Sidney Nelson, Jr. v. Office of Personnel Management ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    SIDNEY NELSON, JR.,                             DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                         SF-0845-13-0347-I-1
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: August 15, 2014
    MANAGEMENT,
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL *
    Sidney Nelson, Jr., Seattle, Washington, pro se.
    Kristine Prentice, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    affirmed the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) reconsideration decision
    which found that he had received an overpayment of annuity benefits under the
    Federal Employees’ Retirement System in the amount of $36,505.58. Generally,
    *
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    we grant petitions such as this one only when:        the initial decision contains
    erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
    interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
    the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or
    the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an
    abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or
    new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the
    petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5
    of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).
    After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following
    points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any
    basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we
    DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the
    Board’s final decision. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    (b).
    ¶2        The appellant bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to a waiver
    by substantial evidence.    
    5 C.F.R. § 845.307
    (b); Knox v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 
    107 M.S.P.R. 353
    , ¶ 5 (2007). A waiver may be granted when the
    annuitant is without fault and recovery would be against equity and good
    conscience.   
    5 U.S.C. § 8470
    (b); 
    5 C.F.R. § 854.301
    .         OPM policy further
    provides that individuals who know or suspect that they are receiving
    overpayments are expected to set aside the amount overpaid pending recoupment,
    and that in the absence of exceptional circumstances—which do not include
    financial hardship—recovery in these cases is not against equity and good
    conscience.   IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 6 (Policy Guidelines on the Disposition of
    Overpayments under the Civil Service Retirement System and Federal Employees
    Retirement System, § I.B.6.)
    ¶3        Here, the appellant’s petition for review does not challenge OPM’s
    calculation of the overpayment or his receipt of the monies. Petition for Review
    File, Tab 1. Rather, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred by
    3
    finding him not to be without fault in the overpayment. The appellant reasserts
    his argument that it was not his fault if he received an overpayment and that he is
    entitled to a waiver of the overpayment because it is OPM’s responsibility to mail
    him a disability annuity check with the correct amount. Id.
    ¶4        We have considered the appellant’s arguments on review concerning the
    administrative judge’s weighing of the evidence, however, we discern no reason
    to reweigh the evidence or substitute our assessment of the record evidence for
    that of the administrative judge. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    74 M.S.P.R. 98
    , 105-106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s
    findings when the administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew
    appropriate    inferences,   and   made   reasoned     conclusions);   Broughton   v.
    Department of Health & Human Services, 
    33 M.S.P.R. 357
    , 359 (1987) (same).
    ¶5        In this case, the administrative judge thoroughly addressed this issue and
    found that the appellant is not entitled to a waiver or adjustment of the
    overpayment.     Initial Decision (ID) at 5-11.      Specifically, the administrative
    judge found that the appellant did not dispute the existence or amount of the
    overpayment. ID at 5.        The administrative judge found further that, in 2001,
    while the appellant was receiving disability retirement benefits from his
    retirement with the Postal Service, the appellant was also working for the Internal
    Revenue Service and receiving a salary that nearly matched what he had received
    from the Postal Service prior to his retirement, and that he did not advise OPM of
    his IRS salary. ID at 7. The administrative judge also found that OPM’s April 4,
    2005 letter provided the appellant with written notice of the 80% limitation on
    annual earnings for a disability retiree and it notified him of his base salary, and
    thus, the appellant had specific notice of his 80% limitation on earnings by April
    4, 2005. Nonetheless, the appellant earned over $40,000.00 annually in 2005,
    2006, and 2007. Thus, the administrative judge found that the appellant is not
    entitled to a waiver of the overpayment because he was not without fault in
    creating it. ID at 8.   With regard to the repayment schedule, the administrative
    4
    judge found that the appellant failed to submit substantial evidence sufficient to
    establish what his monthly income is or whether his spouse has an income. ID
    at 10. The administrative judge found further that the appellant also failed to
    submit a current Financial Resources Questionnaire (FRQ) (the only FRQ in the
    file is dated 2006), and that, while most of the monthly expenses the appellant
    claims in an unsworn narrative are reasonable, he also claims that he has
    $800,000.00 in student loans, but he submitted no verification for such an
    extraordinary debt. ID at 10. Accordingly, the administrative judge found that
    the appellant failed to establish by substantial evidence that he is entitled to any
    adjustment of the recovery schedule. ID at 11. While the appellant does not
    agree with the administrative judge’s findings and determinations, he has
    provided no basis upon which to disturb them.               The appellant’s mere
    disagreement    with   the   administrative   judge’s   findings   and   credibility
    determinations does not warrant full review of the record by the Board.         See
    Gager v. Department of Commerce, 
    99 M.S.P.R. 216
    , ¶5 (2005); Weaver v.
    Department of the Navy, 
    2 M.S.P.R. 129
    , 133-34 (1980), review denied, 
    669 F.2d 613
     (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Accordingly, the appellant has provided no
    basis upon which to disturb the initial decision.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to
    the court at the following address:
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
    days after the date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
    5
    27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
    held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
    and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
    Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
    States   Code,    at   our   website,   http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
    Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.
    Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and
    Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,
    6, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court
    appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of
    attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for
    Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems
    Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor
    warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                            ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.