Woodard v. Jones , 247 F. App'x 494 ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 28, 2007
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 07-30161
Summary Calendar
KAREN ROBISON WOODARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
H. LYNN JONES II, Successor to James
Andrus as Clerk of the Court for the 14th
Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu,
Defendant-Appellee,
DELLA GASTZKE; MICHAEL WAGNER; PAUL FOUNTAINE; CAROLINE
SPENCER; EARL PANIA; THOMAS ROQUE; LATIYA SMITH; CONRAN FRICKE;
MARY DONNA ANTEE; JENNIFER GUILLORY; BILLY CHARLES HERRMANN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
LOUISIANA CLERK OF COURT ASSOCIATION; ROBERT T. BAROUSSE,
In His Official Capacity as Clerk 15th Judicial
District Court Acadia Parish; GERALD W. HARRINGTON, In
His Official Capacity as Clerk 33rd Judicial District Court
Allen Parish; KERMIT A. BOURQUE, In His Official
Capacity as Clerk 23rd Judicial District Court Ascension
Parish, also known as Hart Bourque; DARLENE LANDRY, In Her
Official Capacity as Clerk 23rd Judicial District
Assumption Parish; ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(2:03-CV-2098; 2:06-CV-257)
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
For this interlocutory appeal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b), appellants challenge a partial summary judgment
against their putative 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class-action claims.
This consolidated action claims putative class members were
overcharged for civil filing fees by clerks of courts in Louisiana
parishes where they filed civil actions. Violations of Louisiana
statutes setting filing fees and deprivation of constitutional
rights are claimed.
Partial summary judgment was awarded on two bases: seven of
the state actions underlying the claims were prescribed by state
law; and punitive damages were not available against the clerks of
court because they were sued in their official capacity.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo. E.g., Todd v. AIG Life
Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1451 (5th Cir. 1995). Such judgment is
proper if the summary-judgment evidence “show[s] that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c);
see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50
(1986). In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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inferences in favor of the non-movant. Id. at 255. Conclusory
allegations and naked assertions, however, are not sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780
F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (5th Cir. 1986).
Essentially for the reasons stated by the district court, the
partial summary judgment was proper. Concerning prescription, the
constitutional torts claimed are most similar to a general tort
under Louisiana law, which has a one-year prescriptive period. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478, 483 (1980) (because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lacks its own
prescriptive period, federal courts apply that of the most analogous
state-law cause of action); LA. CIV. C. ART. 3492 (providing one-year
prescription for general torts).
Summary judgment for punitive damages against the clerks of
court was proper because such damages would necessarily be paid from
clerk of court funds. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247, 267-71 (1981).
AFFIRMED
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