Djohan v. Ieyoub , 247 F. App'x 502 ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
September 6, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
_______________________
No. 07-30135
Summary Calendar
_______________________
TAMRIN DJOHAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RICHARD IEYOUB, In His Official Capacity as Attorney General of
the State of Louisiana; SID GATREAUX, In His Official Capacity as
Chief of Police, City of Baker; CASEY HOWARD, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Investigator for Louisiana Department of
Law Enforcement; UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS, Sued Individually and
in Their Official Capacities; THE CITY OF BAKER; CAPTAIN JESSIE
BOURGOYNE; JAMES PIKER; DETECTIVE MIKE SHROPSHIRE; JAMES
BROUSSARD; LIEUTENANT MIKE KNAPS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
No. 3:03-CV-00686
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Tamrin Djohan appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Defendants on a plethora of claims
arising from a search of the house where he rented a room. Finding
no error, we AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I. BACKGROUND
After receiving a tip regarding child pornography at the
home of John Mickelson, the Louisiana Attorney General’s High Tech
Crime Unit obtained a “no knock” warrant to search Mickelson’s home
and “all other structures, vehicles, and places on the premises.”
While executing the warrant, the crime unit, assisted by Baker
police officers, searched a room adjoining the garage, which Djohan
was renting.
Following the search, Djohan asserted claims against the
officers and the attorney general for false arrest, unreasonable
search, unreasonable seizure of property, conspiracy in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and various state law claims. The district court granted summary
judgment to Defendants on all claims, and Djohan now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standards as the district court.
MacLachlan v. ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir. 2003).
A court should grant summary judgment when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
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to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Facts are
material only if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law....Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on
Djohan’s false arrest claim. Although his movement was restricted
to some degree during the search, this was required in order to
provide for the protection of the officers and to prevent the
contamination of evidence. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
702, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2594 (1981). The record evidence shows that
Djohan was not physically restrained or abused at any point, and
any restraint was both minimal and justified.
Similarly, the search of the garage room was proper. The
plain language of the warrant allowed the officers to search the
entire premises, and that room shared a roof with the main house.
Even assuming the room is separate from the main house, it easily
would fall under the definition of curtilage. See United States v.
Thomas, 120 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 1997).
Djohan’s remaining claims are without merit. He presents
no facts to establish his § 1985 conspiracy claim, see Hilliard v.
Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994), and identifies no
official policy that would substantiate his § 1983 claim, see
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)
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(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 2038 (1978)).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
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