United States v. Jacobs , 162 F. App'x 148 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-6-2006
    USA v. Jacobs
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-2711
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Jacobs" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1778.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1778
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 05-2711
    ________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    ORLANDO JACOBS,
    Appellant.
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Crim. No. 93-cr-00141-1)
    District Judge: Honorable Thomas M. Hardiman
    __________________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    December 13, 2005
    BEFORE: MCKEE, FUENTES AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
    (Filed : January 6, 2006 )
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Orlando Jacobs was convicted following a jury trial in United States
    District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania of possession of a weapon by a
    convicted felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1). The indictment alleged that
    Jacobs possessed a .357 magnum revolver, after having been previously convicted in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, for the crime of burglary.
    Applying the "Armed Career Criminal" provision of the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4,
    the sentencing court concluded that Jacobs' guidelines' sentencing range was 262 to 327
    months, and the court sentenced him to imprisonment for 22 years.
    We affirmed in United States v. Jacobs, 
    44 F.3d 1219
     (3d Cir. 1995), and Jacobs’
    petition for writ of certiorari was denied. A motion to vacate sentence under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     was denied by the sentencing court, and, in 1999, we denied Jacobs’ request for a
    certificate of appealability with respect to that decision. We then denied an application
    made by Jacobs in 2001 for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion.1
    In May 2004, Jacobs filed a motion in the district court for clarification and
    correction of sentence pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). He argued that Amendment
    599 to the Guidelines applied to him and would lower his applicable sentencing range.
    He also contended that a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) for
    recklessly endangering the arresting officer was improperly assessed under United States
    v. Fenton, 
    309 F.3d 825
     (3d Cir. 2002), a case we decided after the conclusion of Jacobs’
    section 2255 proceedings. In a somewhat related claim, he contended that the offense
    conduct of recklessly endangering the arresting officer was impermissibly double counted
    1
    In that application, Jacobs had contended that his sentence was enhanced pursuant to
    the Armed Career Criminal Act even though the indictment did not charge him with, nor
    did the jury find him guilty of, violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1), which imposes a fifteen
    year minimum sentence for career criminals who violate section 922(g).
    2
    under both § 4B1.4(b)(3) and § 2K2.1(b)(5).
    The District Court addressed Jacobs’ claim concerning the applicability of
    Amendment 599 as one properly raised pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2), but the court
    would not consider the remaining claims, because they did not involve an amendment to
    the Guidelines. Relief was denied as to Amendment 599 because it did not apply to
    Jacobs. Jacobs filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an order
    entered on May 12, 2005. Jacobs appeals.
    We will affirm. Section 3582(c)(2) provides that, upon motion of a defendant, the
    court may reduce a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
    subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).
    Amendment 599 went into effect on November 1, 2000 and expanded the commentary to
    U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 on use of a firearm during or in relation to certain crimes. It was made
    retroactive pursuant to § 1B1.10. Amendment 599 was intended to clarify the
    circumstances in which a defendant sentenced for a violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) in
    conjunction with convictions for other offenses may receive weapon enhancements
    contained in the Guidelines for those other offenses. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual app. C, vol. II, at 69-70 (2003).
    Jacobs was convicted of violating § 922(g)(1). He was not charged with violating
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c), and his sentence was not based on guidelines germane to that statute.
    Amendment 599 does not apply to or modify the guidelines under which he was
    3
    sentenced. The District Court did not err in rejecting this claim.
    We further agree with the District Court that the remaining claims cannot be
    brought under section 3582(c)(2), because they are not founded on a change in the
    Guidelines. In Fenton, 
    309 F.3d 826
    , we held that, for purposes of applying the four-level
    enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5), the phrase “another felony offense” means a felony or
    act other than the one used by the sentencing court to calculate the base offense level. Id.
    at 827. More recently, in United States v. Lloyd, 
    361 F.3d 197
     (3d Cir. 2004), we
    explained that: “We read Fenton ... as standing for the proposition that, where a defendant
    is convicted for possession of firearms resulting from a theft of those same firearms, that
    theft is effectively a "firearms possession ... offense." 
    Id. at 202
    .
    Fenton thus concerned the interpretation of an existing Guideline. It did not
    involve a sentencing range that subsequently had been lowered “by the Sentencing
    Commission.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). Jacobs’ claim under Fenton, and his related
    double counting claim involving § 4B1.4(b)(3) and § 2K2.1(b)(5), are the kinds of
    contentions appropriately raised on direct appeal, or, if waived, in a section 2255 motion
    to vacate sentence upon a showing of cause and prejudice. United States v. Frady, 
    456 U.S. 152
     (1982).
    Second collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence, like this one of Jacobs’
    involving our decision in Fenton, are barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
    Penalty Act, see 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 2255
     and 2244, unless they are certified by a court of
    4
    appeals to contain a prima facie showing of newly discovered evidence that would be
    sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of
    the offense or a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
    review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. These claims have not
    been appropriately certified nor would certification be warranted.
    The Fenton and related double counting claims lack merit in any event. Jacobs
    was sentenced as an armed career criminal under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. Jacobs, 
    44 F.3d at 1227
    . The enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) played no role in the actual determination
    of his sentence. In addition, Fenton does not affect the applicability of the armed career
    offender guideline in Jacobs’ case. The government’s evidence established that, as the
    arresting officer approached with his gun drawn, Jacobs pulled his weapon from his
    waistband and pointed it at him. Jacobs, 
    44 F.3d at 1221
    . His act of doing so establishes
    that he possessed the gun in connection with another felony offense; thus, an
    enhancement was warranted under either § 2K2.1(b)(5) or § 4B1.4(b)(3). The crime of
    recklessly endangering another in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2705 involves a
    sufficient distinction in conduct from the crime of possession so as to constitute "another
    felony offense" for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(5). See generally Lloyd, 
    361 F.3d at 204
    (holding that state law crime of criminal mischief is distinct from crime of possession of
    unregistered explosives under Blockburger).2
    2
    Like the state law crime at issue in Lloyd, this second degree misdemeanor with
    which Jacobs was charged is punishable by up to two years in prison, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
    5
    Finally, Jacobs has argued in his informal brief that his sentence enhancement for
    pointing a gun at the arresting officer violates the Sixth Amendment because it was based
    on facts determined by a judge instead of a jury, but we recently held that Booker v.
    United States, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005), does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
    review. Lloyd v. United States, 
    407 F.3d 608
    , 614-16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 288
     (U.S. October 3, 2005).
    We will affirm the order of the District Court denying the motion for clarification
    and correction of sentence.
    Ann. § 1104(2), and it thus is sufficient to constitute a felony under the Guidelines.
    Lloyd, 
    361 F.3d at
    204 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.7).
    6