Johnson v. Crown Enterprises Inc. , 178 F. App'x 393 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                        May 2, 2006
    _______________________
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    No. 05-30373                              Clerk
    Summary Calendar
    _______________________
    JOHNNY L JOHNSON,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    CROWN ENTERPRISES INC, ET AL,
    Defendants,
    KEVIN MEDINE, MICHAEL CAMPESI and LOUIS JORDAN,
    Appellees.
    ________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    No. 3:01-CV-481
    _________________________________________________________________
    Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellant    Johnny   L.   Johnson   challenges    the    district
    court’s denial of his motion to amend his complaint to include the
    individual Appellees.       Because this court lacks jurisdiction to
    reach the merits of Johnson’s appeal, we DISMISS.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The facts are undisputed.         On June 15, 2001, Johnson
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    filed a lawsuit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
    1964.   Johnson alleged that he was terminated because of his race.
    On July 23, 2002, the district court issued an order permitting
    Johnson to amend his complaint for the purposes of including a
    claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.     On October 10, 2003, the district
    court dismissed all claims, including the § 1981 claim, as not
    timely filed.   Johnson timely appealed to this court.   On February
    15, 2005, this court reversed the district court to allow Johnson
    to state a cause of action under § 1981, relating back to the
    original Title VII claim.    Post-reversal, Johnson sought to amend
    his complaint to include the individual Appellees, who at no point
    were named as parties to the original suit.     The district court
    denied Johnson’s motion to amend his complaint.          Johnson now
    appeals, seeking relief from the district court’s denial of his
    motion to amend his complaint to include these Appellees.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Before reaching the merits, this court must consider
    whether we have appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s
    order denying Johnson’s motion to amend his complaint.    Because no
    certificate of appealability was issued by the district court under
    FED. RULE CIV. PROC. 54(b), we turn our attention to jurisdiction
    granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.    Section 1291 states that, “[t]he
    court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
    decisions of the district courts of the United States.”          The
    2
    Supreme Court has held that “a decision is ordinarily considered
    final and appealable under § 1291 only if it ends the litigation on
    the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
    judgment.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. 
    517 U.S. 706
    , 712, 
    116 S. Ct. 1712
    , 1718 (1996).      It is well settled that orders granting
    or denying motions to add parties are not final within the meaning
    of § 1291.    See McClune v. Shamah, 
    593 F.2d 482
    (3d Cir. 1979); see
    also    Fowler   v.   Merry,   
    468 F.2d 242
    ,    243   (10th   Cir.    1972)
    (“Although an order refusing or permitting the filing of an amended
    complaint joining an additional party is a discretionary action by
    the trial court and subject to appellate review as part of an
    ultimate judgment, the order itself is not appealable as such in
    isolation.”).
    Under the collateral order doctrine, an exception to the
    final    order   requirement   is    limited   to    decisions     that    are
    “conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the
    merits, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final
    judgment in the underlying action.”            Swint v. Chambers County
    Comm’n, 
    514 U.S. 35
    , 42, 
    115 S. Ct. 1203
    , 1208 (1995).            We are not
    persuaded that this case presents a situation indicating allowable
    review under the collateral order doctrine.
    In the instant case, nothing in the district court’s
    ruling prevents Johnson from pursuing his § 1981 claim against
    Dixie Harvesting Company, one of the original Defendants. However,
    this court lacks jurisdiction over Johnson’s appeal to amend his
    3
    complaint and therefore, his appeal is dismissed.
    DISMISSED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-30373

Citation Numbers: 178 F. App'x 393

Judges: Barksdale, Benavides, Jones, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 5/2/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023