any event, we are reviewing for abuse
of discretion; the evidence does not create the impression that the district
court’s exclusion of the Falls County Department from the jury charge
affected the outcome of the case or improperly guided the jury’s
deliberations. See Jowers v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 617 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir.
2010).
B.
Asphalt Zipper also challenges the district court’s denial of its post-
trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. It argues
that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s liability and
damages findings. We disagree.
To prevail on a design defect claim, a plaintiff must establish the
following elements: “(1) the product was defectively designed so as to render
it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the
defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks
recovery.” Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009). The
record is replete with evidence supporting each element.
For example, Mr. Pruitt’s expert witness testified that there was no
evidence that Asphalt Zipper adequately tested the equipment before selling
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it, nor was there evidence that it ever conducted a stress analysis, hazard
analysis, or center of gravity analysis. He also testified about defects in the
equipment’s storage system. The equipment is designed to be stored in an
upright position on three jack legs, which connect to a mount via circular
pins. Mr. Pruitt’s expert explained that, due to clearance between the
circular pins and the hole they are designed to fit through, the pins have a
tendency to abrade the hole and allow the jack legs to rotate, making the
whole system unstable. With a mere four inches of forward lean, the system
falls over.
Mr. Pruitt also presented witnesses to testify as to the availability of a
safer alternative design for the equipment. One of those witnesses testified
that Asphalt Zipper could have adjusted the equipment’s center of gravity,
as well as used square pins instead of circular pins. And, he testified, had
Asphalt Zipper used square pins, there would have been virtually no way for
the system to sway. Doing so would have been economically feasible, yet
Asphalt Zipper did not consider any alternative designs for the pins.
Finally, Mr. Pruitt presented testimony from an accident
reconstruction expert establishing that the accident occurred due to “play”
in the equipment system’s front jacks.
Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility
determinations in Mr. Pruitt’s favor, sufficient evidence exists to support the
jury’s design defect finding. At best, Asphalt Zipper’s evidence presents an
alternative explanation for what caused Mr. Pruitt’s injuries that the jury was
free to accept or reject. But it certainly does not preponderate so heavily in
Asphalt Zipper’s favor that no reasonable jury could find for Mr. Pruitt.
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Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Asphalt Zipper’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Pruitt’s design defect claim. 2
For substantially the same reasons as outlined above, there was not “a
complete absence of evidence to support the verdict”; thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Asphalt Zipper’s motion for a new
trial. Benson, 889 F.3d at 234 (quoting Sam’s Style Shop, 694 F.2d at 1006).
IV.
In sum, the district court did not err by excluding the Falls County
Department from the jury charge. Nor did it err by denying Asphalt Zipper’s
post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
2
Because the jury’s design defect finding supports its damages verdict, we do not
reach the marketing defect claim.
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